Sumant Sinha, Chairman and Managing Director, ReNew Power
Nations need to direct investments towards a green and healthy recovery, as insurance against future disasters. The paper argues that renewable energy can revitalise the economy by creating “green” jobs, ensuring energy security and strengthening resilience. To that effect, Europe has set the early benchmarks for a global green recovery.
Towards a green, equitable and resilient future
The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a devastating toll on lives, livelihoods and economies globally. However, a silver lining to the cloud was that it enabled us to catch glimpses of a better world – cleaner air, blue skies and reduced emissions, besides reinforcing the value of public health.
We are now at a pivotal moment, as national governments design stimulus packages to reboot their economies. We simply cannot afford to return to “business as usual” and continue to pursue a high-carbon, unsustainable growth template. Rather, global recovery measures should target a green, equitable and resilient future.
As nations press the “reset” button, they need to make the right choice and direct investments towards a green and healthy recovery, which is the best insurance against future disasters. The pandemic has only strengthened the case for accelerating the transition to clean energy. As we “build back better” we must be careful not to place sustainability on the back burner, but rather ensure that renewables and other clean technologies are at the heart of rebuilding strategies.
Green job creation and reduced import bills
A low-carbon growth path can stimulate the economy as well as mitigate climate risks. Renewable energy can revitalize the economy by creating “green” jobs, ensuring energy security and strengthening resilience. Each million dollars invested in renewables or energy flexibility could create at least 25 jobs, while each million invested in efficiency would create about 10 jobs. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) estimates that transforming energy systems based on renewables could boost global GDP by $98 trillion by 2050, and create 63 million new jobs globally in renewables and energy efficiency. In India, which saw over 100 million job losses during the lockdown, 1.3 million full-time jobs can be created by achieving 160 GW from renewables by 2022.
A shift towards renewables can help countries such as India and China save vital funds through a drastic reduction in their import bills. Even if half the generated renewable power is used to replace imported coal, India can save over $90 billion between 2021 and 2030. As a major source of harmful emissions, coal has always been associated with negative consequences. The fact that renewables are now the cheaper alternative in most countries makes a compelling case for funnelling spending on coal imports towards speeding up adoption of renewables. It is also essential that we cut back on fossil fuel subsidies wherever they are still significantly large, especially with oil prices plunging.
Cleaner air and improved health
The pandemic has brought the need for clean air and health considerations to the forefront. Globally, more than 4 million premature deaths per annum can be attributed to air pollution, while the World Health Organization has identified climate change as a major cause of infectious diseases and spread of antimicrobial resistance, raising the risk of future epidemics.
A recovery driven by renewables can tackle the twin challenges of air pollution and climate change by curbing greenhouse gas emissions, thus reducing vulnerability to life-threatening diseases. Last but not least, a renewables-driven recovery will contribute to more equitable and inclusive growth by improving access to energy. This can dramatically improve living standards in disadvantaged communities – by assuring them of basic amenities like healthcare, food, water.
Europe is leading the way
Traditionally, Europe has led the world in tackling climate change and, not surprisingly, it has once again set the early benchmarks for a global green recovery. Amidst the Trump administration slashing green protections and China sending mixed signals, as evident from its recent investments in coal-fired power plants, the EU has shown positive intent by setting aside 25% of its nearly €850 billion recovery package for building energy-efficient infrastructure; investing in renewables and other clean technology, such as batteries, clean hydrogen and carbon capture; promoting low-carbon mobility and installing 1 million EV charging points; fostering sustainable land use and preserving biodiversity. It is also considering a landmark border tax on carbon-heavy imports from other countries.
It is important that other governments take a leaf out of Europe’s book and adopt a policy and investment response that is geared towards a sustainable and just recovery. We also need other stakeholders to step up: corporates to adopt sustainable and clean business practices; and investors to decarbonize their portfolios and back the renewables sector. Civil society must actively support plans for a green and just recovery by adopting sustainable lifestyles.
It is evident that global recovery plans must be aligned to the vision of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030, for an equitable, healthy and resilient future. By making energy transition an integral element of the wider recovery plan, nations can build the much needed capacity to absorb shocks from pandemics or similar disruptions. Enhanced cooperation across the global community can help frame a robust action plan and ensure adequate funding for expediting the global green recovery. As we restart our economies, we owe it to our future generations to choose the right path and opt for a low-carbon development model.
Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).
Les débats en cours autour de la réintroduction provisoire des néonicotinoïdes – ces insecticides dits « tueurs d’abeilles » – pour la culture de la betterave le montrent une nouvelle fois : en agriculture, l’usage des produits phytosanitaires (« phytos ») fait polémique, et beaucoup de prises de position contraires se cristallisent.
Une grande confusion s’est progressivement installée dans l’esprit de nombreux publics, car si des dangers pour la santé sont régulièrement mis en avant dans les médias par certaines associations et la littérature scientifique, le discours officiel reste de prôner sa confiance dans le système mis en place et souligne qu’il y a peu de véritables problèmes pour la santé.
Dose journalière et limite maximale
D’un point de vue réglementaire, deux indicateurs sont utilisés pour rendre compte de la sécurité des consommateurs.
Il y a tout d’abord la dose journalière admissible (DJA), c’est-à-dire la consommation quotidienne possible d’une substance xénobiotique au cours d’une vie entière sans risque connu pour la santé. Elle est fixée avec une marge de sécurité très importante (facteur de 100 ou 1000) par rapport à la dose sans effet.
Il y a ensuite la limite maximale de résidus (LMR), déterminée de façon à ce que la quantité de résidus d’un pesticide ingérée par une population donnée ne dépasse pas la DJA ; elle est calculée dans un produit agricole de manière à ce qu’un apport journalier maximum théorique des résidus provenant d’un pesticide donné soit inférieur à sa DJA. Comme la LMR dépend des habitudes alimentaires d’un consommateur moyen, elle varie selon les pays et selon les produits. Il y a une LMR pour chaque pesticide et pour chaque production végétale.
La LMR est critiquée pour les pesticides qui sont des perturbateurs endocriniens car pour ceux-ci, il n’y a plus de proportionnalité des effets induits avec la dose. Cette catégorie de pesticide est notamment soupçonnés d’être responsables d’une recrudescence des cas d’infertilité, et d’être un facteur de risque pour plusieurs maladies chroniques non transmissibles.
En outre, il a été montré expérimentalement des effets cocktails entre certains pesticides ; or ces effets ne sont jamais pris en compte pour leur évaluation. Enfin, l’impact possible d’une ingestion de très faibles quantités tout au long d’une vie sur la diversité et le fonctionnement de notre microbiote intestinal, n’est pas considéré alors que de tels effets ont été montrés expérimentalement.
Accumulation, résistance
Les mêmes différences de perception sont observées quant aux effets sur la biodiversité.
Si les pesticides sont toxiques pour les organismes qu’ils ciblent, leur effet manque parfois de spécificité et peut donc impacter aussi d’autres composantes de la biodiversité comme les ennemis naturels des ravageurs des cultures, les bactéries, champignons, oiseaux, mammifères, amphibiens, et poissons.
Les insecticides et les herbicides à large spectre affectent aussi directement et indirectement la faune via la disparition des habitats et la contamination des sources de nourriture. Les pesticides qui tendent à s’accumuler dans la chaîne alimentaire posent également un risque à long terme pour les prédateurs, affaiblissant le potentiel de régulations naturelles. Ceci fragilise la gestion des ravageurs et accroît la dépendance future aux pesticides.
En outre, à l’usage, des résistances aux phytos peuvent apparaître chez les organismes cibles (insectes, micro-organismes ou plantes indésirables), rendant leur usage inopérant.
Trois voies pour évoluer
Dans ces débats complexes, il semble important de tenir compte de la perte de confiance des citoyens envers les sphères politiques et agricoles : malgré des initiatives publiques dédiées à la réduction forte des phytos (plans Ecophyto 1, 2 et 2+), les dernières statistiques montrent un accroissement de leur usage en dix ans.
Enfin, une bataille sémantique brouille le débat : quand certains parlent de « pesticides », d’autres parlent de produits « phytopharmaceutiques » ou produits « phytosanitaires ». Dans la première acception, il est implicite que les produits tuent le vivant, et qu’ils ne sont pas non plus sans danger pour la santé des animaux et des hommes. Dans la seconde, leur utilisation est légitimée au même titre que l’usage des médicaments l’est pour les humains.
Malgré ces différences de perception et de terminologie, il y a un objectif largement partagé de réduire les usages comme les impacts ; cependant trois voies de progrès coexistent. Les deux premières ne remettent pas ou peu en cause les pratiques existantes et considèrent que les plantes sont forcément vulnérables aux bioagresseurs, contrairement à la troisième qui va s’intéresser à leur environnement pour réduire leur vulnérabilité.
