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    AI is reshaping the workplace – but what does it mean for the health and well-being of workers?

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
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    Arif Jetha, Associate Professor, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto

     

    The business landscape has undergone a significant shift over the past few years because of artificial intelligence (AI). This technological advancement has innovated business practices and is changing the way we work.

    Businesses are increasingly turning to AI to solve problems and perform tasks that have traditionally required human intelligence. Across different industries and occupations, AI is being used to detect patterns, make predictions and even create content.

    However, the rapid rate of AI adoption is putting workplaces at risk of overlooking its potentially adverse impacts, particularly those that could impact the health and well-being of workers.

    AI in the workplace

    The type of AI currently being used in workplaces has a narrowly defined role. It primarily augments the work being performed by humans, as seen by customer service chatbots, robots working alongside factory workers or cancer diagnostic platforms.

    The recent strike of the Writers Guild of America offers an example of workers in a field once previously thought to be shielded from automation fighting to protect their jobs from the use of generative AI to write scripts and produce creative content in Hollywood.

    But future types of AI might be very different than the ones we are seeing now. In the future, AI that matches, or even surpasses, human intelligence might be introduced into workplaces. These stronger, more capable forms of AI will undoubtedly change the role of human workers.

    Some economists project that up to 300 million full-time jobs could have some portion of their tasks performed by AI. Others predict that the quickly growing advancement and use of AI could also create a number of new jobs that require workers to work alongside machines.

    Worker health and well-being

    Throughout history, periods of technological transformation have introduced new tools to workplaces and altered working conditions in ways that have impacted worker health in both positive and negative ways.

    The increasing availability of smartphone technology, for example, has given rise to the digital gig economy characterized by temporary and freelance work, or short-term contracts. While this shift presents novel work opportunities, it also contributes to widespread labour market precarity that has negatively impacted the well-being of workers.

    Our understanding of how AI will impact working conditions and worker health, however, is not yet clear. There are several ways in which current (and future) forms of AI could bring advantages and disadvantages to workers.

    On one hand, AI could be used to perform strenuous tasks that pose the greatest risk to workers’ health. It could also identify occupational hazards and employees’ physical and mental well-being in real-time to quickly deliver health and safety solutions.

    At the same time, AI being more applicable to some industries or occupations could result in inequities within the labour market. Currently, the occupations where AI is least useful are those that involve unpredictable and highly physical job tasks (e.g., nursing aides, janitors, food service workers) or those that have leadership responsibilities (e.g., chief executive officers).

    Some predict AI has the potential to contribute to a hollowing out of the labour market, with widening income gaps and disparate effects on worker health.

    The adoption of AI within the workplaces could also increase the intensity and stressfulness of work or create pressure among humans to keep up with machines. And in cases of biased design, AI could reinforce discriminatory workplace practices faced by workers from the most disadvantaged backgrounds.

    Prioritizing health research on AI

    According to a recent report led by the non-profit Institute for Work & Health and informed by a multidisciplinary team (including me), research about the health impacts of AI should take several critical directions.

    There is a need for research to better understand how increasingly autonomous and advanced versions of AI will impact working conditions and worker health. Equally vital is the creation of a road map for AI design that optimizes health.

    The report also underscores the importance of research that can be put into practice. Research needs to meaningfully inform discussions about the health and safety implications of AI adoption, as well as the regulations needed to safeguard human health.

    Workers should also be able to access evidence to better understand the potential impacts of the technology — both harmful and helpful — on their jobs and well-being, and to gain practical insights on how to safely work alongside AI.

    AI will bring rapid and large-scale changes to the working world. Without evidence of the health-related challenges and opportunities AI may present, it will be difficult for decision-makers to protect and promote worker health and safety.

    There is a critical need for research that can be used to understand, anticipate and address AI’s potential risks and opportunities for the human workforce, and to ensure that worker health and well-being is at the forefront of AI adoption.The Conversation

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    Main photo by ThisIsEngineering on Pexels. 

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Africa is being courted by China, Russia and the US. Why the continent shouldn’t pick sides

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
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    Bhaso Ndzendze, Associate Professor (International Relations), University of Johannesburg

     

    Some three decades since the end of the Cold War, the world order is undergoing a structural transformation. At the heart of it is the challenge posed to the hegemony of the US. This is primarily being led by Russia and China which are discontented with Washington’s excesses across the global stage. The most recent example of this rebellion was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Fiona Hill, a British-American foreign affairs specialist, observed that the war was a “proxy for a rebellion by Russia and the ‘Rest’ against the United States”.

    The African continent is an obvious contender for major power courting as this realignment takes place. This is for at least four reasons.

    Firstly, it is the largest regional bloc in the United Nations, representing some 28% of all the votes in the General Assembly. Secondly, it possesses some crucial raw minerals that are found only in the continent. Thirdly, it possesses some important sea trade routes, particularly in east Africa. Finally, the continent is home to the fastest-growing youth demographic and will account for about 42% of the world’s youth by 2030.

    I am a scholar of geopolitics and have conducted research on the continent’s trade ties to the major powers. My findings have led me to the conclusion that Africa can gain more by being neutral than by picking sides.

    The drivers

    Africa’s size in the UN General Assembly can’t be overstated. The continent sometimes struggles to respond in a coordinated way. Nevertheless, it has, in the past, been able to vote in sync in a way that has proved influential. The most notable example of this was the 1971 vote for the resolution that brought mainland China into the UN and replaced Taiwan. In total, there were 76 votes in favour, of which 27 came from African member states.

    In today’s UN, having this large grouping on one’s side helps countries the most when it comes to passing – or defeating – resolutions. With the UN Security Council in gridlock because the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) have veto power, there has been a shift towards the UN General Assembly, which works on one-member-one-vote. General Assembly votes are mainly symbolic. But they are a useful indicator of where the international community stands and are a powerful moral weapon for any major power.

    Africa’s other major attraction is, of course, its resource wealth. This has become even more pronounced and taken on extraordinary importance in the push towards alternative sources of energy, both renewable and non-renewable. And in the production of products driven by the rise in technological innovation, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo’s cobalt, which is needed to make device screens among other things. The DRC is the world’s leading producer of this crucial mineral.

    At the same time the oil reserves of Algeria, Angola and Nigeria will become increasingly important as countries look to diversify away from Russia for natural gas, and from fossil fuels more broadly.

    Then there are the trade routes. The Red Sea route, which straddles northeast Africa and links it to the Indian Ocean, constitutes 10% of annual global trade.

    The Red Sea route passes countries such as Eritrea and Somalia. Both have been actively courted by Russia.

    For its part, China has earmarked the route through its Maritime Silk Road initiative. Its aim is to boost port infrastructure among countries with Indian Ocean coastlines.

    Lastly, Africa is home to the fastest-growing youth population. This will be important in the search for future markets, particularly in sectors such as technology and education.

    The US and Europe are also keen to tap this human capacity as their own populations age above the global average. Many are looking to Africa as a source of inward migratory flows.

    Africa’s ties with the major powers

    In 2022, the continent as a whole exported US$43.1 billion worth of goods to the US and imported goods worth US$30.6 billion.

    By comparison, China exported US$164.1 billion to Africa and imported US$117.5 billion worth of African goods, in the same year. With African exports totalling US$661.4 billion, the US accounts for 6.5% and China 17.7%.

    China, the notable growth story of the past half-century, has thus become the African continent’s single biggest trading partner, though the combined power of the European Union’s trading bloc of 27 countries still leads.

    China’s ties with the continent are the result of decades of diplomatic and commercial efforts to woo the continent through the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. Part of this has been driven by its desire to counter the US. The other driving force has been to sustain its economy, given Africa’s untapped potential.

    Russia has pursued a different strategy. Given that its trade with the continent is at a minimum – exports and imports were around US$18 billion in 2021 – it has rather sought to become a security partner, drawing on sentimentalised Soviet history.

