Bhaso Ndzendze, Associate Professor (International Relations), University of Johannesburg

Some three decades since the end of the Cold War, the world order is undergoing a structural transformation. At the heart of it is the challenge posed to the hegemony of the US. This is primarily being led by Russia and China which are discontented with Washington’s excesses across the global stage. The most recent example of this rebellion was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Fiona Hill, a British-American foreign affairs specialist, observed that the war was a “proxy for a rebellion by Russia and the ‘Rest’ against the United States”.

The African continent is an obvious contender for major power courting as this realignment takes place. This is for at least four reasons.

Firstly, it is the largest regional bloc in the United Nations, representing some 28% of all the votes in the General Assembly. Secondly, it possesses some crucial raw minerals that are found only in the continent. Thirdly, it possesses some important sea trade routes, particularly in east Africa. Finally, the continent is home to the fastest-growing youth demographic and will account for about 42% of the world’s youth by 2030.

I am a scholar of geopolitics and have conducted research on the continent’s trade ties to the major powers. My findings have led me to the conclusion that Africa can gain more by being neutral than by picking sides.

The drivers

Africa’s size in the UN General Assembly can’t be overstated. The continent sometimes struggles to respond in a coordinated way. Nevertheless, it has, in the past, been able to vote in sync in a way that has proved influential. The most notable example of this was the 1971 vote for the resolution that brought mainland China into the UN and replaced Taiwan. In total, there were 76 votes in favour, of which 27 came from African member states.

In today’s UN, having this large grouping on one’s side helps countries the most when it comes to passing – or defeating – resolutions. With the UN Security Council in gridlock because the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) have veto power, there has been a shift towards the UN General Assembly, which works on one-member-one-vote. General Assembly votes are mainly symbolic. But they are a useful indicator of where the international community stands and are a powerful moral weapon for any major power.

Africa’s other major attraction is, of course, its resource wealth. This has become even more pronounced and taken on extraordinary importance in the push towards alternative sources of energy, both renewable and non-renewable. And in the production of products driven by the rise in technological innovation, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo’s cobalt, which is needed to make device screens among other things. The DRC is the world’s leading producer of this crucial mineral.

At the same time the oil reserves of Algeria, Angola and Nigeria will become increasingly important as countries look to diversify away from Russia for natural gas, and from fossil fuels more broadly.

Then there are the trade routes. The Red Sea route, which straddles northeast Africa and links it to the Indian Ocean, constitutes 10% of annual global trade.

The Red Sea route passes countries such as Eritrea and Somalia. Both have been actively courted by Russia.

For its part, China has earmarked the route through its Maritime Silk Road initiative. Its aim is to boost port infrastructure among countries with Indian Ocean coastlines.

Lastly, Africa is home to the fastest-growing youth population. This will be important in the search for future markets, particularly in sectors such as technology and education.

The US and Europe are also keen to tap this human capacity as their own populations age above the global average. Many are looking to Africa as a source of inward migratory flows.

Africa’s ties with the major powers

In 2022, the continent as a whole exported US$43.1 billion worth of goods to the US and imported goods worth US$30.6 billion.

By comparison, China exported US$164.1 billion to Africa and imported US$117.5 billion worth of African goods, in the same year. With African exports totalling US$661.4 billion, the US accounts for 6.5% and China 17.7%.

China, the notable growth story of the past half-century, has thus become the African continent’s single biggest trading partner, though the combined power of the European Union’s trading bloc of 27 countries still leads.

China’s ties with the continent are the result of decades of diplomatic and commercial efforts to woo the continent through the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. Part of this has been driven by its desire to counter the US. The other driving force has been to sustain its economy, given Africa’s untapped potential.

Russia has pursued a different strategy. Given that its trade with the continent is at a minimum – exports and imports were around US$18 billion in 2021 – it has rather sought to become a security partner, drawing on sentimentalised Soviet history.