Faire mieux… sans viser à changer le système
Les leviers les plus promus par les politiques publiques ne remettent jamais frontalement en cause la structure des systèmes agricoles intensifs et simplifiés (rotations courtes, travail du sol fréquent, absence ou insuffisance d’infrastructures agroécologiques) qui dominent aujourd’hui en France.
Les phytos sont encore utilisés suivant des pratiques d’assurance quasi systématique (traitement des semences indépendamment des besoins réels de protection, par exemple). Au-delà du choix de variétés résistantes, les mesures préventives visant à renforcer la santé des plantes ne sont que très peu mobilisées. Ce système s’appuie implicitement sur l’efficacité des seules solutions curatives que les phytos incarnent.
Deux grandes stratégies de réduction des pesticides chimiques sont à l’œuvre dans ces systèmes simplifiés. La première réside dans l’augmentation de l’efficience des traitements via l’optimisation des apports dans le temps et l’espace grâce aux technologies de l’agriculture de précision. La deuxième est basée sur l’utilisation de substituts organiques ou biologiques aux produits de synthèse (phéromones sexuelles de synthèse pour piéger des insectes, microhyménoptères parasites de nombreux ravageurs, biopesticides). L’innocuité de ces biopesticides reste à démontrer et l’utilisation d’organismes vivants pose le problème de la pérennité de la solution et des possibles effets de diffusions incontrôlées.
Ces deux stratégies permettent effectivement de réduire l’utilisation des pesticides de synthèse, mais elles correspondent à des formes d’agriculture où les pesticides gardent leur fonction de « parapluie » de protection. Dans cette approche, il faut protéger les plantes dont la vulnérabilité est élevée du fait des modes de culture intensifs que l’on ne cherche pas à remettre en question. Cette approche est prônée par ceux qui défendent la possibilité de maintenir une forte capacité d’exportation de denrées agricoles et soulignent le besoin de nourrir une population mondiale croissante par ce seul moyen.
Pour des systèmes agricoles moins vulnérables
Les recherches récentes convergent pour souligner qu’il ne sera possible de diminuer drastiquement les pesticides pour un usage en dernier recours, que si on combine un ensemble de leviers, chacun n’ayant qu’un effet partiel, mais visant, conjointement à renforcer la régulation naturelle des bioagresseurs. Détaillons les trois principaux axes.
Premier axe, une diversité de plantes à l’échelle de la parcelle : succession de cultures et d’intercultures pour réprimer certains bioagresseurs, mélange d’espèces et de variétés résistantes ou tolérantes pour réduire l’amplitude des dégâts, espèces différentes en bordure de parcelle pour favoriser certains ennemis naturels et/ou mieux contrôler certains bioagresseurs. Toutefois, cet axe complexifie la récolte et peut induire le besoin de trier la collecte.
Second axe, un sol en bonne santé : les apports organiques et un travail du sol, limité ou nul, réduisent l’oxydation du sol et favorisent son activité biologique (microorganismes, faune), rendant les plantes moins vulnérables aux bioagresseurs souterrains et aériens. Cela favorise les mycorhizes, champignons filamenteux vivant en symbiose avec la plupart des plantes, qui améliorent l’acquisition de ressources rares (phosphore, eau…) et renforcent la résistance des plantes aux stress biotiques et abiotiques (sécheresse, froid…). Leur développement nécessite cependant une non-perturbation mécanique du sol et des apports modérés de fertilisants, incompatibles avec la « quête des derniers quintaux ».
Troisième axe, une surface réduite pour chaque parcelle combinée à la présence d’infrastructures écologiques (haies, prairies, lisières…) alentour favorisent l’abondance et la diversité les ennemis naturels des bioagresseurs. Cet axe bute toutefois actuellement sur la standardisation et la productivité réalisées à l’aide d’équipements de grand gabarit.
La combinaison de ces trois familles de leviers aboutit à des agro-écosystèmes sièges de nombreuses régulations biologiques dans et au-dessus du sol, porteurs de cultures moins sensibles, et donc plus résilientes. Dans ces conditions, une parcelle peut jouer le rôle d’habitat pour une partie du cycle des espèces auxiliaires (source de nourriture et lieu de ponte) et ainsi être peu voire pas traitée.
Cette stratégie amène aussi à raisonner de manière plus systémique, par exemple en choisissant les couverts intermédiaires en fonction de leur facilité de destruction sans recours à la chimie et pas seulement pour leur facilité d’implantation. Ces régulations peuvent mettre du temps à s’instaurer et vont nécessiter des travaux pour savoir comment en fiabiliser et renforcer les effets.
Ces leviers présentent l’immense mérite de fournir d’autres services à l’agriculture (pollinisation, meilleure efficience de l’eau, fertilité des sols…) ainsi qu’à la société et la planète : régulation du climat par séquestration du carbone, préservation de la biodiversité.
Pour autant, ce ne sont pas les leviers les plus promus par les politiques publiques ni les plus rencontrés dans les exploitations agricoles, car, mal maitrisés, ils peuvent entrer en conflit avec la simplicité et la rentabilité de court terme des exploitations. De fait, ils n’apportent actuellement pas la reconnaissance financière qui justifierait de systématiser leur intégration dans l’évaluation des performances des exploitations.
Une nouvelle approche autour du bien commun
Pour n’utiliser les phytos qu’en dernier recours, comme des médicaments, la conception de la santé des plantes devra se baser sur la résilience des écosystèmes vis-à-vis des bioagressions, via le développement de la biodiversité fonctionnelle bénéfique. Cela devrait être un des tout premiers critères pour juger de la performance des systèmes mis en place.
Cela nécessite également des coordinations entre agriculteurs et acteurs locaux pour diversifier les cultures au sein d’un territoire et gérer les infrastructures agroécologiques. Choisir cette famille de leviers ne relève donc pas du seul libre arbitre de l’agriculteur, mais bien d’une gestion collective du bien commun que constitue cette biodiversité fonctionnelle et les habitats qui la favorisent à l’échelle d’un territoire.L’instauration de pratiques basées sur la biodiversité utile devra être contextualisée en fonction des caractéristiques de sol, de climat et d’histoire culturale de la parcelle. Il y a donc beaucoup moins de « recettes » que pour les voies de protection des cultures basées sur l’amélioration de l’efficience des intrants (chimiques) ou sur leur substitution.
Il faut donc que les marchés évoluent pour proposer des solutions portant à la fois une forme d’universalité et d’adaptation aisée aux situations locales. Cela suppose aussi de fournir un conseil moins normatif aux agriculteurs et le développement de nouveaux dispositifs pour capitaliser et partager les connaissances.
Enfin, si l’on vise le développement de systèmes agricoles moins vulnérables via la gestion d’un bien commun, il sera judicieux que les nouvelles pratiques soient reconnues par un label rémunérateur ou que les services environnementaux rendus à la société soient rémunérés. Cela n’entraînera pas nécessairement de surcoût, car la société paye déjà pour ces services via la dépollution de l’eau ou la prise en charge des dépenses de santé. La moindre productivité actuelle des exploitations qui s’essayent à l’agroécologie peut être soutenue par une demande locale (avantage apporté par une garantie de débouché), une reconnaissance via une labellisation des produits mais aussi des exploitations.
Tant qu’une partie des pesticides restent autorisée, les progrès sur les approches alternatives à la chimie restent timorés. Par ailleurs, on voit mal comment les produits issus d’une agriculture agroécologique pourraient se distinguer de ces mêmes produits issus de l’agriculture conventionnelle si tous finissent dans un même silo ou une même cuve masquant la distinction. Le consentement à payer pour, par exemple, une agriculture « zéro pesticides » ne peut se déployer qu’avec une traçabilité marquée. En effet, pour les fruits par exemple, les systèmes réduisant les pesticides ont généralement un chiffre d’affaires par hectare moins bon qu’en système conventionnel et qu’en agriculture biologique (AB), comme le souligne la figure suivante.
Les résultats du réseau Dephy montrent les systèmes économes en pesticides (ECO) sont actuellement moins rémunérateurs que les systèmes conventionnels (REF) ou sous cahier des charges AB (AB), car on ne tient pas compte des valeurs non marchandes comme les impacts sur la santé, les pollutions évitées et la protection de la biodiversité. Ecophytopic
Cela pose la question de la possible coexistence de trois formes d’agricultures conventionnelle, agroécologique et biologique. Soit les pratiques agroécologiques deviennent les standards du conventionnel (renforcé par une règlementation très ferme sur les pesticides), soit le différentiel entre conduite agroécologique et AB n’est pas suffisant et mène à leur fusion.
Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).
For decades, thinking and strategies around food have developed in silos, with little coordination between communities working on nutrition, agriculture, food, environment, water, health, climate, employment, trade or transport. This has generated serious problems – from policies that provide cheap calories but lead to high rates of diet-related diseases, to market innovations that prioritize efficiency above all and production systems that contribute to climate change and biodiversity loss.
