Jeevesh Augnoo, Head of the Law Department and Senior Lecturer at Rushmore Business School, Mauritius

Krishnee A Appadoo, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law and Management, University of Mauritius & PhD candidate at the University of Western Australia

Bhoomika Jaggeshar, PhD candidate at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow

Climate change poses significant long-term challenges to planetary and human wellbeing. It is unfortunate that anthropogenic actions over the decades have exacerbated the situation for vulnerable people and systems, who are facing the severe and irreversible impacts of climate change. The island of Mauritius, which also forms part of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) community, is no different regarding this issue. With varying temperatures and rainfall patterns, frequent and highly intensified cyclones affecting it, the country has established various strategies and mechanisms to help curb the impacts of climate change in order to alleviate the problems being faced by its population. However, very little has been done in order to include climate change education into the educational curriculum whether at nursery, kindergarten, primary, secondary or university levels. This research paper intends to showcase how we can promote climate change education in schools in order to better equip the community (especially our youth) with the relevant knowledge to better understand and address the climate change crisis within the Mauritian context.

Introduction

Climate Change has been the subject of debates and discussions, with a breakthrough reached for vulnerable states at COP27 in terms of the fund for “loss and damage.” The effects of climate change have been researched, documented and disseminated widely. This research made its way into the corporate culture, gaining some impetus following the open letter of 2015 “urging for concrete climate action” (Allen & Craig, 2016), and becoming a prominent and crucial element considered by companies worldwide in terms of good governance and operation as well as the higher education level, with a range of broad and focused educational qualifications available at various levels. It is therefore essential to promote adequate climate change education in schools, especially in SIDS, such as Mauritius to move from goals to processes. Described as education which “helps people understand and address the impacts of the climate crisis, empowering them with the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes needed to act as agents of change,” it is an essential tool for social transformation and sustainable development (UNESCO, 2023).

Climate Change Education and its Importance

Climate change is not just a scientific phenomenon but a socio-scientific problem requiring more than content teaching. Learning to adapt to risk, uncertainty, and rapid change is the focus of climate change education (IPCC, 2014).  Organisations like governments and nongovernmental bodies have traditionally conducted climate change education. However, they might experience issues in transmitting the necessary messages in order to engage with the appropriate audience (Lee et al., 2013). According to Mochizuki and Bryan (2015), one of the most important and effective ways to build capacities for addressing the climate crisis is to integrate climate change education into formal education systems. This is because of the multiplier effects, in which individuals share what they have learned, particularly in relation to adaptation and mitigation, for the benefit of families and communities. As a result, climate change education must emphasise the kinds of learning, critical and creative thinking, and capacity building that will enable young people to engage with the information, comprehend, and take the actions crucial to address climate change.

Climate change schooling cannot be restricted to conventional designs and formal educational plans but rather needs to draw on new informal and hybrid spaces offering better opportunities for learning and activity (Stevenson et al., 2017). As with any form of education, climate change education in schools has the potential to “influence families and communities as well through the multiplier effect” discussed above. Climate change education is vital in terms of mitigation and adaptation. Climate change education should be comprehensive and multidisciplinary.  That is, it should be interlinked with concepts such as sustainable development, disaster risk reduction, sustainable consumption and production, as well as the circular economy.

The evolution of climate change has accentuated the need for reviewed climate change education, and its widespread effects even more so. Consequently, what is taught and learnt about climate change has also evolved, with increasing focus on learning about the risk, uncertainty and rapid change. Cordero, Centeno & Todd (2020) discussed the relevance of climate change education for engagement at an individual level. Eilam (2021) identified the lack of widespread climate change education, stressing how it can no longer be ignored in curricula at school level. Global actors in school curricula including Cambridge Education have further explained how climate change education is important, offering free access to books as well as working together with partners to ensure adequate dissemination, as propounded by UNESCO.

Climate Change Education in Mauritius

In Mauritius, there are very limited measures being undertaken to implement climate change education. For example, in 2015, a new education kit was unveiled in Mauritius to assist students in learning about climate change adaptation and mitigation measures. The Climate Change Education Kit was launched by the Mauritius Institute of Education (MIE). The latter announced that it would be targeting 258,000 primary and secondary school students, aged six to eighteen years old. According to the MIE, “the kit aims at informing and challenging the students to develop appropriate skills and qualities for adaptation and survival in fast-changing ecological and environmental trends.” The kit’s role is to inform and challenge students to develop appropriate knowledge and skills for adaptation and mitigation in a society with fast changing environmental and ecological tendencies. Keshwar Beeharry-Panray, representative of the NGO ‘Environment Protection and Conservation Organisation (EPCO)’ praised this initiative, highlighting that “this climate change kit is a preparedness programme to help the kids get ready to face the issues of climate change.” Dr Ravhee Bholah, Project Coordinator of the Climate Change Education Kit at the Mauritius Insititute of Education (MIE), explained that the production of the kit was funded by the government of Japan, as part of the Africa Adaptation Programme, to the tune of US$ 3 million.

In terms of content, the kit contains a wide range of curriculum resource materials, including factsheets, bookmarks, flyers, comic strips, 3D models and teachers’ manuals. This kit was distributed to 320 primary and 176 secondary schools across the island. In terms of content, the kit aims at offering insights to students on learning to adapt to climate change associated risks, uncertainty and rapid change, as well as equip them with understanding regarding adaptation and mitigation strategies especially as Mauritius is a small island. In secondary schools, as per the National Curriculum Framework (NCF), there has been a first step in terms of climate change education, as the latter is distributed across some modules such as Design and Technology, Home Economics, etc. It is encouraging to note that one of the core values of the NCF is sustainability, which means that the curriculum, by extrapolation, embraces the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and hopefully SDG 13 which is climate action.