    Washington’s principal instrument for growing trade, and encouraging good behaviour, in Africa is the African Growth and Opportunity Act, set to expire in 2025. The framework is a lever. But, as the data show, trade is in evident decline.

    The general picture can obscure some nuances. Some African states are more deeply intertwined with the US than others. For example, Djibouti has an American military base (along with other states, though not Russia at this point). And Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa are also among the top recipients of US direct investment.

    On the other hand, Eritrea, which was the only African state to brazenly vote against the UN General Assembly to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, seems to have no aspirations to be in America’s good graces. This notorious outlier aside, the world is deeply intertwined, with high interdependence even among the competing major powers.

    The US and China, despite their trade war, have struggled to decouple from one another, with their bilateral trade reaching new heights as recently as last year.

    In light of the comparatively diminished US-Africa trade, the US may be looking to make use of third parties. It could potentially influence the EU to influence Africa. The Huawei issue demonstrates this. The US has successfully pressured quite a few of its allies to halt doing business with the Chinese technology giant. According to UNCTAD data, France (US$60 billion) and the UK (US$65 billion) are the principal holders of African assets.

    As these and other European states seek to “de-risk” from China, there may be third-party consequences for Africa. This might include undue pressure on the continent to behave in certain ways towards China and towards Russia.

    Picking sides isn’t the best option

    Recent research, including my own on US-China trade “competition” over Africa, shows that the prevailing notion that smaller countries need to “pick sides” in polarised global contexts is false. Africa is best served when it conducts trade with as many partners as possible.

    Indeed, as shown, the major contenders are themselves conducting record-breaking trade with one another.

    All the while, Europe continues to conduct trade with Russia following the war against Ukraine (indeed, it is growing in some respects).

    The continent can, therefore, afford to be neutral. What it cannot afford to do is pick sides and preclude any partnerships. In the oncoming multipolar order, there are no self-evident, African-specific needs to pick sides. All options can be on the table. The Conversation

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    Main Photo by Lara Jameson on Pexels.

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Improving how the IMF does business could help billions of people worldwide — by giving governments money to spend on public goods and increasing accountability. Podcast

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
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    Mend Mariwany, Producer, The Conversation Weekly, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The Conversation

    Nehal El-Hadi, Science + Technology Editor & Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The Conversation

     

    In countries across the Global South, the launch of IMF programs often sparks considerable concern. This is because of the IMF’s reputation: during the 1980s, many nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America turned to the IMF seeking loans to mitigate economic challenges. These loans were accompanied by stringent conditions, and countries faced pressure to reduce public subsidies and social spending, downsize the public sector workforce, and increase taxes.

    Originally founded after the second world war, the IMF aimed to provide a framework for countries to cooperate in managing their exchange rates and to facilitate international trade. Since then, it has evolved to provide financial assistance and support to countries facing economic crises and emergencies worldwide. Member countries contribute a certain amount of money to the IMF based on their economic size, and in turn, they are able to access loans as a means of aid.

    During the recent COVID-19 pandemic, the IMF extended loans to over 80 countries. Presently, more than 90 countries remain indebted to the IMF, with such loans being accompanied by policy conditions.

    In this episode of The Conversation Weekly, we speak with two researchers about the impact of IMF loans on recipient countries and why countries continue to rely on IMF loans. We also discuss potential alternatives to this system.

    Ongoing impact of colonialism

    Danny Bradlow, a Professor of International Development Law and African Economic Relations and Senior Fellow at the University of Pretoria in South Africa, highlights the harmful effects of IMF-imposed austerity measures.

    The ongoing impact of colonialism means many countries in the Global South “were in a very dire situation to begin with,” Bradlow explains. “The IMF said if you follow our policy prescriptions, things will turn around and you’ll do much better.”

    The measures imposed by the IMF limited access to healthcare and education for poorer people. Throughout the 1980s, the IMF pressured country after country — in what’s often known as Structural Adjustment Programs — with lasting damage on economies and populations.

    The policy measures dictated by the IMF also had detrimental environmental consequences. To encourage economic growth, many countries were pressured to shift “from producing food to producing agricultural products that you could sell on the global markets,” Bradlow says. “Often that meant you were using more environmentally damaging fertilizers, or you were doing extractive mining projects that were environmentally damaging. In some cases it was logging, so countries would tear down forests.”

    Prolonged debt and austerity

    Attiya Waris is Associate Professor of Fiscal Law and Policy at the University of Nairobi in Kenya, and an expert on foreign debt and international financial obligations and their implications for human rights.

    As part of her work, Waris sheds light on the experiences of Argentina and Pakistan. Both countries have received multiple loans since the 1950s to address economic challenges such as inflation, currency devaluation, and external debt crises. Argentina currently holds the highest outstanding debt of US$46 billion, while Pakistan ranks fifth with US$7.4 billion.

    “Pakistan is one of 14 countries across the world that has a loan with the IMF that has a surcharge on it. A surcharge means that if you are paying a 1% interest rate and you default on your payments, then you’ll be paying 3%. So you’re being penalized for being unable to pay,” Waris explains. This in turn increases the likelihood of prolonged debt and austerity.

    But for Waris, one of the biggest problems is that the contracts around IMF loans are extremely opaque, meaning it’s difficult to hold the institution to account or even evaluate what impact it has beyond the austerity measures.

    “This is problematic because there can be no societal oversight over what a group of human beings in their country are deciding to take on, on their behalf,” she says. “Representative, democratic or otherwise, people need to know what their governments are doing on their behalf.”

    For Bradlow, there are signs for positive change. A recent research paper shows that the IMF acknowledges some of the devastating impacts it has had on countries. In the paper, it identifies areas of enhanced focus, including climate change, gender, inequality, and social protection. However, while the IMF has adapted its focus and policies to address some of the negative consequences, it remains uncertain how it will achieve these goals.

    The Conversation has reached out to the International Monetary Fund for comment regarding the issues covered in this episode and is awaiting response.

    Listen to the full episode of The Conversation Weekly to learn more about the impact of IMF loans on recipient nations, the potential benefits of allocating funds for public services in the Global South, and the importance of implementing accountability mechanisms within the IMF.

    This episode was written and produced by Mend Mariwany, who is also the executive producer of The Conversation Weekly. Eloise Stevens does our sound design, and our theme music is by Neeta Sarl.

    You can find us on Twitter @TC_Audio, on Instagram at theconversationdotcom or via email. You can also subscribe to The Conversation’s free daily email here.

    Listen to “The Conversation Weekly” via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our RSS feed or find out how else to listen here.The Conversation

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    Main photo by Simone D. McCourtie/World Bank on Flickr.    

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Food crisis in Africa: the high cost of imported fertilisers is adding to the problem

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
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    Simon Roberts, Professor of Economics and Lead Researcher, Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, University of Johannesburg

    Ntombifuthi Tshabalala, Economist at Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, University of Johannesburg

     

    Global fertiliser suppliers have made incredibly high profits in 2022/23 on the back of price spikes attributed to the Russia-Ukraine war. The profits of the world’s top nine producers trebled in 2022 from two years previously.

    The margins and impacts have been even greater on fertiliser supplies to African farmers. Moreover, the super-high profit margins are being sustained in 2023 in many African countries even while international prices have come down. The harvest season has recently come to an end in most countries in southern Africa with farmer margins and production being squeezed by high input costs.

    The wide gaps between fertiliser prices in the region and international fertiliser prices point to major issues within the supply chain with excess margins of some 30%-80% being earned on sales to many African countries.

    South Africa has the benefit of robust competition enforcement meaning prices in this country have come down substantially. This only serves to highlight the disadvantage being faced by farmers in other countries such as Malawi and Zambia.