The pandemic has shown that sectors that seem distinct do not operate independently. Though still being investigated, COVID-19 likely originated in wild animals sold in open food markets. The virus easily jumped to humans because farmers had cleared and settled large areas of natural habitat, increasing interactions of wildlife with people, including as food. Sanitary standards at markets were poorly regulated, while rapid transport between densely populated cities spread the virus globally. Now whether infected people become seriously ill or die depends on their underlying health and nutrition, as well as their access to healthcare, sanitation and adequate housing. Indeed, COVID-19 is a story of multiple systems impacting each other, triggering a host of unintended consequences impossible to understand, let alone manage, without looking at them together.
Reimagining and re-designing our food systems
Understanding the connections between these seemingly distinct domains is crucial to emerge stronger from the pandemic. Systems thinking – a way of understanding how interdependent structures interact in a dynamic system – can help.
Taking a systems view allows us to tackle complex questions, such as: How can food systems help eliminate diet-related disease? How can we ensure abundant harvests while sustaining natural habitats and healthy ecosystems? How can farmers adapt to and help fight climate change? How can marginalized consumers, workers and producers be empowered? How can we reduce vulnerabilities to future shocks?
Next year, world leaders and experts will convene for the Food Systems Summit of 2021, called for by the United Nations Secretary General, to articulate and adopt an actionable, integrated plan for food systems transformation. Looking ahead to the summit, we need to bring siloed communities together to redesign how we produce, process, distribute, regulate, legislate, research, cook and eat food.
This is ambitious, but we must be bold and think big. Drawing on systems thinking, we propose three initial actions to reimagine and redesign our food systems:
Image: Rockefeller Foundation and EcoAgriculture Partners
1. Re-think supply chains for a diverse and healthy diet. Food choices matter. If all humans shifted their diets to include more fruits, vegetables, seeds, nuts, fish and whole grains, we would see substantial reductions in diet-related disease, including heart disease, cancer, diabetes and stroke – many of which increase the risk of serious illness from COVID-19. Yet the global food system isn’t built for diverse, healthy diets: 80% of the world’s food supply is grain and grain-fed livestock, while fruit, vegetables, pulses and fish are expensive and much less accessible.
We must redesign supply chains with nutrition and human health in mind. We can begin by supporting local food systems with shorter, fairer and cleaner supply chains that address local priorities, while configuring national and global trade to promote diversity and reduce supply risks.
2. Build strong connections between environment and food policy. How farmers produce food determines not only the fertility of their soils, but the health of the planet. The food systems of tomorrow must embrace the One Health vision and advance positive interactions between human health, livestock health, wildlife health and ecosystem health. This approach can minimize the spread of disease, ensure adequate water for crop irrigation, reduce destructive flooding and wildfires, and protect farmlands from intense climate events, while also sustaining wild biodiversity and essential forest, grassland and wetland habitats. Farmers should be helped to diversify their incomes and incentivized to farm both productively and as environmental stewards.
In 2021, the global community will develop a new action framework for the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, advance action under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and begin the UN Decade for Ecosystem Restoration. Sustainable food systems must be central to these strategies.
3. Strengthen, democratize and localize food systems planning. To approach food systems transformation holistically, policy-makers must democratize planning and invite all actors working in and alongside food systems – producers, businesses, social and environmental organizations, health workers, farmers, consumers, scientists and policy-makers – to be part of the effort. While national policy-makers can provide critical perspectives and frameworks for change, local and regional stakeholders must be able to shape their own food systems to reflect local values, resources and priorities.
EcoAgriculture Partners, for example, has documented nearly 500 large landscape partnerships in Africa, Latin America, Asia, Europe and the US, whose members are collaborating on long-term food system resilience and sustainable development. We need their perspectives at the upcoming Food Systems Summit.
Moving forward
The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the vulnerabilities and failures of our food systems, and the urgent need to build back better. Visionaries around the world are already leading the way. The Rockefeller Foundation’s Food System Vision Prize received innovative ideas from 1,300 collaborative organizations focused on building food systems that integrate food, environment, health, culture, diets and technology. These ideas prove that we can build resilient food systems that sustain both human health and the health of our planet – and a systems approach will help us get there. We’ll be exploring those ideas during a virtual event on 24 June – we hope you will join us.
Now, we have a choice: to go back to the old “normal,” or to work together and emerge stronger. A nourishing, resilient and sustainable food future is within our grasp.
Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).
Jaime de Melo, Emeritus Professor, University of Geneva [1]
Despite Mauritius’ history of resilience, Jaime de Melo highlights some of the country’s fragilities in terms of governance, environmental protection and human capital. In the short-run, he calls on the country to improve its governance by committing to external scrutiny and to resist protectionist winds. In the longer-run, the article highlights three imperatives: 1) a substantial boost in education to enable the country to grab opportunities brought about by the 4th industrial revolution, 2) the development of a services hub for Africa and 3) greater preservation of the environment to reverse the current rapid environmental degradation on the island.
Effective policies, resilience to shocks (cyclones), adaptation to a changing environment (end of rents associated with the Sugar and Multi-fiber agreements) were key to the success of Mauritius’ 50- year development path. The outcome was five pillars: sugar, textiles, export-processing zone, tourism and outsourcing. Of these, sugar and textiles have faded away. The other three can be preserved. This note argues that three new pillars, each requiring strong government commitment will be needed:
Education to preserve the three pillars and to face the 4th. industrial revolution
Protecting the environment (land and marine environments)
Developing a service centre for Africa along the lines of Dubai in the Middle East, Hong Kong in China and Singapore in South East Asia.
Early resilience to confront the Covid shock
When the Covid pandemic arrived, Mauritius was cruising on a new model of “one tourist visit per Mauritian” every year. An early hard lockdown was thus crucial to stop Covid from spreading. Health-protecting measures were accompanied by substantial fiscal and macro-financial measures to protect wealth [2]. Even though the case fatality ratio of 3% did not place Mauritius among the top performers according to this indicator, Mauritius was among a handful of countries that arrested the spread of the pandemic closing the cases in 40 days.
The economic situation remains uncertain. For tourist-dependent economies, especially those with a weak health sector like Mauritius (Mauritius has a relatively low score on the Global Health Security Index even among African countries), it is appropriate to apply the precautionary principle “better safe than sorry”. However, since it is highly unlikely that the virus will be “under control” in the next 6-12 months globally, the government cannot expect to have a successful partial re-opening for tourism and business travel under the current strict 14-day confinement in a hotel room. With the tourism industry having missed the end-of-year holidays, probabilistic calculations (like those illustrated by Thomas Pueyo, 2020), that evaluate, along a range of indicators, the travellers’ spreading risks need to be carried out now. This would allow the adoption of tailored travel policy for each country.
Relatedly, the Wakashio shipwreck in late July and its aftermath have shown strong collective action support by Mauritians in the clean-up effort, a clear example of resilience. But the event has also exposed the lack of preparedness and competence in protecting the maritime environment. The so-far peaceful, but widespread, mass protests indicate forcefully that Mauritians are losing confidence in their government. Yet trust is essential for effective crisis management. Once lost, trust is hard to restore as shown by the recent example of Chile.
This commentary focuses on economic measures. In the short-run, committing to external scrutiny would help discipline the government and restore confidence. Resisting covid-related protectionist pressures, evidenced in other countries, would also be crucial. In the longer-run, all countries are facing a paper clip shock (temporary shock with permanent effects) that is accelerating the pressure to adapt to the twin challenges of the 4th industrial revolution and the degradation of the environment.
Short-run: restore confidence and resist protectionist pressures
Restore confidence
Health, education, basic research, hard infrastructure are public goods, all with indivisibilities and positive externalities calling for government action. Government financing is, therefore, necessary to ensure adequate supply of these public goods. At the same time, management of government expenditures always requires scrutiny, especially so in this pandemic period of large government support measures. Submitting to external scrutiny should help transparency and build trust. The transparency indicators collected in the Open Budget Survey every two years for a large number of participating countries help benchmarking the level of a country’s transparency in the budget process. Another is the IMF Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA) framework. This is a tool for evaluating the results of government investments through peer comparisons. Mauritius could also join the WTO plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Signatories take steps to ensure open, fair and transparent conditions of competition in government procurement.
The ICAC should be reformed to make it truly independent. One suggestion is for the Parliamentary Committee that oversees ICAC to be chaired by the Opposition and have a majority of opposition members. ICAC reform jointly with the submission of government expenditures to external scrutiny should help restore trust and transparency.