At the tertiary (higher education/university) level, there are undergraduate and postgraduate programmes which focus on climate change education. For example, at the University of Mauritius, there is the MSc Sustainable Energy Engineering with Environmental Management, which has a dedicated climate change module. Furthermore, the Faculty of Agriculture, of the same institution, also offers an MSc in Climate Change and Sustainable Development. At the same time, the University of Technology, Mauritius, offers an MSc in Climate Change, Health and Disaster Management. The Université des Mascareignes gives the possibility to students to enrol on its MSc in Sustainable Business Management, which has a few climate change focused modules.

On top of this, the government of Mauritius, in its bid to empower students to embark upon climate change focused degree, through its Ministry of Education, Tertiary Education, Science and Technology, is offering Masters scholarships to eligible students who are either Mauritians or citizens of member states of either the African Union of African Commonwealth countries, and these scholarships are tenable for the MScs offered as mentioned above at the University of Technology, Mauritius and the Université des Mascareignes.

While the above examples demonstrate the commendable measures which have been taken in Mauritius to integrate climate change education into the nursery, kindergarten, primary, secondary and university curricula, it is argued that these remain inadequate. Despite the fact that Mauritius has updated its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to mention that “an awareness raising strategy and communication plan ha[d] been prepared to sensitise various stakeholders (women association, youth leaders, senior citizens, fishers, planters, academia, professionals, students, private sector, civil society and NGOs)” on climate change adaptation and mitigation, it is rather unfortunate that this is not the case as can be demonstrated by the lack of climate change education and awareness in Mauritius, by government-run educational institutions. What is clearly lacking is a holistic approach to climate change education and awareness which should be mainstreamed across relevant subjects and modules at primary, secondary and tertiary education levels in Mauritius.

Moreover, climate change education should not be included in the curriculum with the mere attempt to tick boxes. Instead, more effort should be put into training educational professionals across all three levels to integrate climate change education so that students are not only taught but also assessed through engaging, fun and mature modes. Additionally, students should be immersed into the realities of climate adaptation, mitigation and loss and damage, by bringing them closer to the communities which are being affected by the climate crisis such as fisherfolk, farmers, and other groups that rely on the climate for their livelihoods.

Climate Change Education around the world

While the UN has been calling for climate change education to become mandatory in schools as from the ages 2-5 so as to better equip children to adapt and mitigate global warming in the future, only a handful of countries currently mandate climate change studies in their education system, despite most of them being signatories to this objective in the Paris Agreement. As such, article 7 (5) of the Paris Agreement calls for “Parties acknowledg[ing] that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate.” It is believed that integrating climate change-related subjects in school curricula will assist the youth in coping better, both psychologically and practically with the reality of climate change.

Cambodia has integrated climate change education into its curriculum with a new and enhanced Earth Science curriculum, since the year 2020. High school students are being taught about the factors that contribute to climate change and also about the vulnerability of their country to the effects of climate change. While learning the basics of adaptation and mitigation, the youth are also assigned to work on projects such as climate-smart agriculture and tree-planting. Argentina’s Parliament recently approved a National Law of Comprehensive Environmental Education, also known as the Pino Solanas Law, in 2021, where environmental education is now being taught in all schools at all levels.

The vulnerability of India vis-a-vis climate change is evidenced by the catastrophic climatic events it faces namely, flash floods, landslides, and intense cyclones. Therefore, the country has already advanced towards introducing climate change education in schools as an adaptation strategy. India has established child cabinets, adolescents and youth platforms like Meena and Raju at school so that girls and boys can forthrightly discuss topics related to climate change and disaster risk reduction. In addition, UNICEF assisted in adapting the Safe Saturday concept, a component of school safety aiming at developing children’s knowledge and skills in order to be better prepared in dealing with disasters and climate change.

With the intention of strengthening the capacities of 100 master trainers and 10,000 schoolteachers through related training, successful advocacy in the State of Maharashtra resulted in the integration of climate action and environment lesson plans into the first and second-grade curricula of 65,000 primary schools across the state (UNICEF, 2023). However, according to Sarang (2021), the rewritten curriculum in India makes the first tentative connections between disciplines thereby emphasising the complexity of coincidental issues and procedures. However, putting these curriculum changes into action is difficult. Even though subjects are redesigned around environmental issues, they do not address immediate concerns like sustainability and climate change.

Recommendations and Conclusions

As has been discussed above, climate change education is vital not only for the youth but for all sections of the population, be it young or old. However, climate change education and awareness-raising is even more important for the youth as they are the stewards of tomorrow and will inherit the Earth as it is progressing now. In line with the principle of inter and intragenerational equity, we owe it to this and the next generation, to leave the planet as pristine and climate safe as possible.

In Mauritius, as has been demonstrated above, there is a dearth of projects and initiatives which focus on climate change education. For this reason, it is proposed that Mauritius turns to countries like India, Argentina and Cambodia to mainstream climate change education into the educational curricula. Moreover, more funding should be diverted towards climate change education, whether at the nursery, primary, secondary or university levels. Additionally, there should be enhanced training of staff, such as educators and academia in order for them to be able to teach climate change education. Measuring the impact of any curriculum change or initiative in education is quintessential, and thus requires signalling. Finally, climate change education should not only be relegated to the youth, but there should be community projects and programmes aimed at raising awareness for climate change for people of all ages, ethnic groups, genders and more importantly minority groups such as women, the disabled and indigenous groups.

Main photo by Gustavo Fring on Pexels. 