    High fertiliser prices undermine production, contribute to high food prices, and exacerbate food insecurity.

    Our work on fertiliser and agri-food markets in the African Market Observatory points to major problems with how international and regional markets work, including the market power of large international suppliers. High prices for fertiliser inputs are squeezing African farmers who are cutting back on fertiliser use meaning low yields and supply, and high food prices.

    International action is therefore urgently required on fertiliser prices to improve food security in Africa.

    Impact

    African countries are dependent on imported fertiliser and usage is relatively low. For example, Kenya and Zambia use around 70kg/ha, compared with 365kg/ha in Brazil.

    Production

    The harvest season has recently come to an end in most countries in southern Africa. There’s evidence that farmer margins and production are being squeezed by high input costs. High costs and low application are a factor in maize yields in Zambia being less than half of those in South Africa and a third of Argentina (according to the FAO).

    In 2022, Kenya imported almost 30% less fertiliser and production fell. Maize output in 2022/23 was 18% lower than the average for the previous five year, with yields and area planted both being lower, compounding the effect of poor rains. This has meant a substantial deficit relative to local demand and very high prices.

    Continued high fertiliser prices will constrain production, even while there is a great need to expand agriculture output to meet regional demand.

    For example, Zambia has abundant arable land and water for agriculture to increase production. Of the country’s 42 million hectares of arable land, only 15% (or around 6 million) is under cultivation, including for pasture, with only 1.5 million of this cultivated for crop production. Zambia has around 40% of the water resources available for agriculture in the entire SADC region.

    If farmers earned better returns, with cheaper input costs, then production could be a multiple of the current levels.

    Food insecurity: Approximately 73 million people in the East and Southern Africa region are experiencing acute food insecurity. People in low- and middle-income countries bear the harshest burden – both in terms of the importance of small-holder farmers and in the vulnerability of low-income urban households to high food prices.

    Most countries on the continent rely on food imports. Countries such as Kenya which have been affected by drought are struggling to source imports which has worsened food security in the country. This has been exacerbated by export restrictions on maize imposed by Zambia and Tanzania, which have suppressed prices to farmers in those countries, even while input costs, notably fertilizer, have increased.

    Uneven playing field

    International fertilizer prices more than doubled in two months – from September to November 2021. The peak continued into early 2022, reaching an average price of US$915/t for the benchmark urea fertilizer between March and April 2022. This compares with around US$226 in the previous five years. This was driven by the world’s largest fertilizer companies taking advantage of the rise in the price of natural gas, an important input for nitrogen-based fertilizer, as well as supply disruptions associated with the Russia-Ukraine war. The fertilizer companies exploited the shocks and raised prices by more than the increase in costs.

    By March 2023, the international price of urea had fallen back to close to $300/t. With additional costs to import to coastal countries which should be no more than $150/t and to inland regions no more than $250/t including a trader margin, South Africa’s inland prices now reflect fair prices but in other African countries super profits are continuing.

    What needs to be done

    To ease the adverse impacts of high fertilizer prices, governments in the region have tried to implement fertilizer subsidy programmes. For example, prices in Tanzania with the government subsidy have been reduced from around $1100/t to US$600-700/t.

    But the subsidies have huge costs for governments which many African countries have not been able to incur, while the programmes have generally not been working well. In Malawi, for example, a large portion of the Affordable Inputs Programme (AIP) targeted beneficiaries did not receive fertilizer under the 2022/2023 programme.

    International action is therefore urgently required on fertilizer prices to improve food security in Africa. First, competition authorities in Africa should investigate signs of anti-competitive conduct. Second, investments are required in logistics, storage and advice on optimal usage. Third, a fertilizer market observatory as the EU is currently setting-up would provide ongoing data about fertiliser markets, factors affecting them, and exchange experiences and good practices for optimal usage.The Conversation

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    Main photo by Anthony Trivet on Pexels. 

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Africa’s groundbreaking women’s rights treaty turns 20 – the hits and misses of the Maputo protocol

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
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    0

     

    Anthony Idowu Ajayi, Associate research scientist, African Population and Health Research Center

     

    2023 marks two decades since the adoption of the Maputo Protocol. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol) is arguably the most progressive legally binding instrument on women’s and human rights instruments globally. A total of 44 African countries have signed and ratified it. The Maputo Protocol provides for extensive and progressive women’s rights. These include the right to health and reproduction, inheritance, economic and social welfare, education and training, access to justice and equal protection before the law, and elimination of harmful practices. Reproductive health researcher, Anthony Ajayi, unpacks the significance of the document in women’s lives over the years.

     

    What does it mean for sexual and reproductive rights?

    Articles 2 and 14 made specific provisions to protect the sexual and reproductive rights of women and girls.

    Article 2 mandates member countries to enact and implement laws and other measures to curb all forms of discrimination, especially harmful practices that endanger health and general well-being.

    Advocacy efforts to end child marriage and female genital cutting are anchored on this specific provision. Such efforts have resulted in 43 African countries now having laws that put the minimum age of marriage at 18 years old or above for both girls and boys. While some of these countries have parental consent exceptions and parallel customary marriage laws, the past ten years have seen more countries remove these exceptions. Also, 22 out of 29 African countries practising female genital cutting now have national laws in place banning the practice.

    Article 14 mandates member countries to ensure the right to health of women, including sexual and reproductive health. This includes the right to control fertility, decide whether to have children, the number of children and the spacing of children, and choose any method of contraception.

    Has it been effective?

    Since the inception of the Maputo Protocol, most African countries have removed user fees for maternal health services in government-owned health facilities. This has increased access to quality maternal healthcare services for marginalised women and girls. As a result, maternal deaths have declined markedly.

    More countries have broadened their laws to allow access to safe abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, life-threatening fetal anomalies, and when a pregnancy endangers the woman’s mental and physical health or her life. Between 2000 and 2021, 22 African countries expanded their legal grounds for abortion. Six – Cape Verde, South Africa, Tunisia, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe (up to 10 weeks of gestation in Angola) – permit abortion at the woman’s request during the first trimester of pregnancy. More countries have developed and launched post-abortion care guidelines to expand access for women and girls.

    The success of the Maputo Protocol in protecting and guaranteeing the rights of women and eliminating discrimination is quite remarkable. Where the rights of women and girls are violated, the Maputo Protocol has become an instrument for seeking legal redress and a tool for seeking accountability. It was referenced in these examples:

    • A court ruling in December 2020 found that the Kenya government violated several human rights instruments, including the Maputo Protocol, for failing to investigate and prosecute cases of sexual and gender-based violence that happened during the post-election violence of 2007. The government was ordered to pay compensation to four of the survivors, amounting to KSh 4 million (about US$40,000) each.
    • In December 2019, the ECOWAS Court of Justice found that the ban on pregnant schoolgirls going to school in Sierra Leone was discriminatory and in violation of girls’ right to education, in breach of Articles 2 and 12 of the Maputo Protocol. Since the ruling, the government of Sierra Leone has lifted the ban.
    • Article 13 and 17 of Tanzania’s Marriage Act, which set the minimum age of marriage for girls at 15 years and 18 years for boys, was challenged at the appeal court in 2019. Citing the Maputo Protocol, the court upheld the earlier ruling that marriage under the age of 18 was illegal.

    What have its shortcomings been?

    Progress in realising women’s and girls’ rights remains uneven within and between countries. Eleven countries haven’t ratified the protocol. Twenty-four haven’t fulfilled their reporting obligation to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Consequently, discriminatory laws persist. And customary, common and civil laws remain in parallel with constitutional provisions. This creates loopholes for the violation of women’s and girls’ rights.

    For example, 11 countries (Cameroon, Seychelles, Sudan, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Tanzania) permit girls below 18 years to marry. One member state has no minimum age for marriage. But legal reforms are happening in five of these countries.