Resist protectionist pressures
Mauritius is in the club of countries most open to the world for trade in goods and trade in services [3]. Resisting protectionist pressures in times of distress is especially difficult, even in an open economy, because of the pressure to provide for jobs. However, once in place, protectionist measures are difficult to remove because of pressures by lobbies to maintain them. Since the start of the pandemic, the rupee has depreciated approximately 20%. This is a boost for Mauritian exports, but it is also a boost for import-competing activities equivalent to a 20% tariff. For a small economy like Mauritius where dominant positions can develop easily, an economy open to foreign competition by low tariffs is the most effective anti-trust policy (or competition policy) to protect the interests of the consumers. In the current tariff-free economy, the threat of competition from imports (known as the ‘import-discipline’ hypothesis in the economics literature) is the best anti-trust policy.
Long-run: Three new pillars, education, a service centre and the environment
Education
Twenty years ago, human capital was already signalled as ‘the marginal’ contributor to the Mauritian miracle [4]. More recent comparisons confirm this diagnostic [5]. Subsequent structural change over the period 2001-2015 exacerbated this diagnostic through an expansion in the relative demand for highly educated labour outpacing the expansion in relative supply. The outcome was an increase in household income inequality over 2001-2015, notwithstanding large increases in public transfers to the bottom quintile of households [6].
This growing shortage of high-skill labour was exacerbated by the advent of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Progressively ‘telemigration’ took hold, with workers in one country working for offices in another country, like the call centres in Mauritius. Emerging technologies (advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, internet of things) were already on their way when the Covid pandemic accelerated this transition [7]. Now, white-collar robots-software perform functions, like those in call centres, traditionally accomplished by humans. This is a sudden new challenge for many jobs in the services industries. With fewer activities relying on face-to-face contacts, offices will become redundant, hence we can expect a slowdown in construction activity [8].
This accelerating change in demand for skill presents both a hardware and a software challenge for Mauritius. On the hardware side, access to performing ICT technologies will be necessary. Here Mauritius, as the sixth country in the world with 100% Fiber To The Home is well prepared. Education is the software side of this challenge. Here Mauritius needs a big push. Currently, the share of education expenditures in GDP is around 5% (about the average for the OECD), but there are no indicators of ICT skills. Neither are indicators of preparedness available on a comparative basis. Education outcomes need to be monitored and improved.
Notwithstanding the announcement of further fiscal incentives in the 2020 budget speech to attract foreign institutions to establish campuses in the country, Mauritius will have to improve its higher-education outcomes if it is to be ready to face and take advantage of emerging technologies. The top University in Mauritius ranks 77 out of the top 200 universities in Africa. The first step, however, is improving education outcomes at the high-school level [9]. Here too, submitting to external scrutiny by participating with 77 other countries in the regularly administered OECD PISA tests would be a good yardstick to monitor progress.
Service Centre for Africa
Drawing on its geographic location, solid infrastructure and ethnic diversity, improved educational outcomes would lay the ground for Mauritius to become the prime service centre for Africa. It could contribute to the development of the continent by offering a range of business services and logistics. In addition to the type of services offered by Dubai, Hong Kong and Singapore, Mauritius can export its social model as an alternative to the investment by China and by multi-nationals. The Mauritius social model includes making workers and farmers into shareholders as well as the provision of free primary healthcare and education, and a rudimentary social safety net.
The Environment
According to UNEP data, Mauritius has failed to protect both its land and its marine environment [10]. Millennium Development Goals (MDG) targets for water usage and per capita CO2 emissions have been off-target (see Government of Mauritius,2011, table 1.2). Mainstreaming biodiversity in the public and private sectors is yet to take place. Finally, scores on progress towards meeting the Aichi 2011 biodiversity targets for 2020 are low [11]. This balance sheet on environmental preservation is particularly disappointing for the country that was the source of inspiration for Pierre Poivre, the first environmentalist. He wrote the Règlement Economique (1769) for Mauritius making the first set of measures ever proposed that included provisions for forest conservation [12].
Signal that the country is taking the environment seriously
Provide support at home for taking environmental measures when facing politically difficult decisions
Help meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (e.g. by eliminating fuel subsidies moving towards a green development path, etc.)
Show credibly that the country is serious about being “environmentally friendly”, a boost for the tourism pillar.
Unfortunately, Mauritius did not join the group of five countries (Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway) that launched the ACCTS.
The early days of Covid showed, once more, that Mauritius has resilience in times of crisis. At the same time, post-crisis developments brought out cracks in the government’s preparedness and overall transparency in governance, as reflected in the nation-wide manifestations. In the short-run, restoring independence to the Independent Commission Against Corruption and committing to external scrutiny should contribute to restore confidence. Resisting to protectionist winds in the name of job creation would avoid facing the resistance to removing protection later on. In the longer-run, emerging technologies (AI, IOT), an ‘Apollo’ type challenge, calls for a huge boost in education and the development of a service centre for Africa. Greater preservation of the environment is the other long-run challenge. Taking the SDGs more seriously is the way forward. These long-run challenges would also benefit from external benchmarking and scrutiny.
[1] Thanks to Paul Baker, Myriam Blin and Ali Mansoor for comments and suggestions. A longer, more substantiated version appeared here.
[2] The Central Bank of Mauritius issued 10% of GDP and earmarked another 13% of GDP in foreign exchange to the government, placing Mauritius at par in June with the 11 per cent average for the G20. Bonardi et al. (2020) suggest that governments should provide full support for labour costs but only partial support capital costs through corona loans.
[3] Mauritius is among the top five countries with the lowest average applied tariff (here).
[4] Bunwaree, S (2001) “The Marginal in the Miracle: Human Capital in Mauritius”, International Journal of Educational Development, 21(3), 257-71.
[5] Grigoli (2014) finds that Mauritius lags behind many peers in efficiency of education expenditure, ranked 48th out of 89 developing countries behind, inter alia Barbados, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Fiji, Jamaica, Samoa, Seychelles, Saint Lucia and Tonga. Grigoli, Francesco (2014) “A Hybrid Approach to Estimating the Efficiency of Public Spending on Education in Emerging and Developing Economies”, IMF Working Paper WP/14/19, 2014.
[6] Public transfers have risen steadily over the last 20 years to counteract the increasing wage inequality (World Bank, 2017, figure 1.7).
[7] Many observers describe ICT as the third industrial revolution. Baldwin (2018) calls this new industrialization phase combining telemigration with robotics, ‘globotics’. Baldwin, R. (2019) The Globotics Upheaval: Globalization, Robotics and the Future of Work.
[8] Dingel and Neiman (2020) estimate that 35% of US jobs can be performed at home. For a sample of developing countries, Saltiel (2020) estimates it in the range 5.5% (Ghana) to 23% (Yunnan, China) so 20%, would be a ballpark estimate for Mauritius. Dingel, J. and B. Neiman (2020) “Who Can Work at Home”, Covid Economics, vol. 1. Saltiel, f. (2020) « Who can Work from Home in Developing Countries”, Covid-Economics issue 6.
[9] Based on UNESCO data, Bunwaree (2001, table 1) documents that Mauritius was lagging Bangladesh, Indonesia and other Asian countries in the enrollment rates in technical fields.
[10] Target 11 of the convention on biological diversity calls for at least 17% of land and 10% of coastal and marine areas to be conserved by 2020. On protecting Land areas, Mauritius ranks 158 out of 192. On marine areas, the table suggests that Mauritius has no legislation to protect its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). And in a composite Environmental Protection Index that includes ecosystem preservation, Mauritius ranks 82 out of 180 countries. As an example of challenges ahead on biodiversity, the GOM recognises the lack of progress towards the Aichi (2011) biodiversity targets (see GOM, 2017).
[11] The scores for the 20 targets shows little progress (an average score of 22 out of a maximum score of 100 if all 2020 targets were met at the time of the report in 2017, see GOM (2017, tables 1.10-1.14).
[12] Techera, E. (2019) “Deforestation, climate change and the emergence of legal responses: the international influence of Pierre Poivre’s environmental leadership”.
Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).
COVID-19 has created a human tragedy on a huge scale, with deep consequences for the global economy that will lead to an extended recession and long-term hardship.
This foreshadows the greater challenge we face in the years to come as the climate crisis escalates. Already, droughts, tornadoes and floods are threatening the lives and livelihoods of far too many people around the world, yet we are not doing nearly enough to deal with it.
As our thoughts move towards recovering from COVID-19, we must create a more resilient system that ensures the health and safety of all people. We must make sure that we are stronger in the face of the challenges to come. And we must do so without delay
The only way to do this is by re-imagining our relationship with the natural world. We need to entwine social, environmental and economic progress, and decouple economic growth from unsustainable consumption, while driving concrete and collective actions that speed up the adoption of the circular economy and realize systematic change.
Understanding the problem: the take, make, waste system
If we are to build a more resilient system, we must first understand what makes us so vulnerable. Our current linear economic model – in which economic growth is dependent on the endless extraction and use, or misuse, of natural resources – is pushing our planet to the brink.
Over 100 billion tons of resources flow into the economy each year, with the majority eventually lost as waste or emissions, causing lasting damage to the environment and leaving us vulnerable to the ever-worsening effects of the climate crisis.