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Sheistah Bundhoo-Deenoo, Lecturer in Management at Charles Telfair Education

The article examines the intersectional inequalities from a gender dimension in the Mauritian context. Intersectional inequality gained recognition through the work of black feminist Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw. Intersecting inequalities is very much prominent in  Mauritius given the colonial and patriarchal history of the country. However, it has not been noted that this aspect was neglected in social activism of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) lobbying for human rights. As such, the article sheds light on the dimensions of intersectional inequalities relevant to the Mauritian context and focuses on the impact it has on the female population.

The Relevance of Intersectionality in Mauritius

The impacts of intersectional inequalities are multi-fold, severe, and directly challenge core human rights. The term “intersectional inequality” gained recognition through the work of the well-known black feminist Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw in 1989 through her work on “Demarginalising the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics.”  Despite the relevance and significance of this term amidst the social sciences sector and the social policy discipline, this dimension has not been well conceptualised in the work and lobbying activities of CSOs in Mauritius. Nonetheless, it remains of utmost value to expand this notion and incorporate an intersectional axe in advocacy given that the colonial and patriarchal history of Mauritius is embedded with aspects of sexism and gender, social class as well as ethnic and income inequalities.

Madhoo and Nath (2013) elaborate on the fact that factors such as limited access to education, housing, and healthcare, alongside the unequal distribution of income and persistent poverty can impede the development of human capabilities and the equitable distribution of benefits from economic growth in Mauritius. They also highlight the ethnic dimension of Mauritius by acknowledging that the country stands out as an example of ethnic cooperation in contrast to certain Sub-Saharan African nations where ethnic divisions have often led to power struggles and resource conflicts. The authors further acknowledge that the segmented Mauritian society, characterised by its ethnic divisions, has proven to be conducive to both economic growth and the enhancement of welfare.

Regarding the gender dimension, Ramtohul (2012) argues that Mauritian women carry a multitude of diverse and sometimes conflicting identities primarily rooted in factors such as class, religion, caste, and ethnicity which therefore lead to the social division of women into distinct interest groups and identity clusters. Ramtohul (2012) further explores the intersectional identity of Mauritian women by making the link with religion and its impact on feminism. The author puts forward that religion provides an underlying ideology of male authority over women and the endorsement of women roles within the family as caregivers, wives, and mothers. Consequently, these religious contexts offer limited space for organisations to challenge patriarchal authority, transcend intersecting identities, and engage in feminist activism that extends beyond the inclusion of women in education and domestic skills training.

Intersectionality versus Diversity

When applying intersectional lenses in advocacy, it is crucial not to confuse “intersectionality” with “diversity”. The Poverty and Inequality Commission puts forward that “intersectionality is not a synonym for diversity”. Indeed, while diversity initiatives primarily focus on increasing representation and inclusion across various dimensions of human differences, such as race, gender, age, and sexual orientation, intersectionality rather posits that social identities and systems of oppression are interconnected and mutually constitutive towards the reinforcement of hierarchical categories. Therefore, diversity initiatives aim to promote fair representation and subsequently create awareness while intersectionality provided a nuanced framework backed up by concepts of power and privilege to understand existing social inequalities.

Intersecting social differences demonstrate the dynamics of power and complex inequalities. This phenomenon is not solely applicable to CSOs. Ken and Helmuth (2021) analysed 379 articles on intersectional topics having a nominal mention of mutual constitution where the most common elements remained the gender, race and class dimensions. Interestingly, in their analysis, the authors point out that there also seems to be a non-reciprocal understanding of the definition of “race”, “class” and “gender” by several authors. The Equality and Human Rights Commission has taken steps to establish its own interpretation of the concept, thereby facilitating its practical application in the context of monitoring equality and human rights. A measurement framework has even been provided to measure intersectionality in the education sector, health services, workplace, political and civic participation and so on. In accordance with their perspective, intersectionality is employed as an analytical instrument to elucidate the various specific manifestations of harm, abuse, discrimination, and disadvantage encountered by individuals when multiple social identity categories intersect with one another. This tool can be beneficial when designing and implementing human rights and equality advocacy strategies. For instance, the Framework provides six domains (Education, Work, Living Standards, Health, Justice, Personal Security and Participation) which are measured using three core and two supplementary indicators each. This measure allows an organisation to track practical intersectional implications to present the distinct forms of harm, abuse, discrimination, and disadvantage experienced by people when multiple categories of social identities interact with each other.

Intersectionality and Gender Diversity

Research has shown that intersectional inequalities have a direct influence on how we understand violence against women, children’s exposure to intimate partner violence, gender-based violence politics, mental health, educational performance and achievement as well as on global gender inequality. The various consequences of intersectional inequalities provide solid ground for adopting intersectional lenses when advocating for the elimination of social issues and uplift human rights. It is essential to have an intersectional foundation discourse which reflects the multiple identities and experiences of people. It has been acknowledged that intersecting inequalities can be cultural, spatial, economic and political. Besides, various indicators have been used to measure economic inequalities  including income or wealth (also termed as vertical inequalities) and social discrimination (also termed as horizontal inequalities). Nonetheless, it has been proved that gender inequalities cut across all the forms of inequality which therefore positions women and girls from poor and socially marginalised groups as the most disadvantaged persons in  society.

The World Bank Report (2018) reveals that the primary driver of escalating income inequality is derived from household income generated through labor. This phenomenon can be ascribed to two principal intersectional factors: firstly, demographic aspects encompassing the composition, amalgamation, and attributes of households, along with the extent to which individuals marry within their own income group; and secondly, labor market dynamics including participation in the workforce and disparities in individual labor earnings. The  report  also shows that Mauritian females encounter significant disadvantages to access the labor market even though there has been consistent increase in women’s participation in the labor force over the past decade. The gender disparity remains alarmingly high, and this is explained by differences in age, educational level, marital status, household demographic structure. Moreover, women are also paid less (on average of 30% less) than men per hour worked in the private sector.