    There’s been improvement in sexual and reproductive health outcomes. But sexual and gender-based violence, child marriage and female genital cutting remain high in most African countries. Maternal deaths and new HIV transmission have declined. But incidences remain relatively high in several countries.

    Young people, particularly girls, bear a disproportionate burden of poor sexual and reproductive health outcomes. This hinders their smooth transition into adulthood and affects their immediate and lifelong health (physical and mental) and socioeconomic wellbeing and empowerment.

    What more needs to be done?

    More advocacy is needed to ensure:

    • the remaining 11 countries ratify the protocol
    • countries with reservations about some of the articles in the protocol need to address them
    • those who have ratified it fully domesticate and implement its provisions.

    Such advocacy should be informed by contextually relevant evidence on sexual and reproductive health, including what works in addressing harmful practices, increasing young people’s access to information and services, and reducing new HIV infections and maternal deaths.

    The partnership between all actors working to ensure women’s health and reproductive rights are realised should be reinvigorated and sustained to make certain that gains are consolidated and not reversed.

    Entrenching a culture of equity around sexual and reproductive rights will also require tailored engagement with community and religious leaders to build their capacity on matters of sexual and reproductive health. Sustained funding of civil society organisations working to ensure women’s rights is also key, and so is the need to bolster the women’s movement on the continent.

    Juliet Kimotho, senior advocacy officer at the African Population and Health Research Center, contributed to this article. The Conversation

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    Main photo by Dazzle Jam on Pexels. 

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Web immersif : et si nous ressentions Internet ?

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
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    0

     

    Ahmed Azough, Professeur de Réalité Virtuelle et Vision par Ordinateur, Pôle Léonard de Vinci

     

    Si, aujourd’hui, nous sommes habitués à surfer sur Internet, partie émergée d’un énorme iceberg de données interconnectées, les évolutions technologiques récentes devraient bientôt nous permettre de nous immerger dans cet océan bouillonnant de big data.

    L’immersion vise à procurer à l’utilisateur un sentiment de présence en utilisant des technologies de captation et restitution sensorielle : l’utilisateur se sent transporté dans l’environnement digital créé par des technologies numériques, à tel point qu’il ressent ces objets numériques virtuels comme faisant partie de sa réalité.

    De leur côté, les systèmes numériques détectent et interprètent de mieux en mieux les comportements et les émotions de leurs interlocuteurs, à tel point que l’humain a l’impression que ce système est conscient de sa présence et interagit volontairement.

    Les films Matrix et plus récemment Ready Player One reflètent bien cette idée : s’interposer entre les récepteurs sensoriels de l’homme et la réalité afin de créer un monde nouveau, que l’on appelle parfois le « métaverse ». Ce concept est déjà utilisé depuis de plusieurs années pour les simulateurs d’aviation ou de conduite, ou pour des parcs de loisirs (L’Extraordinaire Voyage au Futuroscope par exemple).

    Le web immersif fait suite à trois générations du web : du web 1.0 statique qui ressemble à une « vitrine » d’affichage, au web 2.0 participatif qui intègre les utilisateurs dans la création du contenu, et au web 3.0 dit « sémantique », qui introduit de l’ingénierie de connaissance pour structurer les données.

    Cette quatrième génération, le « web 4.0 » ou « web immersif », doit être très accessible grâce aux réseaux haut débit 5G et à l’internet des objets (IoT). Le couplage du web et de la 5G nous fait entrer depuis le début des années 2020 dans l’ère d’un web « ambiant », pervasif et ubiquitaire, où de nombreux objets sont connectés et communiquent de manière autonome.

    Les technologies immersives de réalité virtuelle, augmentée ou mixte sont considérées par plusieurs acteurs comme la quatrième révolution du numérique (après les ordinateurs personnels, les ordinateurs portables et les smartphones). Elles devraient permettre une importante métamorphose de la pratique du Web, dont les fonctionnalités risquent d’évoluer plus ou moins rapidement selon le niveau d’adoption de la technologie, du dispositif utilisé, mais aussi selon l’évolution des réglementations relatives à la protection des données.

    À quoi ressemblera Internet avec le web immersif ?

    Les agents conversationnels virtuels (comme ChatGPT) répondent de manière naturelle et précise aux requêtes des utilisateurs. Dans le cadre d’un moteur de recherche, les requêtes n’ont plus besoin d’être constituées de mots clés, mais deviennent des discussions naturelles.

    Ce type de conversations plus naturelles pour les humains pourrait avoir d’autres applications : un prototype de thérapies de groupe dans le milieu scolaire a par exemple été testé par 134 étudiants à l’université National Tsing Hua University à Taiwan en 2021. Des systèmes similaires sont testés pour des entretiens d’embauche ou des assistants industriels.

    Les réponses des moteurs de recherche pourraient être des objets 3D virtuels transférés à l’utilisateur, ou des visites d’environnements virtuels. Les technologies immersives sont même considérées comme une technologie de rupture qui révolutionne la gestion et le marketing du tourisme.

    Par ailleurs, les réseaux sociaux, les chats et les forums sont en train d’être transformés en métavers (second life, Meta Horizon worlds). Les visioconférence peuvent évoluer en « holoportation » : un système développé en 2016 par Microsoft, qui permet de la reconstructions 3D de haute qualité et en temps réel d’un espace entier, y compris les personnes, les meubles et les objets qu’il contient, à l’aide d’un ensemble de nouvelles caméras de profondeur. Cette technologie a également été testée dans le domaine de l’éducation à travers quelques prototypes, et a permis de mettre en l’évidence le rôle important de la présence (et de la télé-présence) dans l’enseignement supérieur.

    Des casques de réalité mixte autonomes plus légers et plus puissants pourraient permettre l’adoption de cette technologie à grande échelle, avec par exemple le casque Meta Quest 3 présenté par Mark Zuckerberg le 1 Juin 2023.

    Côté santé, la chirurgie a connu de nombreuses avancées technologiques, depuis la première télé-chirurgie en 2001. Les chirurgiens peuvent de travailler à distance avec un écran tridimensionnel, via des jumelles haute définition – mais la latence moyenne, autour de 700 millisecondes, privilégie les usages d’entraînement et de planification. La première opération chirurgicale collaborative de l’épaule au monde à l’aide de la réalité mixte a été réalisée en 2017 à l’hopital Avicenne AP-HP en France. Le retour haptique permet la transmission des informations tactiles aux chirurgiens, ce qui permet de sentir la consistance du tissu et la tension dans les sutures.

    Aujourd’hui, plusieurs prototypes de soins médicaux faisant appel à des dispositifs haptiques et de capteurs corporels connectés permettent aussi d’envisager le diagnostic et les soins à distance. Récemment, la NASA a même envoyé virtuellement des médecins sur l’ISS pour aider les astronautes à rester en forme.

    L’e-commerce pourrait aussi bénéficier des technologies immersives : des caméras 3D et des capteurs connectés permettraient de transmettre les mensurations exactes des clients et d’essayer (virtuellement) leurs choix dans des chambres d’essayage virtuelles sans se déplacer.

    On envisage également que la navigation GPS devienne la navigation « VPS » (pour Visual positioning system) : avec des lunettes de navigation basée sur la réalité augmentée, ainsi que des retours sonores et haptiques, elle deviendrait plus intuitive. Un tel prototype ciblant les personnes âgées a été développé en 2018 à Telecom ParisTech en France.

    Enfin, et bien qu’elle soit à ses balbutiements, la recherche dans le domaine de la « saveur augmentée » vise à développer des dispositifs olfactifs pour sentir des parfums ou goûter des plats à distance.

    Que peut-on virtualiser ?