Any disruption to this flow of resources into the economy also leaves us exposed to huge economic shocks, as has been made all too clear by COVID-19. Global shifts in the labour market, transport and consumer demand have led to wildly fluctuating commodity prices and widespread economic hardship.
With demand for resources expected to double by 2050, our exposure to both environmental and economic challenges will continue to grow.
A visualization of the circular economy in action Image: Ellen MacArthur Foundation
A vision for a more resilient world: a circular economy
We need a clear vision for an alternative future. A world in which we can breathe clean air; a world without the climate threats of droughts and floods. A world where resources are plentiful, with enough for all of us to earn a good livelihood. Our vision for the future is ambitious, but it is possible: a circular economy.
A circular economy is focused on designing out waste and pollution, keeping products and materials in use, and regenerating natural systems, so that we do not exhaust the resources of our planet. Changing the way we make and use products can contribute to addressing 45% of global greenhouse gas emissions, making a critical contribution to mitigating the impending climate crisis. Reducing our reliance on scarce resources increases our economic resilience, and building a circular economy offers a $4.5 trillion economic opportunity by avoiding waste, making businesses more efficient, and creating new employment opportunities. By creating a circular economy we can create a stronger system and flatten or even reverse some of the trends that now threaten the existence of future generations.
1. Focus recovery stimulus on green and circular investment
As economic stimulus packages are introduced to support recovery from COVID-19, such as the €750 billion ($843 billion) proposed by the EU, there is a huge opportunity to deepen our commitment and promote a circular economy as part of a green recovery. The priorities will be investing in renewable energy, protecting biodiversity and transforming agriculture, and funds should also be used to directly encourage circularity – for instance by investing or providing loan guarantees to circular economy start-ups that are driving solutions.
2. Create a policy framework for a circular economy
Governments play an important role in creating this vision. We need to see an ambitious and broad range of policies introduced to shift our relationship with natural resources and incentivize a move towards a circular economy. There should be subsidies for the re-use of materials, and taxes on waste. Recycling should be enforced, with an associated investment in the recycling infrastructure needed to make this possible. Carbon pricing is crucial. Procurement should take into account the ‘total cost of ownership’. Single-use plastic should be banned outright. The European Green Deal includes many of these elements, with a Circular Economy Action Plan sitting at its heart. The broader adoption of these policies would go a long way towards nudging the behaviour change we need to see. An ever growing number of global businesses have made a clear call for the introduction of policies for a green recovery to support their own pledges to embed the SDGs in their ways of working, via initiatives such as the UN Global Compact and the Dutch Sustainable Growth Coalition.
3. Pioneer the adoption of circular business models
Many companies are already shifting away from one-off transactions towards ongoing relationships with their customers. Sharing platforms are on the rise. Some companies are starting to take products back at the end of their economic life – this has the dual benefits of keeping scarce materials in use for as long as possible, while also reducing reliance on availability of raw materials and thus creating a business model that is more resilient against shocks.
The immediate crisis caused by COVID-19 is certainly putting pressure on many companies, but it is crucial that business leaders maintain their commitments to sustainability and circularity during any short-term impact. Long-term thinking is key, but actions make all the difference. When governments introduce measures like carbon pricing and border adjustment tariffs as included in the European Green Deal, the companies that are innovating and adjusting their business models will find themselves at a clear business advantage – as well as contributing to the better world we so desperately need.
4. Innovate to stimulate circularity
There are many opportunities for encouraging innovation to change our relationship with our ecosystem, by using new technologies that enable more circular business models. COVID-19 has seen a sudden and dramatic shift towards home working, remote healthcare, and digital virus-tracking, and we can take these lessons forward into the recovery. We need to encourage the use of new, competitive technologies to reduce energy consumption, to harvest and re-use materials, scale the availability of green energy sources, expand lifecycles of products, and reduce waste. The technology breakthroughs are within reach; we just need to invest in and adopt them.
As we move towards recovery from COVID-19, we must embrace the future, and not postpone the inevitable by hanging on to the past. We must reject waste and adopt circularity. By leveraging all the knowledge, power and influence we have to push forward on these priorities we can build a circular economy. It will take deep collaboration between business, government and civil society, but the rewards will be well worth it; a stronger ecosystem that will be resilient for the decades to come, and a world where people and nature can live together in harmony.
Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).
As the threat of a COVID-19 pandemic emerged earlier this year, many felt a sense of apprehension about what would happen when it reached Africa. Concerns over the combination of overstretched and underfunded health systems and the existing load of infectious and non-infectious diseases often led to it being talked about in apocalyptic terms.
However, it has not turned out quite that way. On September 29th, the world passed the one million reported deaths mark (the true figure will of course be higher). On the same day, the count for Africa was a cumulative total of 35,954.
Africa accounts for 17% of the global population but only 3.5% of the reported global COVID-19 deaths. All deaths are important, we should not discount apparently low numbers, and of course data collected over such a wide range of countries will be of variable quality, but the gap between predictions and what has actually happened is staggering. There has been much discussion on what accounts for this.
As leads of the COVID-19 team in the African Academy of Sciences, we have followed the unfolding events and various explanations put forward. The emerging picture is that in many African countries, transmission has been higher but severity and mortality much lower than originally predicted based on experience in China and Europe.
We argue that Africa’s much younger population explains a very large part of the apparent difference. Some of the remaining gap is probably due to under reporting of events but there are a number of other plausible explanations. These range from climatic differences, pre-existing immunity, genetic factors and behavioural differences.
Given the enormous variability in conditions across a continent – with 55 member states – the exact contribution of any one factor in a particular environment is likely to vary. But the bottom line is that what appeared at first to be a mystery looks less puzzling as more and more research evidence emerges.
The importance of age
The most obvious factor for the low death rates is the population age structure. Across multiple countries the risk of dying of COVID-19 for those aged 80 years or more is around a hundred times that of people in their twenties.
This can best be appreciated with a specific example. As of September 30th, the UK had reported 41,980 COVID-19 specific deaths while Kenya, by contrast, had reported 691. The population of the UK is around 66 million with a median age of 40 compared with Kenya’s population of 51 million with a median age of 20 years.
Corrected for population size the death toll in Kenya would have been expected to be around 32,000. However if one also corrects for population structure (assumes that the age specific death rates in the UK apply to the population structure of Kenya), we would expect around 5,000 deaths. There is still a big difference between 700 and 5,000; what might account for the remaining gap?
Other possible contributors
One possibility is the failure to identify and record deaths.
Kenya, as with most countries, initially had little testing capacity and specific death registration is challenging. However, Kenya quickly built up its testing capacity and the extra attention to finding deaths makes it unlikely that a gap of this size can be fully accounted for by missing information.
There has been no shortage of ideas for other factors that may be contributing.
A recent large multi-country study in Europe reported significant declines in mortality related to higher temperature and humidity. The authors hypothesised that this may be because the mechanisms by which our respiratory tracts clear virus work better in warmer more humid conditions. This means that people may be getting less virus particles into their system.
It should be noted however that a systematic review of global data – while confirming that warm and wet climates seemed to reduce the spread of COVID-19 – indicated that these variables alone could not explain most of the variability in disease transmission. It’s important to remember that there’s considerable weather variability throughout Africa. Not all climates are warm or wet and, if they are, they may not stay that way throughout the year.
Other suggestions include the possibility of pre-existing protective immune responses due either to previous exposure to other pathogens or to BCG vaccination, a vaccine against tuberculosis provided at birth in most African countries. A large analysis – which involved 55 countries, representing 63% of the world’s population – showed significant correlations between increasing BCG coverage at a young age and better outcomes of COVID-19.
Genetic factors may also be important. A recently described haplotype (group of genes) associated with increased risk of severity and present in 30% of south Asian genomes and 8% of Europeans is almost absent in Africa.
The role of these and other factors – such as potential differences in social structures or mobility – are subject to ongoing investigation.
More effective response
An important possibility is that public health response of African countries, prepared by previous experiences (such as outbreaks or epidemics) was simply more effective in limiting transmission than in other parts of the world.
However, in Kenya it’s estimated that the epidemic actually peaked in July with around 40% of the population in urban areas having been infected. A similar picture is emerging in other countries. This implies that measures put in place had little effect on viral transmission per se, though it does raise the possibility that herd immunity is now playing a role in limiting further transmission.
At the same time there is another important possibility: the idea that viral load (the number of virus particles transmitted to a person) is a key determinant of severity. It has been suggested that masks reduce viral load and that their widespread wearing may limit the chances of developing severe disease. While WHO recommends mask wearing, uptake has been variable and has been lower in many European countries, compared with many parts of Africa.
So is Africa in the clear? Well, obviously not. There is still plenty of virus around and we do not know what may happen as the interaction between the virus and humans evolves.