Intersectionality, Gender and Mauritius

Dabee’s thesis (2018) titled “An Intersectional Feminist Perspective” highlights that intersectionality enables an understanding of Collin’s (1990) ‘matrix of domination’ faced by Mauritian women.  This thesis argues that Mauritian women negotiate withing the site of power-struggle within both the private and public spheres given the colonial and patriarchal history of Mauritius.

Being a pluri-ethnic society with an ethnic majority, the Mauritian intersectional context can thus be studied from a feminist post-colonial theory. From a post-colonial feminist perspective, Tyagi (2014)  puts emphasis on the fact that women “suffers from ‘double colonisation’ as she simultaneously experiences the oppression of colonialism and patriarchy”.  Tyagi (2014) depicts nationalism as being pivotal in fostering the advancement of women’s emancipation movements in the African region and at the same time makes a clear distinction between feminism and nationalism characterising the two concepts as being ‘complex’ and adversarial dynamic due to the inherent discordance between their respective social and political objectives.

Indeed, looking back at the history of women’s movement and empowerment in Mauritius, it is noted that women’s activism peaked in the 1970’s with a focus on challenging patriarchal systems through efforts directed at amending the Civil Code and the Immigration and Deportation Act. Ramtohul (2012) argues that the progression of the women’s movement in Mauritius unfolded gradually, with women initially congregating within religiously oriented organizations primarily dedicated to education and social welfare initiatives.

Social stratification in Mauritius is deeply rooted in the history of slavery, indentured laborers and traders who seek to accommodate themselves according to a color-caste-class rules. Till date, the caste system is still embedded in contemporary Mauritian society, for instance, Hindus exhibit divisions based on factors such as the caste system, language, region of origin, and religious affiliation. Similarly, the Creoles perceive divisions among themselves based on aspects of skin color (light and dark) and language preference (French and Creole speakers).

This intersecting stratification is more profoundly felt by Mauritian women, and it is noted that there is not only a lack of research in this field but also, it has been left out in the advocacy discourse for female empowerment and/or gender equality. It is insufficient to only respond to the call  for applying gender perspective in the public domain andadopting gender mainstreaming or more inclusive policies. Intersectional inequalities should feature across gender-based projects and initiatives aimed at advancing equality in order to address the core issue which has been omitted from the discourse.

The National Strategy and Action Plan 2020-2024 is a powerful strategic document aimed at addressing inequalities with a ‘new approach to address gender based violence (GBV) in a holistic manner.’. As such, a study on Religious Practices that Impede the Rights of Women and Girls had been planned for 2021 and ‘women with disabilities, the elderly, different forms of gendered-identities and individuals from lower socioeconomic groups’ have been recognised as “context specific risks” as often these groups are considered as homogenous. These factors indicate an understanding of intersectional inequalities (though the concept is not mentioned in the action plan) but there is a gap between policy intent and implementation.

The topic of women empowerment, gender equality and feminist movements in Mauritius remain subjective to the implementing agency (be it CSOs, private and public sectors and research institutions). For instance, the National Social Inclusion Foundation, which is the main institution receiving and allocating public funds to NGOs, identifies ‘family protection including gender-based violence’ as one of its priority areas. On the other hand, private sectors tend to be more aligned with Sustainable Development 5 Gender Equality as a foundation for gender equality and women empowerment projects.

It has been noted that the conceptualisation of “womens empowerment” and “gender equality” in Mauritius remain subjective to individuals as well as institutions despite its widespread usage in debates, discourses, or projects. Women do not constitute a homogeneous group, nor are their needs. As a matter of fact, Dabee’s thesis (2018)underpins the extent to which ‘women’s interests’ in the Mauritian context has been ‘framed in response to women lived experiences, socio-economic and political status at particular points in time’. Therefore, it remains a challenge to capture the essence of women empowerment and gender equality in contemporary Mauritius due to the diversity of perspectives and experiences; yet it is of crucial importance to identify a unified advocacy approach to address women intersectional issues.

Communities and Partnerships

The way forward to tackle intersectional inequalities in Mauritius can be embedded in the advocacy actions of CSOs. The European Network of National Human Rights Institutions stresses  the power of community. By collaborating and leveraging their respective skills, diverse CSOs can enhance their capacity to bring about meaningful transformation. Partnerships are widely encouraged to ensure a participatory dialogue and to harmonise data available and collected by CSOs. As such, addressing intersectional inequalities automatically become a prime focus when human right defenders collaborate on their initiatives and advocacy strategies.

The best practice set by Kaleidoscope Trust under the Equality & Justice Alliance (EJA) programme for Mauritius proves that collaborative work can yield insightful results. Under the said programme, the Kolektif Drwa Imin (KDI), which constitute of several non-governmental partners was formed to advocate for change in laws and policies towards a sustainable future that ensures a life free of violence, discrimination for women, children, and LGBT+ persons. As a matter of fact, several frameworks have been provided to guide CSOs to mainstream intersectional inequality in their advocacy actions. For instance, Freedom House working on defending human rights provides a toolkit for “advocacy in restricted spaces” and recommends  developing an advocacy guide as a starting point, followed by assessing ‘alternative entry points’, ‘engage unlikely allies’, ‘use of evidence-based approach’, and ‘creating cultural resistance’ all with an underlying intersectional axe.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) signed by the Mauritian state in 2005 is very relevant when addressing women’s intersectional inequalities. In contrast to other existing instruments addressing women’s human rights, the Maputo Protocol outlines a broad and substantial array of human rights pertaining to women, encompassing the entirety of civil and political domains, economic considerations, social and cultural aspects, and environmental rights. Thus, the representation of the intersectional experiences of women is reflected through the protocol and is further reinforced by the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights (SOAWR) which represents a coalition of 80+ civil society organisations from 33 countries, working towards ensuring the articulation of the protocol. Interestingly one of SOAWR core values include “diversity and inclusivity”, accentuating on the fact that women’s intersectional identities intensify discrimination.