    Tous les sens font l’objet de récents progrès scientifiques et technologiques : la vision, le toucher, l’ouïe, l’odorat, le goût, mais aussi les sens du mouvement, de l’équilibre, de la chaleur par exemple. Dans ce sens, une interface olfactive souple, miniaturisée et sans fil a été ainsi développée pour la réalité virtuelle à l’université de Hong Kong en 2023.

    Dans la modalité visuelle, les dispositifs varient en niveau d’immersion : des écrans de smartphone peu immersifs, à des dispositifs semi-immersifs comme les écran incurvés et casques de réalités mixtes, jusqu’aux dispositifs immersifs comme les casques VR (virtual reality). Plus ces casques deviennent économiquement abordables, légers et autonomes, plus l’adoption de cette technologie augmente. La communauté anticipe que le casque de réalité mixte nouvelle génération Apple Vision Pro annoncé le 5 juin 2023 lors de l’Apple Worldwide Developers Conference constitue un pas majeur vers l’adoption de la technologie immersive par le grand public, comme l’a constitué l’iPhone 2G en 2007 pour l’adoption des smartphones.

    La modalité sonore accompagne souvent ses dispositifs d’immersion visuels à travers le son spatialisé 3D (le son stéréo traditionnel est diffusé en deux canaux seulement, gauche et droite). Le son spatialisé ajoute une dimension supplémentaire en introduisant des informations de localisation sonore verticales, horizontales et en profondeur. Cette technologie est aujourd’hui bien maîtrisée et largement utilisée dans le domaine des jeux vidéo.

    Pour le toucher, il existe des dispositifs dits « intrusifs » (car encombrants) comme les gants haptiques et les combinaisons corporelles ; et d’autres dispositifs moins invasifs ultra-minces ainsi que des peaux artificielles connectées sont en développement.

    D’autres dispositifs plus ludiques comme les bouches artificielles connectées ou des sex-toys connectés laissent présager du développement à venir de l’industrie « adulte » sur l’internet de demain.

    Les risques du web immersif

    Aujourd’hui, les technologies immersives posent déjà des défis éthiques importants, avec des risques potentiels pour la santé mentale, notamment le trouble de dépersonnalisation/déréalisation. Elles sont aussi sujettes à de sérieuses préoccupations liées à la négligence personnelle du corps (réel) des utilisateurs, et des environnements physiques réels. Elles peuvent également être utilisées pour enregistrer des données personnelles qui pourraient être déployées de manière à menacer la vie privée et à présenter un danger lié à la manipulation des croyances, des émotions et des comportements des utilisateurs.

    Ces défis se trouveront accentués avec le web immersif. Même si des initiatives existent pour encadrer éthiquement l’usage de la réalité virtuelle, l’aspect addictif du web et l’aspect intrusif de l’IoT posent de nouveaux défis et exigent plus d’effort pour la protection des usagers.

    L’insécurité, l’intrusion à la vie privée, l’isolement social, les crimes pornographiques, les délits virtuels, les maux de têtes, les blessures physiques ou l’addiction, tous ces dangers se verront accentués et devront attirer l’attention à la fois des designers et des représentants des usagers pour une utilisation plus sûre et plus éthique.The Conversation

    Cet article est republié à partir de The Conversation sous licence Creative Commons. Lire l’article original.

    Main photo by Tima Miroshnichenko on Pexels.

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Debunking migration myths: the real reasons people move, and why most migration happens in the global south – podcast

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
    -
    0

     

    Avery Anapol, Commissioning Editor, Politics + Society, The Conversation Weekly Podcast

    Mend Mariwany, Producer, The Conversation Weekly, The Conversation Weekly Podcast

     

    Around the world, borders between countries are getting tougher. Governments are making it more difficult to move, especially for certain groups of vulnerable people. This comes with a message, subtle or not: that people are moving to higher-income countries to take advantage of the welfare system, or the jobs of people already living there.

    But evidence shows that much of what we think about migration – particularly those of us in Europe, North America and Australia – is wrong. Political narratives, often replicated in the media, shape the conversation and public attitudes toward migration.

    As the researchers we speak to in this episode of The Conversation Weekly tell us, these narratives are not the full picture. Our interviewees explain what migration really looks like around the world, what drives people to uproot their lives and move, and how some countries in Africa are welcoming refugees.

    Challenging the narrative

    Heaven Crawley, a researcher at UN University Centre for Policy Research based in New York, has been interested in migration since the late 1980s. Then, the breakup of the former Yugoslavia caused what was often referred to as a refugee “crisis” in Europe.

    Language like “crisis” has been a part of the discourse on migration for years. But Crawley thinks of this in a particular way: “It’s absolutely fair to say that there is a crisis associated with migration. It’s normally for the people who are actually moving, because they’re often in situations where there are huge inequalities in the right to move.”

    Crawley shared that migration, while “intrinsic to our economies and the way we function”, is not actually the norm. Most people don’t migrate, and those who do mostly move within their country of origin.

    She explained how, in Europe especially, perceptions of those who do migrate are often clouded by a narrative that people who move, legally, for work are “good” migrants. Conversely, people who move without visa permission or through clandestine means are viewed as “bad” migrants.

    In reality, people moving for any reason is usually a force for good for the country they move to and the people they encounter, Crawley suggested. “People are coming to realise that actually, migration can be very positive in terms of their day-to-day lives, who they mix with, who their family are married to.”

    When people decide to migrate, whether seeking economic opportunities or to escape violence or persecution, there are a number of factors influencing where they go. Valentina Di Iasio, a research fellow at the University of Southampton in the UK, has researched what makes people choose one country over another.

    Di Iasio and her colleague Jackie Wahba wanted to investigate the theory of the “welfare magnet”, that people choose to migrate to countries where the welfare state is more generous.

    But looking specifically at asylum seekers, they found that the strongest “pull factor” attracting people to particular countries is social networks. In other words, it’s not about the economy or welfare state, it’s about “having the possibility to rely on a community that is already there and already established”.

    Di Iasio also noted that many countries have policies preventing asylum seekers from working when they first arrive. But she said these policies often backfire, both for people arriving, and the host country’s overall economy: “If you ban asylum seekers from employment, this leads people … to become more dependent on public spending in the short term, and this is not good for anyone.”

    Migration in the global south

    It’s impossible to understand the global picture of migration if we only look at specific routes – for example, from India to the UK, or from Mexico to the US. According to Crawley, about one third of global migration happens within the global north (Europe, North America, Australia and parts of Asia), one third happens within the global south (South America, Africa and parts of Asia), and the remaining third is between the two.

    With that in mind, we spoke to Christopher Changwe Nshimbi, a researcher at the University of Pretoria in South Africa, about a region with frequent movement across borders. He studies the relationship between migration, development and regional integration (countries forming economic and trade relationships with each other) in Africa.

    Nshimbi said that more open borders are beneficial to regional integration in Africa. They allow people to move where their skills are needed, and to send remittances (money) back home to family, often within the same region.

    And yet, some countries are tightening their migration policies. Part of this, Nshimbi explained, is even influenced by attitudes in the global north. For example, development funding from the European Union is often tied to efforts to curb migration from Africa to the EU. Nshimbi said that when migrants are seen as a threat to high-income European countries: “The tendency seems to be to try and influence the movement … of Africans within the African continent.”

    But he said this approach is misguided, and that funding development in low-income countries “doesn’t necessarily translate into people stopping migrating”. In some cases, this funding to stop migration has been used in a way that causes instability and violence – and ultimately, more migration.

    Looking toward the future

    Nshimbi is now researching how the effects of climate change, such as extreme weather patterns, are leading people to migrate. While this will present challenges for governments, Nshimbi said the history of migration on the continent gives him reason to be optimistic.

    He said he wonders why European countries talk about refugee “crises” when countries in Africa regularly host many more refugees. Citing the example of Uganda, he said: “There are shining examples on the continent of countries that, though poor, host large numbers of refugees.”