Washington’s principal instrument for growing trade, and encouraging good behaviour, in Africa is the African Growth and Opportunity Act, set to expire in 2025. The framework is a lever. But, as the data show, trade is in evident decline.

The general picture can obscure some nuances. Some African states are more deeply intertwined with the US than others. For example, Djibouti has an American military base (along with other states, though not Russia at this point). And Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa are also among the top recipients of US direct investment.

On the other hand, Eritrea, which was the only African state to brazenly vote against the UN General Assembly to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, seems to have no aspirations to be in America’s good graces. This notorious outlier aside, the world is deeply intertwined, with high interdependence even among the competing major powers.

The US and China, despite their trade war, have struggled to decouple from one another, with their bilateral trade reaching new heights as recently as last year.

In light of the comparatively diminished US-Africa trade, the US may be looking to make use of third parties. It could potentially influence the EU to influence Africa. The Huawei issue demonstrates this. The US has successfully pressured quite a few of its allies to halt doing business with the Chinese technology giant. According to UNCTAD data, France (US$60 billion) and the UK (US$65 billion) are the principal holders of African assets.

As these and other European states seek to “de-risk” from China, there may be third-party consequences for Africa. This might include undue pressure on the continent to behave in certain ways towards China and towards Russia.

Picking sides isn’t the best option

Recent research, including my own on US-China trade “competition” over Africa, shows that the prevailing notion that smaller countries need to “pick sides” in polarised global contexts is false. Africa is best served when it conducts trade with as many partners as possible.

Indeed, as shown, the major contenders are themselves conducting record-breaking trade with one another.

All the while, Europe continues to conduct trade with Russia following the war against Ukraine (indeed, it is growing in some respects).

The continent can, therefore, afford to be neutral. What it cannot afford to do is pick sides and preclude any partnerships. In the oncoming multipolar order, there are no self-evident, African-specific needs to pick sides. All options can be on the table.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Simon Roberts, Professor of Economics and Lead Researcher, Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, University of Johannesburg

Ntombifuthi Tshabalala, Economist at Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, University of Johannesburg

Global fertiliser suppliers have made incredibly high profits in 2022/23 on the back of price spikes attributed to the Russia-Ukraine war. The profits of the world’s top nine producers trebled in 2022 from two years previously.

The margins and impacts have been even greater on fertiliser supplies to African farmers. Moreover, the super-high profit margins are being sustained in 2023 in many African countries even while international prices have come down. The harvest season has recently come to an end in most countries in southern Africa with farmer margins and production being squeezed by high input costs.

The wide gaps between fertiliser prices in the region and international fertiliser prices point to major issues within the supply chain with excess margins of some 30%-80% being earned on sales to many African countries.

South Africa has the benefit of robust competition enforcement meaning prices in this country have come down substantially. This only serves to highlight the disadvantage being faced by farmers in other countries such as Malawi and Zambia.

High fertiliser prices undermine production, contribute to high food prices, and exacerbate food insecurity.

Our work on fertiliser and agri-food markets in the African Market Observatory points to major problems with how international and regional markets work, including the market power of large international suppliers. High prices for fertiliser inputs are squeezing African farmers who are cutting back on fertiliser use meaning low yields and supply, and high food prices.

International action is therefore urgently required on fertiliser prices to improve food security in Africa.

Impact

African countries are dependent on imported fertiliser and usage is relatively low. For example, Kenya and Zambia use around 70kg/ha, compared with 365kg/ha in Brazil.

Production

The harvest season has recently come to an end in most countries in southern Africa. There’s evidence that farmer margins and production are being squeezed by high input costs. High costs and low application are a factor in maize yields in Zambia being less than half of those in South Africa and a third of Argentina (according to the FAO).

In 2022, Kenya imported almost 30% less fertiliser and production fell. Maize output in 2022/23 was 18% lower than the average for the previous five year, with yields and area planted both being lower, compounding the effect of poor rains. This has meant a substantial deficit relative to local demand and very high prices.