Conclusion and the way forward

In a nutshell, based on feminist and post-colonial theories, research and contextual analysis, it can be recommended that applying an intersectional lens in advocacy can yield sustainable results which at the same time addresses core and subsidiary human rights and social issues. In order to pave the way forward, there should be partnerships fostered with multiple stakeholders; collaborative work which includes a plan, strategy, collective goal setting; as well as measurement of impact from an intersectional perspective.

Main photo by Audrew McMurtrie on Pexels. 

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor: Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director: Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

Inequality remains on the top of the policy priority list for most countries in the world. Branko Milanovic, a leading scholar on inequality, recently delivered a lecture titled “Recent changes in the global income distribution and their political implications” at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. Imraan Valodia asked him to unpack some of the main points of his lecture.

Imraan Valodia: There is a lot of discussion across the world about rising income inequality. What your lecture makes clear is that the evidence is more nuanced. Income inequality between countries has actually been falling since the 2000s, but income inequality within countries is rising. Can you elaborate on this, and outline the main factors driving these patterns of income inequality, both between and within countries?

Branko Milanovic: Yes, your summary is correct. Global inequality is the sum of inequality between countries, weighted by countries’ population, and inequality within countries. Since the 1990s, countries in Asia with relatively large populations, like China, India and Vietnam, have had high growth rates per capita – much higher than the developed countries. As a result of this, the population-weighted between-country inequality has been falling.

On the other hand, inequalities within countries have been getting much worse. These are now higher than they were 30 years ago in all major countries: the US, China, Russia, most of continental Europe, even South Africa. Only Latin America, which already was very unequal, has not followed this trend of increase of within-national inequalities.

Most of the time people don’t distinguish between these different inequalities which, as I said, have moved differently. And that creates confusion.

Imraan Valodia: You have highlighted the importance of understanding historical trends in income inequality, and how political factors shape inequality outcomes over time. What are these major historical trends, and why is it important to understand them?

Branko Milanovic: I think that the main historical trends are always reflected in income distributions or inequalities, whether we are talking of inequalities within countries or more broadly, at the global level.

At the global level, I identify three major eras.

The time of colonialism and sharp class conflict within countries during most of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. During that time both between-country and within-country inequalities increased. One can view between-country inequality in this case as something that made colonialism possible, or a reflection of colonialism. Both as a cause and effect.

Then during the second half of the 20th century, global inequality was extremely high and the world was divided into three “worlds”: the First (rich countries), the Second (socialist counties), and the Third (Asia, Africa and Latin America).

That changed with the rise of China, and Asia more broadly (the third era). Global inequality was reduced, but at the “cost” of rising within-national inequalities. What I mean is that globalisation might have strongly helped the growth of Asian countries, but also contributed to the increase of within-national inequalities. This is our current era. But it too might come to an end.

Imraan Valodia: Your research shows that, across the world, since the global financial crisis in 2008, the share of global income accruing to the wealthiest has not been rising. This is a change from the period before the financial crisis, as shown in your famous elephant curve, when the share of the top earners did increase sharply. But you make the point that in recent years, in money terms, the wealthiest are still increasing their incomes rapidly. Can you elaborate and explain what the difference between the relative and absolute trends means, and why it’s significant?

Branko Milanovic: Since the global financial crisis, income of the global top 1% has not returned to the growth rates they enjoyed before the crisis. This can be intuitively best understood through the example of the US, which contributes to almost one-half of the people in the global top 1%. Incomes at the very top of the US pyramid dropped during the crisis, slowly began to recover in the period after 2010, but reached their pre-crisis level only in 2018.

This means that the average growth rate over these ten years was close to zero. The second highest US percentile recovered to the pre-crisis level a bit earlier, by 2015, but the decennial average growth rate was only 1.5%. This is much below the growth rates of the top before the financial crisis.

These are relative numbers. In absolute terms, however, these very small percentage increases did translate into large absolute gains simply because the gaps in the initial-period income distribution are huge. If your income is US$1 million, even a 1% increase will mean $10,000, which is somebody else’s total annual income.

Imraan Valodia: You make the point that with the current slowdown in economic growth in China, the future pattern of global income inequality may be shaped by income trends in Africa. Why is Africa important for the future trajectory of income across the globe, and why are you pessimistic about the potential for Africa to emulate the trends that we have seen in recent years in China and India?

Branko Milanovic: China is no longer the engine of global inequality reduction that it was in the past simply because it is no longer a poor, but rather an upper-middle income country.

If global inequality is to continue on its downward trend we need new “Chinas”. One of them is obviously India, which is currently the most populous country in the world. If India continues to grow, we can expect global inequality to continue to fall.

But the others are populous African countries. This is why African economic growth is central to what happens in this century to both global poverty and global inequality.

I am pessimistic on whether African countries would be able to replicate China and India, simply based on the past: very few African countries were able to maintain high economic growth rates for a relatively long time (say, at least five or ten years in a row).

But it is an observation based on the past. We may be wrong in extrapolating it to the future.

Still the key issue of the importance of African economic growth remains. Without it, global inequality will not be reduced, and might easily increase – which would bring us to the fourth global era (to allude to my answer in the beginning of our conversation).