However, one thing that does seem clear is that the secondary effects of the pandemic will be Africa’s real COVID-19 challenge. These stem from the severe interruptions of social and economic activities as well as the potentially devastating effects of reduced delivery of services which protect millions of people, including routine vaccination as well as malaria, TB and HIV control programmes.
Research agendas
Major implications of the emerging picture include the need to re-evaluate African COVID-19 research agendas. While many of the priorities originally identified may still hold, their relative importance is likely to have changed. The key point is to deal with the problems as they are now rather than as they were imagined to be six months ago.
The same thing applies for public health policy. Of course, basic measures such as hand washing remain essential (regardless of COVID-19) and wearing masks should be continued while there is any level of COVID-19 transmission. However, other measures with broader effects on society, especially restrictions on educational and economic activity, should be under continuous review.
A key point now is to increase surveillance and ensure that flexible responses are driven by high quality real time data.
Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).
Raj Makoond, Program Director – Eclosia & Chairman of the Financial Services Institute
In this paper, Raj Makoond reviews the limited legislative changes that have occurred with respect to the funding of political parties in Mauritius. He argues that, with the recent EU blacklisting, the absence of a regulatory framework is a major systemic weakness in the country’s efforts to combat corruption and money laundering. The introduction of an appropriate legislation to ensure transparency and accountability in the source and use of funds has become a high priority.
Over the last 25 years, Mauritius has introduced a wide range of legal and regulatory reforms in its fight against corruption and money laundering. These reforms were driven by both the international context as well as the national economic exigencies, particularly Mauritius’ strategy to position itself as a reliable and respected jurisdiction for offshore business activities, later to be known as global businesses.
In this paper, I outline the progress achieved on the legal and institutional arrangements in Mauritius to date as well as the challenges that remain to be addressed. In particular, I argue that, in the context of the EU blacklisting, the absence of a regulatory framework with respect to the financing of political parties continues to be a major systemic weakness in the country’s efforts to combat corruption and money laundering. Currently, there is no transparency or accountability with respect to the financing of political parties in Mauritius.
The International Context
At the international level, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Union, and the United States undertook the first wave of anti-corruption initiatives. This included the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption(1996), the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions(1997), and the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption adopted by the Council of Europe in 1999. The European Union also passed a convention against corruption involving officials in 1997.
On the anti-money laundering front, the G7 including the European Commission triggered a global movement by establishing the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) against money laundering in 1989. In October 2001, following the 9/11 attack, the fight against terrorist financing was added to the mission of the FATF. In 2008, following the global financial crisis, the G20 further enhanced the powers and scope of the FATF.
The Mauritian Context
At the national level, following the 1992 Euro Money Conference in Mauritius, it was clearly shown that the country was well-positioned to emerge as an International Financial Services Centre. Mauritius benefited from the opportunities brought about by the opening up of the Indian economy in 1991 and the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) signed between India and Mauritius, and effective since 1983. In 1992, the government passed the Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Act and the Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Authority (MOBAA) was set up. In 2001, the Financial Services Development Act was passed, and MOBAA was replaced by the Financial Services Commission (FSC). The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) was also established under the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2002 to investigate suspicious transactions in the context of money laundering. In the fight against corruption, the Prevention of Corruption Act was passed in 2002, setting up the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in replacement of the Economic Crime Office, which had been dismantled in 2001.
Following a major consultative exercise carried out among all stakeholders and with the advisory support of Mervyn King, chairman of the King Committee on Corporate Governance, the Financial Reporting Act was passed in 2004. The act provided the legal basis for setting up a Code of Corporate Governance by a National Committee on Corporate Governance. This code referred to the need for the disclosure of political donations in line with section 23 of the Model JEC Code of Ethics [1], proposed by the Joint Economic Council (JEC) in 2001. The JEC was the apex private sector organization in Mauritius. It merged with the Mauritius Employers Federation in 2015 to form Business Mauritius.
Funding of Political Parties as a Policy Issue in Mauritius
The aforementioned Model Code of Ethics [1] was elaborated in consultation with Bertrand de Spéville, the former commissioner of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption. It made specific reference to the financing of political parties by the private sector, stating that contributions to political organisations or electoral candidates should be specifically recorded as such in the company’s books and that the contribution should be made in accordance with all applicable laws. Subsequently, the JEC deponed before the bi-partisan Select Committee of the Mauritius legislative assembly. In May 2002, this Select Committee (presided by Emmanuel Leung Shing, Q.C Attorney General) was assigned the task of examining and elaborating the recommendations of the Commission on Constitutional and Electoral Reform 2001/02 regarding the public funding of political parties (chaired by retired South African Judge Albie Sachs) with a view “to promoting sound, dynamic, and lively democracy and eliminating the risks of corruption and influence peddling”[2].
The Select Committee submitted its report in October 2004 [3]. The report addressed three essential components of the regulatory framework, namely the powers of the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC), the sources of fund, and the rules governing the transparency and accountability of political parties.
There is a fundamental difference between the Sachs’ Report and that of the Select Committee with respect to the sources of fund. Whereas Sachs’ position was radical and prescribed state funding as the only source of finance for political parties, the Select Committee took the view that funding could be made by various stakeholders with the State giving some “minimal” reimbursement. Sachs’ approach was exclusive and “state-controlled” whilst the Select Committee adopted a more participatory and inclusive approach.
The JEC supported the conclusions of the Select Committee, and at a Government/ Private Sector meeting held in February 2005, reaffirmed that the establishment of a regulatory framework was urgent, and invited Government to implement the recommendations of the Select Committee.
It is pertinent to highlight that there was no calendar set for the implementation of the recommendations of the Select Committee, contrary to the plan set by Government to establish the Financial Reporting Council and the code of Good Corporate Governance under the Financial Reporting Act.
In 2009, JEC reiterated the need for a regulatory framework in its submission to the Electoral Supervisory Commission in the context of the ruling of the Privy Council in the case of Ashok Jugnauth vs Raj Ringadoo, inviting the ESC to draw up a code of conduct for ministers and civil servants for the period after an election has been declared.
In 2017, Business Mauritius set up a Working Group on the funding of political parties and made representations to the authorities for the establishment of a regulatory framework. In 2019, the Political Financing Bill was introduced in the National Legislative Assembly, but unfortunately, it did not receive the support of the Assembly and was not enacted.
New Legislation Needed
The EU blacklisting announcement in May 2020, following the inclusion of Mauritius in the grey list of FATF in February 2020, was a wakeup call. Indeed, Mauritius has been quick in its response so far, especially with respect to the Designated Non-Financial Business and Professionals (DNFBPs) segment. The amendments brought in 2020 through the AML/CFT (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act [3] and the amendment of the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act empowered the FIU, the FSC and the Bank of Mauritius (BOM) to be more effective in the combat against money laundering.
However, the absence of legislation that would empower the ESC to set the contours regarding the sources of funds and the rules for transparency and accountability of political parties with respect to their expenses, stands out as a major weakness in the regulatory landscape of Mauritius.
Indeed, the EU blacklisting has made it even more fundamental that our laws reflect such transparency, and that we ensure that the proceeds of predicate crimes do not find their way into any activities, including those within the political sphere.
We are today at a major junction to prevent further reputational damage. The political class, across all parties, has to show responsibility and leadership and introduce an appropriate legislation to regulate the funding of political parties as soon as possible, preferably before the next financial year.
[1] Joint Economic Council. Model JEC Code of Ethics. (2001).
[2] Report of the Select Committee on Funding of Political Parties. (2004).
[3] Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of the Financing of Terrorism (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (AML/ CFT Act). (2020).
Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).
For the last few years the African political landscape has been dominated by high profile changes of leaders and governments. In Angola (2017), Ethiopia (2018), South Africa (2018), Sudan (2019) and Zimbabwe (2018), leadership change promised to bring about not only a new man at the top, but also a new political and economic direction.
But do changes of leaders and governments generate more democratic and responsive governments? The Bertelsmann Transformation Index Africa Report 2020 (BTI), A Changing of the Guards or A Change of Systems?, suggests that we should be cautious about the prospects for rapid political improvements.
Reviewing developments in 44 countries from 2017 to the start of 2019, the report finds that leadership change results in an initial wave of optimism. But ongoing political challenges and constraints mean that it is often a case of “the more things change the more they stay the same”.
Political change occurs gradually in the vast majority of African countries.
More continuity than change
From 2015 to 2019, the general pattern has been for the continent’s more authoritarian states – such as Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea and Rwanda – to make little progress towards democracy. In some cases countries became incrementally more repressive.
At the same time, many of the continent’s more democratic states – including Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal and South Africa – have remained “consolidating” or “defective” democracies. Very few of these dropped out of these categories to become “authoritarian” regimes.