    Again referencing Uganda, Nshimbi said that some countries are used to hosting refugees, providing them with land and resources so they can participate in local economies until they move elsewhere: “A poor country, but they take care of them.”

    Listen to the full episode of The Conversation Weekly to learn more about migration around the world, what factors drive people to move, and what some countries in Africa are doing to welcome refugees.

    This episode was written and produced by Avery Anapol and Mend Mariwany, who is also the executive producer of The Conversation Weekly. Eloise Stevens does our sound design, and our theme music is by Neeta Sarl.

    The Conversation

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    Main photo by Folco Masi on Unsplash.

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Central Bank Digital Currencies: A potential solution for reducing transactions costs in Africa and increasing trade

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
    -
    1

     

    Paul R Baker, Founder and Chairman, International Economics Consulting Ltd (IEC)

    Taahirah Zahraa Boodhoo Beeharry, Policy Researcher, International Economics Consulting Ltd (IEC)

    Loan Thi Hong Le, Managing Director of International Economics (Vietnam office)

     

    Why the interest in CBDCs in Africa?

    With the rapid proliferation of cryptocurrencies and the emergence of new digital currencies, national governments are increasing efforts to provide more stable and regulated alternatives to private sector-driven initiatives. Central bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) have garnered considerable interest amongst many governments worldwide, having been implemented by several developing countries and piloted in many others, including the European Union (EU), the US, and several African countries [1]. Nearly a dozen countries across the continent are considering their options concerning implementing CBDCs.

    Figure 1 Central Bank Digital Currencies Status across Africa, Source: IMF based on (cbdctracker.org -updated March 2023)

    There are widespread benefits from the implementation and use of CBDCs. In the African context, one of the most significant achievements of CBDCs would be to lower the costs of transactions within the region. CBDCs can reduce transaction fees and merchant fees. Moreover, by lowering the costs of cross-border transactions, CBDCs are expected to encourage further trade between African countries and contribute to expanding regional value chains.

    What are CBDCs?

    In essence, CBDCs are the digital version of traditional fiat money. They are issued, regulated, and backed by central banks. Unlike cryptocurrencies and stablecoins, where there is almost no government oversight, CBDCs are centralised and operate within the regulatory framework of a government’s financial system. Therefore, they are more stable and secure than cryptocurrencies and stablecoins. There is a wide range of possibilities for governments to design their CBDC system. Examples include an account-based model where customers open deposit accounts with the central ­­bank or private sector models where private institutions continue to act as intermediaries between the central bank and consumers (see Figure 2).  Although the existing use of cryptocurrencies across the continent may represent some form of competition for CBDCs, the two currencies are fundamentally different in their design, purpose, and underlying technology. While CBDCs are designed to work within existing financial systems, cryptocurrencies are designed to operate independently of them. Nonetheless, they are likely to coexist as separate forms of digital currency.

    Figure 2 CBDC Design Options, Source: BIS (2022)

    CBDCs can ease transaction costs and shorten transaction times

    One of the key benefits of CBDCs is their potential to reduce transaction costs in Africa. At present, the cost of cross-border payments in Africa is significantly higher than the global average. As per estimations of the World Bank in September 2022, transaction fees represent 8.5% of the total value of remittances to African countries. In contrast, the transaction fee for global transactions amounts to only 6.5%, with South Asia having the lowest costs at 4.9%. The high costs of transferring money to and within African countries are driven by numerous factors, including the fragmented payment systems, poor governance and risk management among service providers, legal and regulatory barriers as well as a lack of competition in the payment ecosystem. African payment systems rely heavily on the correspondent banking system located outside the continent, which further adds to the cost. According to SWIFT (2018), North America remain the main clearing route for African financial flows. More than 80% of the transactions sent from Africa to the United States have their final beneficiary in another region, including 19.5% of which returns to Africa. In the past year, many different mobile money platforms have emerged in Africa. While this improves competition and creates a bustling digital payment ecosystem, it nonetheless complicates and lengthens the process of connecting different service providers, especially when the latter operates under different standards.

    Figure 3 Average costs of sending remittances by region in September 2022, Source: World Bank (2022)
    Figure 4 Average costs of sending remittances by region divided by cash and digital services in September 2022, Source: World Bank (2022)

    The payment ecosystem in Africa, dominated by numerous traditional commercial banks and inadequate infrastructure, is a hurdle to conducting business. In a survey conducted among 1,300 businesses in Africa, the conventional banking system was portrayed as having numerous deficiencies, including high costs, low speed, and unreliability. 32.1% of the businesses surveyed indicated that business-to-business payment methods were too expensive. Furthermore, while 41.2% of businesses report a day’s waiting time for payments to be credited to their accounts, many businesses reported having to wait for a week (39.5%).

    By providing a more efficient and cost-effective alternative to transferring money, CBDCs could significantly reduce the cost of sending remittances, B2B transactions, and cross-border trade. The costs and time associated with cross-border payments are reduced by eliminating the need for intermediaries such as commercial banks or payment processors. CBDCs allow transactions to be carried out and reflected within seconds. Moreover, since CBDCs are backed by the Central Bank, these would instil greater confidence among traders and mitigate concerns over liquidity, credit risk and foreign exchange settlement risks that currently hinder cross-border payments.

    CBDCs can improve intra-regional trade

    CBDCs will allow greater scope for businesses, especially small enterprises, to trade across borders, thus boosting intra-African trade. With the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) coming into operation, CBDCs can further lower business costs between African countries. In light of the benefits of CBDCs, certain regional economic communities, such as the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) are considering developing a common digital currency. In the case of CEMAC, its digital currency is intended to be used across all six of its Member States, namely Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Moreover, CBDCs can also reduce dependence on the US Dollar as a common currency for trade. As certain African countries struggle to participate in international trade due to foreign exchange reserves, CBDCs provide an alternative, allowing countries to trade in their local currencies. For instance, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are pursuing the possibility of a joint-digital currency, Project Aber, for use within and between the two countries. Thus, by facilitating cross-border trade, CBDCs offer an important avenue for increasing intra-African trade and deepening regional integration.

    In addition to these benefits, it is also worth noting that CBDCs could potentially increase financial inclusion (and in some cases for the informal sector to integrate into the formal sector) and overhaul current payment systems. With greater uptake of CBDCs by the informal sector, CBDCs could shed light on the sizeable share of transactions that take place within the informal economy and could be reflected in the national figures. Hence, CBDCs can also significantly ameliorate financial regulation and monetary policy through evidenced-based policymaking enabled by enhanced data.

    Disintermediation of private banking and other challenges

    However, the introduction of CBDCs is not without its challenges. One important concern arising from CBDCs relates to the potential transition from commercial banking. This relates to accounts-based models. With commercial transactions being undertaken through CBDCs, individuals and businesses may reduce deposits in commercial banks, increasing the volatility of deposits. Given that customer deposits are increasingly important for commercial banking services, CBDCs may threaten banks’ profitability.

    Specific CBDC platforms have also absorbed some of the services private-sector financial institutions offer, such as e-transfers, mobile money, or digital wallets. Nigeria’s e-Naira, for instance, allows for a range of services that were once under the purview of private banks, namely diaspora payment, transfer of government aid to citizens, contactless payment, peer-to-peer payment, foreign exchange transactions, or renewal of television subscriptions and purchase airtime, among others. In order to mitigate such risks arising from their disintermediation, commercial banks may adopt a range of measures, including reduced lending, higher costs of credit, and higher costs of ancillary services. These, in turn, could significantly impact small businesses, especially when 72% of MSMEs in Sub-Saharan Africa and 80% of MSMEs in the Middle East and North Africa experience some financing gap. On the flip side, with the potential disruption to traditional banking models, commercial banks may be encouraged to explore new business models and innovate so as to retain competitiveness.