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Jaime de Melo, Emeritus Professor, University of Geneva

For small island economies like Mauritius, their environment and ecosystem are particularly fragile as trade and tourism, the engines of growth, exert pressure on the environment. This note presents an array of indicators of the health of the environment for Mauritius and 7 ‘comparable’ tourist-oriented small islands. Mauritius’ non-environmental performance over the period 1970-2015 is among the best, a reflection of the ‘Mauritian miracle’. However, for most performance indicators, Mauritius underperforms relative to comparators. This lacklustre performance also shows up when an overall composite indicator of environmental performance is plotted against per capita GDP. Mauritius also has a persistently high carbon-intensive energy mix.

In a span of fifty years, Mauritius is at the door of the high-income status according to the World Bank criterion, even reaching it briefly in 2019. Key to this success was the combination of effective policies and adaptation to changing external events cemented by close collaboration between the government, the private sector, unions, and civil society. In the case of Mauritius, economic appraisals have often touted a “Mauritian miracle” reflected in its high growth rates as reflected by the standard United Nations System of National Accounts that ignores depreciation of natural capital.

It is widely accepted that the health of the environment and its ecosystems are particularly fragile in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) because of population pressures, biodiversity loss, and climate-change related pressures to which they are more vulnerable. SIDS depend strongly on international trade. If not accompanied by policies that protect their environment, international trade can then result in the depletion of their natural resources. Tellingly, Pierre Poivre, the precursor of environmental economics was the first to warn about the environmental impact of the ongoing deforestation he was observing in Mauritius in the 18^th. Century [1].

Usually, countries take better care of their environment as they become richer, both because citizens put greater weight on environmental quality and because governments have more resources at their disposal. This note contrasts Mauritius’ trajectories of economic and environmental indicators with those of ‘comparable’ tourist-dependent small island economies.  Mauritius’ performance is evaluated by comparing the trajectories of several indicators of environmental performance across 7 island economies comparable to Mauritius: Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominican Republic, Haïti, Jamaica, Seychelles, Trinidad & Tobago (see population and population densities for each country in the notes to Figure 1). This note will start with a review of the overall non-environmental performance and then turn to indicators of environmental performance.  The upshot is that Mauritius has done relatively well on the standard indicators of performance like GDP growth and human development, but less well on the environmental front.

Superior GDP Growth and Human Development

Figure 1 displays the trajectories of two non-environmental indicators for each country over 1970-2015: the Human Development Index Purged of the income per capita component (HDIP) on the vertical axis against Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (logarithmic scale) on the horizontal axis [2]. A relatively flat trajectory shows greater improvement along the material (GNI per capital) dimension. A relatively steep trajectory shows greater improvement along the social HDIP) dimension. Since the time dimension is the same for all countries (except Comoros and Seychelles), long trajectories indicate a sustained performance.

Figure 1: Small Islands Trajectories; Human Development Index (HDIP) and GNI

The group exhibits large differences in performance on both social and economic dimensions. In most cases, strong (weak) performance is observed along both dimensions (HDIP and GNI per capita). Jamaica, Haiti and Comoros display weak performance on social and growth indicators whereas Cape Verde, Jamaica, Mauritius and Seychelles display strong performance along both dimensions reflected in the long fairly regular upward-sloping trajectories. Barbados has a strong performance on the social dimension but no growth.

The irregular trajectories for some countries illustrate the importance of shocks, external and or internal, and accompanying policies. The irregular trajectories also remind us of the limits imposed by country idiosyncrasies on any comparative assessment, especially in a small group.  Together, Figure 1 and Table 1 show that Mauritius has fared relatively well within this group. Both indicators showed steady improvements over the period justifying a ‘superior’ label.

Table 1: Social (HDIP) and growth (GNI per capita) indicators: Mauritius and comparators

Lacklustre environmental Performance

Turning to the environment, table 2 presents a dashboard of sub-indexes. These are categorized to capture three aspects of environmental challenges facing Mauritius and other island economies: (i) physical vulnerability to climate change; (ii) current health of the environment: (iii) state of preparedness to meet environmental challenges. Each sub-index is an average of components. Part I captures exogenous aspects of environmental performance. Parts II and III capture the impact of environmental policies.  Because these indices are ordinal rather than cardinal, rankings are provided along with index values.

Table 2: Environmental Dashboard for small islands

Mauritius is the second most vulnerable country to climate change in the group. Because they have lost endemic species, though they still have non-extinct endemic species, Mauritius and Seychelles are at the greatest risk of species extinction (low rank on the RLI). Indeed, Mauritius ranks last on the RLI index. Mauritius has a high rank in the group on the health of the ecosystem (HLT) but has a low rank on ecosystem vitality (ECO) because of low scores on index values for fisheries (FSH), for ecosystem services (ECS), and risk of species extinction (RLI).

Figure 2 plots the values of an Environmental Performance Index for Small Islands (EPISI) which is a geometric average of the HLT and ECO sub-indices. The EPISI omits Green House Gas (GHG) emissions on the grounds that since benefits of abatement accrue beyond the borders of small countries, they are not directly affecting the quality of the environment for tourism (but see figure 3 on progress at reducing GHG emissions.)  As shown in Casella and Melo (2023), Mauritius performs below the fitted curve for the group of comparator tourist islands. Compared with the other tourist-oriented island economies, at per capita income level, Mauritius’ performance is ‘lacklustre’, below Seychelles (‘superior’), Dominican Republic and Jamaica.

Mauritius is the second most vulnerable country to climate change in the group. Because they have lost endemic species, though they still have non-extinct endemic species, Mauritius and Seychelles are at the greatest risk of species extinction (low rank on the RLI). Indeed, Mauritius ranks last on the RLI index. Mauritius has a high rank in the group on the health of the ecosystem (HLT) but has a low rank on ecosystem vitality (ECO) because of low scores on index values for fisheries (FSH), for ecosystem services (ECS), and risk of species extinction (RLI).