A number of countries have seen more significant changes. But in most cases this did not fundamentally change the character of the political system. For example, Cameroon, Chad, Kenya and Tanzania moved further away from lasting political and economic transformation. Meanwhile Angola, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe initially made progress towards it, but these gains were limited – and only lasted for a short period in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe.
As this brief summary suggests, at a continental level the trajectories of different states have by and large cancelled each other out. Positive trends in some cases were wiped out by negative trends in others.
Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has thus seen no significant changes to the overall level of democracy, economic management and governance. For example, the index shows that between 2018 and 2020, the overall level of democracy declined by just 0.09, a small shift on a 1-10 scale. This suggests continuity not change.
Leadership changes often disappoint
In almost all cases, positive trends were recorded in countries where leadership change generated hope for political renewal and economic reform. This includes Angola, after President José Eduardo dos Santos stepped down in 2017, and Ethiopia, following the rise to power of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. It also includes Zimbabwe, where the transfer of power from Robert Mugabe to Emmerson Mnangagwa was accompanied by promises that the Zanu-PF government would show greater respect for democratic norms and values in future.
Sierra Leone also recorded a significant improvement in performance following the victory of opposition candidate Julius Maada Bio in the presidential election of 2018. Nigeria has continued to make modest but significant gains in economic management since Muhammadu Buhari replaced Goodluck Jonathan as president in 2015.
The significance of leadership change in all of these processes is an important reminder of the extent to which power has been personalised. But it is important to note that events since the end of the period under review in 2019 have cast doubt on the significance of these transitions.
Most notably, continued and in some cases increasing human rights abuses in countries such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe suggest that we have seen “a changing of the guards” but not a change of political systems.
Nowhere is this more true than Zimbabwe, where the last few weeks have witnessed a brutal government crackdown. Not only have journalists been arrested on flimsy charges, but the rule of law has been manipulated to keep them in jail. Following this sustained attack on democracy, it is now clear that the Mnangagwa government is no more committed to human rights and civil liberties than its predecessor was.
There is no one ‘Africa’
So what does the future hold? I often get asked what direction Africa is heading in. My answer is always the same: where democracy is concerned, there is no one “Africa”. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index report shows how true this is.
In addition to the well-known differences between leading lights like Botswana and entrenched laggards like Rwanda, there is also a profound regional variation that is less well recognised and understood.
From relatively similar starting points in the early 1990s, there has been a sharp divergence between West and Southern Africa – which have remained comparatively more open and democratic – and Central and Eastern Africa, which remained more closed and authoritarian. There is also some evidence that the average quality of democracy continued to decline in Eastern and Central Africa in the past few years. Because it continues to increase in West Africa, we have seen greater divergence between the two sets of regions.
Figure 1. Average Democracy scores for African regions, BTI 2006-2020*
These variations reflect the historical process through which governments came to power, the kinds of states over which they govern, and the disposition and influence of regional organisations. In particular, East Africa features a number of countries ruled by former rebel armies (Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda). Here political control is underpinned by coercion and a longstanding suspicion of opposition.
This is also a challenge in some Central African states. Here the added complication of long-running conflicts and political instability (Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo) has undermined government performance in many ways.
A number of former military leaders have also governed West African states, including Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. But the proportion has been lower and some countries, such as Senegal, have a long tradition of plural politics and civilian leadership. In a similar vein, southern Africa features a number of liberation movements. But in a number of cases these developed out of broad-based movements that valued political participation and civil liberties. Partly as a result, former military or rebel leaders have had a less damaging impact on the prospects for democracy in Southern and West Africa.
It is important not to exaggerate these regional differences. There is great variation within them as well as between them. But, this caveat notwithstanding, we should not expect to see any convergence around a common African democratic experience in the next few years. If anything, the gap between the continent’s most democratic and authoritarian regions is likely to become even wider.
Charles Telfair Centreis an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).
Rabin Bhujun, Fondateur et Lead Consultant RelateInc.
Les « fake news » prennent de l’ampleur et leurs dégâts réels restent encore à mesurer. Elles ont notamment foisonné à Maurice durant la crise COVID. Dans cet article, Rabin Bhujun analyse les deux facteurs principaux qui ont aidé à décupler la propagation des fake news à Maurice et dans le monde : les réseaux et la technologie, et, la nature humaine. Afin de contrer leur propagation et leurs dégâts, il recommande de meilleures réglementations, une meilleure éducation des audiences, ainsi qu’une plus grande prise de responsabilité et de transparence au sein des médias et des grands acteurs publicitaires.
Les fake news
L’expression fake news occupe une place importante dans l’actualité internationale depuis le milieu des années 2010. Elle a été popularisée par son usage intempestif – et souvent abusif – aussi bien par des hommes politiques de premier plan que par les médias. Si le phénomène fake news n’est pas récent, sa gravité et son ampleur se sont toutefois amplifiées en temps de crise, notamment durant l’épidémie de Covid-19.
Anodines et artisanales, les fake news se sont répandues sous la forme de rumeurs et commérages depuis que les humains communiquent entre eux. Dès 1620, dans Novum Organum, le philosophe Francis Bacon décrit la crédulité, conduisant le citoyen à succomber aux «idols of the cave» (‘idoles de la caverne’). L’idée que chacun a une caverne de pensées issues de son environnement, éducation et habitudes qui le pousse à se conforter dans ses propres préjugés.
La propension des hommes à céder aux «idols of the cave» a été exploitée par des Etats et puissances militaires en temps de guerre mais aussi de paix à travers d’ingénieuses stratégies de désinformation. Cependant, la capacité des fake news à voyager loin, longtemps et auprès d’un grand nombre de personnes a été décuplée par deux facteurs principaux : 1) Les réseaux et la technologie et 2) La nature humaine.
Les réseaux et la technologie
Twitter rassemble 330 000 millions d’utilisateurs par mois, Instagram et Facebook en comptent respectivement 1 milliard et 2,7 milliards et la messagerie WhatsApp est un moyen de communication pour 2 milliards d’individus. Jadis, les stratégies de désinformation dépendaient de moyens logistiques lourds : impression, radiodiffusion et distribution clandestine. Les réseaux sociaux permettent désormais une propagation instantanée, et ciblée, de contenus délibérément trompeurs. C’est notamment ce qu’il s’est produit à grande échelle avec l’opération de Cambridge Analytica durant les présidentielles aux Etats-Unis de 2016 et plus récemment pour l’élection du chef d’Etat de l’Ukraine, en 2019. Un an plus tôt, c’était aussi le cas dans le cadre des législatives en Suède.
La propagation de fake news, mais aussi la difficulté accrue de les distinguer d’informations avérées, est également facilitée par l’utilisation de nouveaux outils technologiques. Le développement de l’intelligence artificielle et du deep learning a inauguré l’ère des médias synthétiques. Ceux-ci permettent, par exemple, la création d’extraits audio et vidéo fabriqués de toutes pièces : Les deepfakes. Comme la fausse vidéo d’un Barack Obama, plus vrai que nature, insultant son successeur à la Maison Blanche.
D’autres outils comme les Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) sont utilisés pour itérer une succession massive de fake news, sans cesse recalibrées afin de les rapprocher le plus possible d’une version que le lecteur/spectateur moyen peut ensuite confondre avec une information crédible et légitime.
La nature humaine
En 2018, le trio Roy, Vosoughi et Aral, du Massachussetts Institute of Technology, a publié le fruit de leurs recherches sur les fake news à partir de l’analyse de millions de tweets publiés entre 2006 et 2017. Leur principale conclusion : Sur Twitter, les fake news se propagent plus rapidement que l’information factuelle. Les trois chercheurs estiment que ce qui est vrai sur Twitter, l’est aussi sur d’autres réseaux sociaux majeurs.
En cause, explique régulièrement Sinan Aral : L’attrait qu’exerce la nouveauté et l’insolite auprès des utilisateurs des réseaux sociaux et des citoyens en général. Si la nouveauté attire, elle conduit également la personne l’ayant apprise à la partager. Le chercheur du MIT suggère que la propension à partager la nouveauté – qui se trouve en l’occurrence être une fake news – provient de la volonté d’être perçu comme étant une personne «in the know». Quelqu’un qui disposerait d’une meilleure compréhension de ce qui se déroule dans la société, l’économie et le monde politique.
Si d’instinct, un grand nombre d’observateurs estiment que la propagation des fake news est facilitée par des personnes peu informées ou avec un sens critique réduit, d’autres études indiquent le contraire. Sous le titre provocateur « Why smart people are more likely to believe fake news », le quotidien britannique The Guardian cite les études ayant démontré que des personnes ayant pourtant réussi académiquement n’exercent pas suffisamment leur sens critique face à des fake news. Elles préfèrent se reposer sur leur intuition – la plus souvent trompeuse – à l’égard d’une information fabriquée, notamment par des logiciels comme les GANs. Ces derniers sont exploités pour simuler le plus fidèlement ce qui est crédible avec pour objectif de tromper la vigilance d’un esprit d’ordinaire critique.