    Cybersecurity threats and data protection are imminent risks that governments need to consider. If any vulnerabilities in the infrastructure and system are taken advantage of, these could potentially jeopardise an entire country’s financial system. In early 2022, DCash, a CBDC introduced in the Eastern Caribbean, hit technical glitches that forced the system offline for weeks. Thus, any CBDC being designed by national governments needs to be done in light of the challenges and threats that could potentially arise. Nonetheless, the cybersecurity risks associated with CBDCs can foster a payment landscape characterised by greater security and trust in transactions with the development of robust security frameworks and the adoption of best practices.

    Moreover, CBDCs also pose concerns regarding the anonymity of transactions. The anonymity of transactions is an essential feature of cash which enables individuals and businesses to conduct transactions while their identities and personal information remain protected. Nonetheless, it is important to ensure that the payment landscape is also secure and transparent. The implementation of CBDCs also requires the design of robust legal and regulatory frameworks that effectively balance the need for privacy and confidentiality and risks against fraudulent activities, especially as it relates to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regulation.

    Considerations for the Mauritian Government

    CBDCs have the potential to revolutionise the global payment landscape. In the African context, CBDCs could hold potential solutions for increasing intra-regional trade, especially by facilitating transactions and reducing transaction costs. Mauritius, as the gateway to Africa, is in a unique position to take advantage of the opportunities brought about by the nexus of continental free trade and technological advances in payment systems. As the Mauritian Government explores the possibility of introducing CBDCs in the domestic payment landscape, it will need to weigh the potential benefits and consider the necessary reforms and upgrades required in infrastructure and technology, as well as the current regulations. Moreover, the critical role that private banking and financial institutions play in the domestic financial ecosystem must be considered and ensure consistent engagement with such stakeholders to assess the modalities for deploying CBDCs and the role that these institutions will play in a new payment ecosystem. The seamless integration of CBDCs in payment systems that ensure interoperability with existing payment infrastructure will facilitate the update of the digital currency and provide convenience to users. Citizens’ uptake of a digital currency would also require outreach and sensitisation activities to build confidence in converting to the new currency. Moreover, the Bank of Mauritius should consider the lessons learned from regions that have already launched CBDCs or are conducting pilot programmes.

    [1] Nigeria was the first African nation to launch a CBDC, the e-naira, making it the second CBDC to have been officially launched worldwide.

    Main photo by Behnam Norouzi on Unsplash. 

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Les océans d’Afrique sont protégés pour servir les intérêts des grandes entreprises étrangères

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
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    0

     

    Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, Lecturer, University of St Andrews

    Freedom C. Onuoha, Professor of Political Science, University of Nigeria

     

    Les précieuses ressources océaniques de l’Afrique ont suscité l’intérêt des nations étrangères, en particulier celles de l’Occident et l’Asie.

    La façon dont elles exploitent ces ressources peut être problématique car ces océans offrent un large éventail de ressources importantes – du poisson des minéraux et des hydrocarbures – qui sont également cruciales pour l’économie et la sécurité alimentaire du continent.

    Mais dans certains pays, les intérêts étrangers dominent. Par exemple, les secteurs exploration pétrolière, transport maritime, infrastructure portuaire et pêche industrielle du continent sont parfois dominés par des entreprises étrangères.

    La production pétrolière de l’Angola, par exemple, est dominée par les grandes sociétés internationales d’exploration et de production pétrolières, notamment Total (France) avec une part de marché de 41 %, Chevron (États-Unis) avec 26 %, Exxon Mobil (États-Unis) avec 19 % et BP (Royaume-Uni) avec 13 %.

    Ainsi, bien que ces eaux soient vitales pour les pays africains et leurs citoyens, les acteurs étrangers agissent au mieux de leurs intérêts, parfois au détriment des pays et des citoyens africains.

    La sécurité maritime (océanique) en est une illustration. La Convention des Nations unies sur le droit de la mer (UNCLOS) stipule que les pays côtiers sont responsables de la gestion de la sécurité de leurs eaux territoriales (jusqu’à 12 milles nautiques de leurs côtes) et de leurs zones économiques exclusives, entre 12 et 200 milles nautiques de leurs côtes. Cela inclut la protection contre les actes illicites en mer, tels que la pêche illégale, la piraterie et les vols à main armée, le terrorisme et d’autres crimes connexes.

    Cependant, la même convention permet à d’autres pays d’agir contre la piraterie, par exemple, dans les zones économiques exclusives.

    En nous appuyant sur notre expertise en matière de gouvernance et de sécurité maritimes en Afrique, nous avons examiné la littérature, les bases de données de documents politiques et les rapports sur la sécurité maritime, afin d’explorer la manière dont les pays non africains définissent de manière sélective ce qui constitue des menaces. La façon dont ces menaces sont formulées détermine la réponse à y apporter et la façon dont cette réponse est financée. Cela a pour effet de saper une notion holistique de la sécurité maritime qui profiterait aux populations africaines.

    Nous affirmons que les pays non africains se concentrent sur la piraterie et les vols à main armée en mer, qui menacent l’extraction des ressources, le transport et la sécurité. Ils ne s’intéressent guère à la protection des ressources marines de l’Afrique, en particulier contre la pollution et la pêche illégale causées par des puissances étrangères.

    Cette approche est illogique. Elle ne tient pas compte du fait qu’il existe un lien entre la privation et les crimes maritimes, y compris la piraterie et les vols à main armée en mer. Les communautés côtières africaines, dont beaucoup sont déjà marginalisées et démunies, dépendent fortement des ressources marines. L’épuisement de ces ressources ne fait qu’aggraver leur situation. Si la protection des ressources marines africaines n’est pas considérée comme une priorité, les populations s’enfonceront encore plus dans la pauvreté et le cycle de l’insécurité en mer se poursuivra.

    Lutte contre la piraterie

    L’attention portée par les pays étrangers à la piraterie est évidente. Plus de 20 résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies ou déclarations présidentielles ont été publiées sur la piraterie dans le golfe d’Aden (Afrique de l’Est) et le golfe de Guinée (Afrique de l’Ouest et Afrique centrale).

    La piraterie est un problème. Elle peut donner lieu à des enlèvements contre rançon et, dans des cas extrêmes, peut entraîner la mort de membres d’équipage. Entre 2005 et 2012, les pirates du golfe d’Aden ont reçu une rançon estimée à 500 millions de dollars. Près de 2 000 marins ont été enlevés et beaucoup ont été tués.

    Au plus fort de la piraterie dans le golfe de Guinée, les pirates gagnaient environ 4 millions de dollars par an.

    Les premières résolutions de l’ONU sur la piraterie en Afrique ont été introduites dans le golfe d’Aden en 2008 et dans le golfe de Guinée en 2011. Depuis lors, les incidents de piraterie ont diminué dans les deux golfs.

    Les poissons et l’environnement

    Mais le problème est que les nations africaines doivent se concentrer sur la protection des stocks de poissons et de l’environnement qui affecte les moyens de subsistance et les sources d’alimentation des citoyens africains. Certaines menaces – comme la pollution par les hydrocarbures et la pêche illégale – sont souvent le fait d’entités étrangères.

    Le poisson est une source de nourriture et de revenus pour des millions d’Africains. Lorsqu’il y a moins de poissons, la pauvreté augmente, tout comme le nombre d’enfants non scolarisés et les problèmes de santé.

    Pourtant, comme nous l’avons constaté au cours de nos recherches, il n’existe aucune résolution des Nations Unies concernant la dégradation de l’environnement ou le pillage des ressources marines. Ces phénomènes sont généralement causés par la pollution et la pêche illégale perpétrées par des entreprises étrangères et des navires hauturiers.