Figure 2 plots the values of an Environmental Performance Index for Small Islands (EPISI) which is a geometric average of the HLT and ECO sub-indices. The EPISI omits Green House Gas (GHG) emissions on the grounds that since benefits of abatement accrue beyond the borders of small countries, they are not directly affecting the quality of the environment for tourism (but see figure 3 on progress at reducing GHG emissions.)  As shown in Casella and Melo (2023), Mauritius performs below the fitted curve for the group of comparator tourist islands. Compared with the other tourist-oriented island economies, at per capita income level, Mauritius’ performance is ‘lacklustre’, below Seychelles (‘superior’), Dominican Republic and Jamaica.

Decarbonization yet to start

Decarbonization is the reduction (or removal) of CO2 output into the atmosphere. It is the start on the path towards the declared zero net CO2 emissions objective by all countries. Relative decoupling occurs when CO2 emissions grow less rapidly than GDP. Absolute decoupling occurs when CO2 emissions stagnate or display negative growth.  Relative decoupling is an indicator of progress towards zero net emissions.  Over the period 1995-2015– the period with CO2 emissions data available for a large number of countries—no country in the group of islands has started to decarbonize. Only Cabo Verde and Dominican Republic each had an episode of relative decoupling.

Over the period 1995-2005, Mauritius had the highest rate of carbonization next to Trinidad and Tobago (TTO) with emissions growing twice as fast as GDP. The situation improved over the next decade, yet CO2 emissions were still growing faster than GDP. Relative decoupling has not started for Mauritius over 1995-2015.

Figure 3: Decadal growth rates: CO2e emissions vs. GD for tourist-dependent islands

To summarize, Mauritius’ CO2 emissions per capita target in the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) for 2015 was already off-track in 2010. Per capita emissions have continued to grow every year, reaching 5.3Tco2e per capita in 2018 – 38% above the 2030 target. And Mauritius’ carbon intensity of electricity was 601g CO2e per KW in 2021. This is 24 percent higher than the average for the upper-middle- income group of countries to which Mauritius belongs and it is 71 percent above the average for the high-income group Mauritius is aspiring to rejoin [3].

Moving forward

Figure 2 shows that Mauritius performs below average on the protection of its environment for its per capita income (a pattern also observed but not shown here when the comparison is extended to all countries). Mauritius is a carbon-intensity electricity country is also significantly above the average of the World Bank’s Upper-middle income category.

This lacklustre performance also extends when evaluation is extended to commitments on other components of the environment like biodiversity. During the negotiations at the Aichi Convention on Biological Diversity, Mauritius pledged to protect 17% of terrestrial and inland water as well as 10% of coastal habitat (Target 11) by 2025. As of 2019, according to Mauritius’ National Voluntary Review (VNR) on SDG targets, only 4.725 % terrestrial area and 0.003% of marine and coastal area are protected.

But progress is on the way. In 2020, as part of its commitments to reach its SDG7 energy target, Mauritius submitted a compact for the next ten years stipulating a list of specific objectives for 2030. The compact is available from the Mauritius Renewable Energy Agency (MARENA). The detailed list includes: 60% renewable in the energy mix; increase efficiency of electricity delivery by 10%; phasing out of coal for power generation by 2030. The document also lists specific accompanying measures (e.g., an increase in battery energy storage, a levy on energy inefficient appliances, labelling, etc…) to help meet these objectives.

This recent shift to presenting objectives progress in terms of easily quantifiable metrics is commendable. However, the government should produce regular updates. For example, for transition towards a renewable electricity mix, updates should be produced on a biennial basis until 2030. Also, different transition scenarios towards renewable energy should be carried out as done recently by Selosse et al. (2018) for Reunion’s “renewable energy revolution” [4].

These updates should be disseminated widely to the public (and discussed in parliament). Only through a greater visibility in the public discourse will the environment figure more prominently in the country’s objectives and slippages of the past be avoided.

[1] Describing Poivre’s instructions in his Règlement Economique of 1769 to prevent deforestation, Brouard (1963), cited in Techera (2019), wrote “‘… hasten to control it [deforestation] with a good policy … examine the existing regulations on this subject, study the exact condition of the forests, exploit and utilise them in the most economical way possible, and only allow people to cut them if they ensure their conservation. This will be the object of a provisional regulation after which … a general forest policy and law will be set for all the forests of the two islands… “text in brackets added.

[2] To ease the interpretation of figure 1, table 1 details the starting and end values for both indicators.

[3] Source: Our World in Data. Income group categories from the World Bank

[4] The bottom-up optimization TIMES model they use to evaluate alternative pathways to achieve a 100 percent transition from coal to renewables by 2030 through a combination of biomass, hydro, wind, and solar would be easily adaptable to Mauritius.

Bibliography

Casella, Henri, and Jaime de Melo (2023) “Taking Seriously the Move to Green Growth: Screening Dimensions of Environmental Progress in African SIDS”, Charles Telfair Centre. https://charlestelfaircentre.com/taking-seriously-the-move-to-green-growth-screening-dimensions-of-environmental-progress-in-african-sids/

MARENA (2021)  SDG7: Energy Compact of Mauritius

Melo, Jaime de (2023) “Environmentally-friendly trade policies to shape Mauritius’ future” FERDI WP#315, https://ferdi.fr/en/publications/environmentally-friendly-trade-policies-to-shape-mauritius-future.

Melo, Jaime de and Jean-Marc Solleder (2023) “The Landscape of CO2 emissions across Africa”, The World Economy, 46(11).