La Trahison des Images, Rene Magritte – Photo by Thomas Hawk
La fake news et ses dégâts
Qu’importe la cause de la propagation des fake news, les conséquences et les dégâts engendrés sont importants. Ils vont bien au-delà des désagréments causés à des stars qu’on fait mourir prématurément ou à l’exaspération temporaire à l’égard de parents qui auraient prétendument prénommé leur fille Brexit.
Avant que l’intervention de puissances étrangères dans le processus électoral des Etats-Unis, du Royaume-Uni, de la Suède ou de l’Ukraine – et la sérieuse menace que cela pose aux démocraties – soit évoquée, les fake news avaient déjà engendré d’autres dégâts ; notamment économiques. Ainsi, en avril 2013, le compte Twitter piraté d’Associated Press avait rapporté la «nouvelle» d’un attentat à la Maison Blanche durant lequel l’ancien président Obama aurait été blessé.
Dans un contexte où les entreprises et traders communiquent avec leurs clients et actionnaires via les réseaux sociaux, et où le trading algorithmique tient en compte le fil d’actualités à la minute près, ce fake news a fait chuter lourdement le S&P 500 de New York, évaporant l’équivalent de 130 USD milliards en valeur boursière. Les dégâts n’ont toutefois été que momentanés, car l’indice boursier a rapidement regagné le terrain perdu dans les heures suivant l’incident.
Maurice et les fake news du COVID
Durant la crise du coronavirus, notamment pendant le confinement total de fin mars à Maurice, les fake news ont failli causer des troubles d’une autre nature : ceux liés à l’ordre public. Le 24 mars, à la suite d’une «nouvelle» faisant état de pillages en cours dans une grande surface du nord du pays, un fort contingent de police s’est rendu, de nuit, dans ce hypermarché au nord de Port-Louis. Pendant que la police concentrait ses moyens de surveillance autour de ce centre commercial, c’est un autre commerce ; toujours en banlieue de la capitale ; mais moins surveillé ; qui avait été vandalisé.
Durant la même période, le nombre officiel de malades de la Covid-19 dans le pays a été contesté sur une base quasi quotidienne. WhatsApp est devenu, durant cette période, la plateforme d’échange privilégiée pour transmettre le prétendument nombre réel de personnes infectées. Dans certain cas, des cartes du pays signalaient même les foyers d’infection, forçant, une nouvelle fois, les forces de l’ordre à effectuer de discrètes mais régulières patrouilles dans ces endroits afin de prévenir tout dérapage.
A Maurice, comme ailleurs, le climat anxiogène causé par l’épidémie de Covid-19 a favorisé la propagation d’un nombre considérable de fake news. Un certain nombre de ces fake news contredisaient directement les consignes des autorités publiques visant à ralentir la propagation de la maladie. Au Canada, 25% des personnes participant à une étude de l’University of Regina ont cru, à tort, qu’une fake news était en fait une information factuelle et crédible. En Grande Bretagne, une étude commanditée par Ofcom en mars a conclu que, face au déluge d’information sur le coronavirus, 40% des personnes interrogées ne savaient plus faire la différence entre ce qui était vrai de ce qui ne l’était pas. Malgré le manque de données, il semble probable que, dans une certaine mesure, les résultats de ces études soient également applicables au contexte mauricien.
Transparence, éducation et réglementations
Devant l’essor des fake news, un plan d’actions croisées est suggéré. Celui-ci requiert toutefois l’intervention de plusieurs acteurs ; sans garantie de succès, voire avec d’autres risques associés dans certains cas.
Une obligation accrue de transparence de la part d’acteurs majeurs comme Google ou Facebook, afin de déterminer quelles informations leurs utilisateurs partagent et à quelle fin ; mais aussi de comprendre comment leurs algorithmes favorisent, ou pas, le partage de certains contenus. Cette obligation serait toutefois en porte-à-faux avec la volonté des utilisateurs de ces plateformes de se prémunir contre la surveillance de leurs activités sur les réseaux.
Une meilleure labellisation du contenu partagé sur les réseaux sociaux en forçant les plateformes d’information à expliquer clairement comment leurs nouvelles sont vérifiées et contre vérifiées afin d’en assurer la crédibilité. Facebook le fait déjà, mais avec un minimum d’information, sur les pages diffusant du contenu en masse.
S’attaquer à l’économie des fake news en privant de publicité les sites qui produisent ce type de contenu ou qui les partagent. Cela requerrait la collaboration active des principaux acteurs de la publicité en ligne comme Facebook, Google et Taboola notamment.
Durcir les lois pénales. Cette voie a déjà été adoptée dans un certain nombre de pays, dont Maurice, ou l’Information and Communication Technologies Act a été durcie. Les militants des droits humains s’inquiètent toutefois des possibles dérives autoritaires que ces lois faciliteraient en exerçant un contrôle plus strict sur la liberté d’expression. Le Code Pénal mauricien punit déjà le délit de publication et diffusion de «fausse nouvelle» depuis 1838.
Encourager les médias à mieux informer et éduquer leurs audiences, notamment en ne cédant pas eux-mêmes à la tentation de consolider les informations erronées, partiellement correctes, hors contextes ou carrément fausses sous le label unique et trompeur fake news. Ceci tend à saper la crédibilité des médias d’information dans leur ensemble. Les médias doivent aussi éduquer leurs audiences afin qu’elles développent le réflexe de consulter une diversité de sources d’information.
Charles Telfair Centreis an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).
The COVID-19 pandemic and consequent lockdown measures have had a huge negative impact on producers and consumers. Food production has been disrupted, and incomes have been lost. But a far more devastating welfare consequence of the pandemic could be reduced access to food.
A potential rise in food insecurity is a key policy point for many countries. The World Economic Forum has stated this pandemic is set to “radically exacerbate food insecurity in Africa”. This, and other supplier shocks, such as locust swarms in East Africa, have made many African economies more dependent on externally sourced food.
As the pandemic continues to spread, the continued functioning of regional and national food supply chains is vital to avoid a food security crisis in countries dependent on agriculture. This is true in terms of both nutrition and livelihoods. Many countries in Southern and East African economies are in this situation.
The integration of regional economies is one vehicle for alleviating pervasive food security issues. But regional integration can’t be achieved without the appropriate support for investment in production, infrastructure and capabilities.
And, crucially, there must be more accurate and timely information about food markets. Data on food prices are crucial for political and economic stability. Yet they are not easily accessible.
But the overall effectiveness of commodity exchanges has been limited in countries in Southern and East Africa. With some exceptions, they have not been widely used, meaning that small producers have not had good access to reliable pricing information.
The patchy data that is available at the producer level indicates very large price differentials across Southern and East Africa. These differentials are far in excess of reasonable transport and related costs. They speak to the lack of integration of markets. They also point to the potential that local market power is being exploited. An example would be the power of large buyers over small producers who face high transport costs to individually transport goods to faraway markets.
Having up-to-date information on food prices – along with other market information relating to production and market structures – is necessary to understand agricultural food systems in the region. This is crucial to track events ranging from the effects of this pandemic to the weather as well as locust swarms.
Without close to realtime data, it is not possible to rapidly plan appropriate responses.
In addition, the lack of readily available market data restricts our understanding of the impact of changing supply and demand conditions in local markets, and regional value chains more broadly. The climate crisis – and other supply shocks like the pandemic – imply much greater volatility in production and food prices. The effects will become ever more dire for farmers, vulnerable consumers and downstream industries.
Hit the reset button
Máximo Torero, chief economist of the Food and Agriculture Organization, has observed that this pandemic is an opportunity to hit the reset button on policies to alleviate food security problems. It has emphasised the fragility of overdependence on a globalised agricultural system. What is needed to achieve a more integrated and regionalised agricultural system is coordinated public policy responses to support agribusiness. These responses must also ensure small and medium-sized farmers are included.
The World Bank is working closely with many governments to track domestic food and agricultural supply chains. The goal is to ensure that food systems continue to function despite the challenges wrought by COVID-19. In addition, the Food and Agriculture Organization has mapped a way to potentially avoid a looming food crisis in Africa. These short-term measures are welcomed.
Action can be taken at a regional level too. For example, an effective market observatory would assist in the promulgation of wider, deeper and more competitive agricultural markets. Market observatories help market participants in reading market signals while also reducing market volatility.
Examples of these can be found throughout the European Union covering a range of agricultural products. Developing this capability would also contribute to identifying key trends in the region in close to realtime. And it would help identify issues relating to market access, border and transport-related problems, and possible anticompetitive behaviour.
In the medium to long term, greater attention is needed on ensuring appropriate market shaping measures for more resilient and integrated regional agricultural systems in the Southern and East African region. Such measures depend on having accurate and timely information on market participants, food production and prices.
Charles Telfair Centreis an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).
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