Continued high fertiliser prices will constrain production, even while there is a great need to expand agriculture output to meet regional demand.

For example, Zambia has abundant arable land and water for agriculture to increase production. Of the country’s 42 million hectares of arable land, only 15% (or around 6 million) is under cultivation, including for pasture, with only 1.5 million of this cultivated for crop production. Zambia has around 40% of the water resources available for agriculture in the entire SADC region.

If farmers earned better returns, with cheaper input costs, then production could be a multiple of the current levels.

Food insecurity: Approximately 73 million people in the East and Southern Africa region are experiencing acute food insecurity. People in low- and middle-income countries bear the harshest burden – both in terms of the importance of small-holder farmers and in the vulnerability of low-income urban households to high food prices.

Most countries on the continent rely on food imports. Countries such as Kenya which have been affected by drought are struggling to source imports which has worsened food security in the country. This has been exacerbated by export restrictions on maize imposed by Zambia and Tanzania, which have suppressed prices to farmers in those countries, even while input costs, notably fertilizer, have increased.

Uneven playing field

International fertilizer prices more than doubled in two months – from September to November 2021. The peak continued into early 2022, reaching an average price of US$915/t for the benchmark urea fertilizer between March and April 2022. This compares with around US$226 in the previous five years. This was driven by the world’s largest fertilizer companies taking advantage of the rise in the price of natural gas, an important input for nitrogen-based fertilizer, as well as supply disruptions associated with the Russia-Ukraine war. The fertilizer companies exploited the shocks and raised prices by more than the increase in costs.

By March 2023, the international price of urea had fallen back to close to $300/t. With additional costs to import to coastal countries which should be no more than $150/t and to inland regions no more than $250/t including a trader margin, South Africa’s inland prices now reflect fair prices but in other African countries super profits are continuing.

What needs to be done

To ease the adverse impacts of high fertilizer prices, governments in the region have tried to implement fertilizer subsidy programmes. For example, prices in Tanzania with the government subsidy have been reduced from around $1100/t to US$600-700/t.

But the subsidies have huge costs for governments which many African countries have not been able to incur, while the programmes have generally not been working well. In Malawi, for example, a large portion of the Affordable Inputs Programme (AIP) targeted beneficiaries did not receive fertilizer under the 2022/2023 programme.

International action is therefore urgently required on fertilizer prices to improve food security in Africa. First, competition authorities in Africa should investigate signs of anti-competitive conduct. Second, investments are required in logistics, storage and advice on optimal usage. Third, a fertilizer market observatory as the EU is currently setting-up would provide ongoing data about fertiliser markets, factors affecting them, and exchange experiences and good practices for optimal usage.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Anthony Idowu Ajayi, Associate research scientist, African Population and Health Research Center

2023 marks two decades since the adoption of the Maputo Protocol. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol) is arguably the most progressive legally binding instrument on women’s and human rights instruments globally. A total of 44 African countries have signed and ratified it. The Maputo Protocol provides for extensive and progressive women’s rights. These include the right to health and reproduction, inheritance, economic and social welfare, education and training, access to justice and equal protection before the law, and elimination of harmful practices. Reproductive health researcher, Anthony Ajayi, unpacks the significance of the document in women’s lives over the years.

What does it mean for sexual and reproductive rights?

Articles 2 and 14 made specific provisions to protect the sexual and reproductive rights of women and girls.

Article 2 mandates member countries to enact and implement laws and other measures to curb all forms of discrimination, especially harmful practices that endanger health and general well-being.

Advocacy efforts to end child marriage and female genital cutting are anchored on this specific provision. Such efforts have resulted in 43 African countries now having laws that put the minimum age of marriage at 18 years old or above for both girls and boys. While some of these countries have parental consent exceptions and parallel customary marriage laws, the past ten years have seen more countries remove these exceptions. Also, 22 out of 29 African countries practising female genital cutting now have national laws in place banning the practice.