Selosse, S., S. Garabedian, O. Ricci, N. Maïzi (2020) “The Renewable energy revolution of Reunion Island”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol 89, 99-105

Wendling, Z. A., Emerson, J. W., de Sherbinin, A., Esty, D. C., et al. (2020). 2020 Environmental Performance Index Report and Technical appendix: New Haven, CT: Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy. https://epi.yale.edu/

Main photo by IPSNews on Flickr.

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Hippolyte Fofack, Chief Economist and Director of Research at the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank)

CAIRO – Nearly 22 years after Jim O’Neill, then an economist at Goldman Sachs, coined the BRIC acronym to capture the economic potential of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the group – called the BRICS since the addition of South Africa – contributes more to global GDP (in purchasing-power-parity terms) than the G7. The International Monetary Fund forecasts that China and India alone will generate about half of global growth this year.

But with geopolitical tensions running high, and the weaponization of the dollar for national-security purposes continuing to escalate, the BRICS have taken on new significance, offering trade diversion and other relief to weaken the effectiveness of sanctions and fast-tracking the transition to a multipolar world. Since 2014, Russia’s trade with G7 countries has fallen by more than 36%, owing to unprecedented Western sanctions, while its trade with the other BRICS has increased by more than 121%.

Following the European Union’s ban on imports of Russian oil products last year, China and India have been the two dominant buyers of Russian crude. Bilateral trade between China and Russia has been particularly strong in recent years, hitting a record $185 billion last year.

Given their economic success, the BRICS are increasingly seen in the Global South as a far more viable force for multilateralism than the Non-Aligned Movement founded in 1961. More than 40 countries – including Algeria, Egypt, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates, but also key G20 members such as Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia – have expressed interest in joining the BRICS, and 22 have formally applied for membership.

Expansion will be high on the agenda at the group’s 15th summit, scheduled for August 22-24 in Johannesburg, South Africa, as will trade and investment facilitation. The latter includes many issues on which the bloc’s views diverge from those of the G7, such as sustainable development, global governance reform (especially reform of the IMF), and de-dollarization.

As more emerging-market economies explore ways to conduct trade in non-dollar currencies, a growing number of experts, including senior US government officials, have recognized that the weaponization of finance may threaten the greenback’s dominance. US Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen recently admitted that the use of “financial sanctions that are linked to the role of the dollar … could undermine the hegemony of the dollar.”

The desire for de-dollarization has given rise to the idea of a BRICS-issued reserve currency that members could use for cross-border trade. But while the BRICS countries, which collectively enjoy a comfortable current-account surplus, have the financial wherewithal to establish such a currency or unit of account, they lack the institutional infrastructure to sustain such a project.

Even assuming that the bloc’s members are fully aligned on geopolitical issues and are more inclined to cooperate than compete, building that infrastructure is a tall order. Like the euro, a shared project of this magnitude would require achieving macroeconomic convergence; agreeing on an exchange-rate mechanism; establishing an efficient multilateral payment and clearing system; and creating regulated, stable, and liquid financial markets that are big enough to absorb global savings and have low-risk default assets where surplus funds could be parked when they are not used for trade.

Given these challenges, South Africa’s ambassador to the group reiterated in July that a BRICS currency will not be on the summit’s agenda; deepening trade and settlement in local currencies will be. In fact, the use of local currencies in cross-border transactions has already yielded significant benefits for the BRICS, including lower transaction costs; a buffer against global volatility; increased trade among members, despite a challenging operating environment; and an easing of the balance-of-payments constraint associated with dollar funding.

And even though border tensions between China and India have grown, both countries stand to benefit greatly from the increased use of local currencies. Saudi Arabia is considering signing a deal with China to settle oil transactions in renminbi, while India is expanding the use of local-currency settlement (LCS) for bilateral trade beyond the BRICS, inviting more than 20 countries to open special vostro bank accounts to settle trade in rupees. Earlier this month, India made its first oil payment to the UAE in rupees.

The good news is that the BRICS already have the institutions they need to create an efficient and integrated payment system for cross-border transactions. The BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism facilitates payments in local currencies between banks based within the bloc. BRICS Pay, a multi-currency digital international payments system, eliminates the need for “vehicle currencies,” such as the dollar or the euro, in transactions among member countries, reducing costs dramatically. Lastly, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement provides liquidity support to those BRICS facing short-term balance-of-payment pressures or currency gyrations.

The New Development Bank, which is spearheading the creation of a BRICS currency, also plans to increase local-currency financing, from 22% to at least 30% of the bank’s portfolio by 2026, and, more generally, to support efforts to reduce the dollar content of cross-border trade and investment between BRICS countries. In the lead-up to the summit, it issued its first South African rand bonds earlier this month. The two bonds of R1.5 billion were oversubscribed, attracting R2.67 billion of bids in total.

If, as expected, the BRICS group agrees to admit new members at the upcoming summit (Saudi Arabia looks most likely), it risks a divergence of interests and coordination challenges. But the benefits outweigh the risks.

With expansion, the BRICS market will expand dramatically, creating scale and accelerating the transition from bilateral to multilateral clearing and, ultimately, to a BRICS currency. This will address one of the major challenges associated with using LCS for bilateral trade: the difficulty of deploying local currencies once imbalances arise.

To be sure, the stickiness of institutional arrangements, along with the breadth and depth of US financial markets, will ensure the dollar’s dominance for some time to come. But an enlarged BRICS group would create a geopolitical coalition with the power to accelerate de-dollarization and lead the transition to a more multipolar world – a far cry from the loosely associated clutch of fast-growing emerging markets that O’Neill identified a generation ago. It seems likely, then, that the BRICS 15th summit will be the most consequential yet.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2023.
www.project-syndicate.org

Main photo by GovernmentZA on Flickr. 

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).