Article 14 mandates member countries to ensure the right to health of women, including sexual and reproductive health. This includes the right to control fertility, decide whether to have children, the number of children and the spacing of children, and choose any method of contraception.

Has it been effective?

Since the inception of the Maputo Protocol, most African countries have removed user fees for maternal health services in government-owned health facilities. This has increased access to quality maternal healthcare services for marginalised women and girls. As a result, maternal deaths have declined markedly.

More countries have broadened their laws to allow access to safe abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, life-threatening fetal anomalies, and when a pregnancy endangers the woman’s mental and physical health or her life. Between 2000 and 2021, 22 African countries expanded their legal grounds for abortion. Six – Cape Verde, South Africa, Tunisia, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe (up to 10 weeks of gestation in Angola) – permit abortion at the woman’s request during the first trimester of pregnancy. More countries have developed and launched post-abortion care guidelines to expand access for women and girls.

The success of the Maputo Protocol in protecting and guaranteeing the rights of women and eliminating discrimination is quite remarkable. Where the rights of women and girls are violated, the Maputo Protocol has become an instrument for seeking legal redress and a tool for seeking accountability. It was referenced in these examples:

• A court ruling in December 2020 found that the Kenya government violated several human rights instruments, including the Maputo Protocol, for failing to investigate and prosecute cases of sexual and gender-based violence that happened during the post-election violence of 2007. The government was ordered to pay compensation to four of the survivors, amounting to KSh 4 million (about US$40,000) each.
• In December 2019, the ECOWAS Court of Justice found that the ban on pregnant schoolgirls going to school in Sierra Leone was discriminatory and in violation of girls’ right to education, in breach of Articles 2 and 12 of the Maputo Protocol. Since the ruling, the government of Sierra Leone has lifted the ban.
• Article 13 and 17 of Tanzania’s Marriage Act, which set the minimum age of marriage for girls at 15 years and 18 years for boys, was challenged at the appeal court in 2019. Citing the Maputo Protocol, the court upheld the earlier ruling that marriage under the age of 18 was illegal.

What have its shortcomings been?

Progress in realising women’s and girls’ rights remains uneven within and between countries. Eleven countries haven’t ratified the protocol. Twenty-four haven’t fulfilled their reporting obligation to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Consequently, discriminatory laws persist. And customary, common and civil laws remain in parallel with constitutional provisions. This creates loopholes for the violation of women’s and girls’ rights.

For example, 11 countries (Cameroon, Seychelles, Sudan, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Tanzania) permit girls below 18 years to marry. One member state has no minimum age for marriage. But legal reforms are happening in five of these countries.

There’s been improvement in sexual and reproductive health outcomes. But sexual and gender-based violence, child marriage and female genital cutting remain high in most African countries. Maternal deaths and new HIV transmission have declined. But incidences remain relatively high in several countries.

Young people, particularly girls, bear a disproportionate burden of poor sexual and reproductive health outcomes. This hinders their smooth transition into adulthood and affects their immediate and lifelong health (physical and mental) and socioeconomic wellbeing and empowerment.

What more needs to be done?

More advocacy is needed to ensure:

• the remaining 11 countries ratify the protocol
• countries with reservations about some of the articles in the protocol need to address them
• those who have ratified it fully domesticate and implement its provisions.

Such advocacy should be informed by contextually relevant evidence on sexual and reproductive health, including what works in addressing harmful practices, increasing young people’s access to information and services, and reducing new HIV infections and maternal deaths.

The partnership between all actors working to ensure women’s health and reproductive rights are realised should be reinvigorated and sustained to make certain that gains are consolidated and not reversed.

Entrenching a culture of equity around sexual and reproductive rights will also require tailored engagement with community and religious leaders to build their capacity on matters of sexual and reproductive health. Sustained funding of civil society organisations working to ensure women’s rights is also key, and so is the need to bolster the women’s movement on the continent.

Juliet Kimotho, senior advocacy officer at the African Population and Health Research Center, contributed to this article.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).