    Un accord visant à mettre fin aux subventions préjudiciables à la pêche, qui favorisent la surpêche et la pêche illégale, a été adopté lors de la conférence ministérielle de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce en 2022. Mais à ce jour, seuls quatre pays ont adhéré à cet accord.

    Avec la pollution, la surpêche et la pêche illégale sont des facteurs clés qui contribuent à l’épuisement des stocks de poissons en Afrique, plongeant les populations dans la pauvreté. En Afrique de l’Ouest, par exemple, les revenus des petits pêcheurs ont diminué de 40 % entre 2006 et 2016. La réduction des prises a également entraîné une diminution de la disponibilité et une augmentation des prix du poisson destiné à la consommation locale.

    Pêche illégale

    La pêche illégale, pratiquée en grande partie par des flottes étrangères, aggrave l’épuisement des stocks de poissons. Elle a un impact massif sur les économies. En Afrique de l’Ouest, elle coûte à six pays environ 2,3 milliards de dollars chaque année.

    Malgré le succès de la coalition internationale en matière de neutralisation de la piraterie dans le golfe d’Aden, la pêche illégale par des navires étrangers continue de représenter une menace importante pour la sécurité alimentaire et économique de millions d’Africains.

    Ce qui est ironique, c’est que la pêche illégale a été citée comme l’un des principaux facteurs contribuant à la piraterie dans le golfe d’Aden. Et dans le golfe de Guinée, la pollution historique causée par les compagnies pétrolières étrangères et les privations qui en résultent ont donné lieu à un militantisme qui s’est transformé en piraterie.

    Il est concevable que plus les gens sont poussés vers la pauvreté, plus ils se lancent dans des activités criminelles dont la piraterie.

    Changement d’orientation

    Se concentrer principalement sur le piratage n’est pas la solution. Il faut s’attaquer à ses causes profondes – l’épuisement des stocks de poissons, la perte des moyens de subsistance et la pauvreté.

    La sécurité maritime en Afrique ne sera assurée que lorsque les gouvernements africains et leurs homologues étrangers accorderont le même niveau d’attention et de ressources à la lutte contre la piraterie qu’à la pêche durable et à la lutte contre la pollution marine.

    Pour parvenir à cet équilibre, il faut prendre plusieurs mesures concrètes.

    5 mesures à prendre

    Tout d’abord, l’Union africaine (UA) et les communautés économiques régionales doivent prendre des mesures collectives pour mettre fin aux relations d’exploitation des ressources océaniques du continent. Il s’agit notamment d’exhorter les Nations unies à reconnaître la pêche illégale et les crimes qui y sont associés comme des menaces graves pour la sécurité.

    Les partenaires internationaux doivent aller au-delà de la rhétorique et cesser de financer l’exploitation des ressources du continent par le biais de subventions permettant l’exploitation légale d’espèces épuisées et de la pêche illégale.

    Deuxièmement, les États africains doivent adopter une approche holistique de la sécurité maritime qui encourage la coopération et la collaboration entre les secteurs, comme le soulignent l’Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy AIMS 2050 et la Charte de Lomé. Cette approche devrait s’appuyer sur des mesures de lutte contre la piraterie pour combattre la pêche illégale et les activités connexes.

    Troisièmement, pour comprendre l’impact des menaces qui pèsent sur la sécurité maritime et l’extraction des ressources, les voix africaines (au niveau communautaire) devraient être prises en compte dans la formulation des politiques et des stratégies.

    Quatrièmement, bien qu’elle ait permis de réduire la piraterie, l’approche actuelle de la sécurité maritime en Afrique n’est pas durable. Il convient de s’attaquer aux causes profondes de l’insécurité, telles que le chômage des jeunes et la dégradation de l’environnement. Cela nécessite une attention immédiate qui met l’accent sur le bien-être social et écologique.

    Enfin, la réduction des incidents de piraterie et de vols à main armée en mer, en particulier dans le Golfe de Guinée, est due à la coopération, la collaboration et la coordination entre les marines régionales et leurs partenaires. Il est largement admis que c’est une approche durable. Elle devrait être maintenue, voire étendue à d’autres menaces pour la sécurité en mer.

    En prenant ces mesures, on s’assurera que personne n’est laissé pour compte et que les perspectives de prospérité future du continent ne sont pas compromises.The Conversation

    Cet article est republié à partir de The Conversation sous licence Creative Commons. Lire l’article original.

    Main photo by Francisco Davids on Pexels. 

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    How Mauritius could exploit petroleum reserves for a zero-carbon sustainable future

    By
    Adam Moolna
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    Adam Moolna, Lecturer in Environment and Sustainability and Programme Director for Natural Sciences at Keele University, UK

     

    Potential petroleum exploitation may offer a golden opportunity to improve the lives and environment of all Mauritians. The petroleum industry is generally lucrative so, if economically viable in Mauritius, it will almost certainly happen despite climate or pollution concerns. Petroleum can, if managed intelligently, support climate action by financing an accelerated transition to zero-carbon and reducing overall cumulative emissions. Sovereign wealth would also allow Mauritius to take control of its own development path and not be constrained by narrower external geopolitical agendas and conditional aid. An improved environment and more equitable society with better livelihoods and opportunities is what matters for people in general. Realising such potential, however, needs robust institutional arrangements, advances in management of environmental impacts, development aligned with sustainability, strategic expertise, and political will. Without these key factors, petroleum will, by default, exacerbate climate change, act only as a budget subsidy, contribute negligibly to a sustainable future, and risk extensive damage to marine ecosystems and the wider Blue Economy. The real opportunities of a petroleum industry will be tragically missed unless government is actively challenged to develop a drastically improved, comprehensive, and trustworthy framework to deliver that vision.

    Can petroleum exploitation be reconciled with responsibilities to address the climate emergency?

    Mauritius is in the early stages of petroleum exploration, with considerable potential in remnants of sedimentary basins across shallow undersea banks. An updated legal and regulatory framework was introduced by the 2021 Offshore Petroleum Bill. “Blue Economy” ocean and coastal resources including petroleum are prime economic opportunities for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) such as Mauritius.  While such economic developments also bring social benefits such as employment and development of human capital, they need reconciling with environmental sustainability, biodiversity conservation, broader social progress, and climate change action. It is well documented that deep-water petroleum exploitation risks serious negative impacts on marine ecosystems and little studied seabed habitats. This also threatens existing key Blue Economy sectors such as fishing. Petroleum exploration must invest in research to increase baseline knowledge, advance the state-of-the-art in environmental management, and mitigate potential harm ahead of exploitation. Advances in offshore infrastructure, information, and governances should also be applied to support the wider Blue Economy.

    Fossil fuel use increases atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) and is a leading factor in human-driven climate change, yet petroleum exploitation does not need to contradict long-term climate action. There are global budgets of total CO2 emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) and petroleum revenues can finance an accelerated transition to zero-carbon, so a lower final total of cumulative CO2 is emitted. Carbon offsetting can drastically reduce the net carbon emissions of petroleum exploitation if managed correctly. Replacing international imports with domestic production can reduce transport emissions and the carbon footprint of national fossil fuel consumption.

    A Mauritian petroleum industry would emerge into a global energy landscape in which producer states take a strategic outlook on decarbonising oil and gas including diversified energy mixes and nature-based carbon capture. An eventual zero-carbon future would have no fossil fuel use, with electricity from renewables and transport powered by electricity, biofuels, or renewable hydrogen. Focus should shift to achieving zero-carbon as soon as possible, rather than detailed CO2 budgets, because climate change is not solely dependent on CO2 and the context of carbon matters more than simplistic accounting.

    The economic catalyst opportunity depends on government approach rather than size of reserves

    What petroleum means for the economy, environment, and society depends both on revenue management and on reserve quantities and quality. The UK and Norway share equal ownership of petroleum in the North Sea but, whilst Norway invested in a sovereign wealth fund that has led to long-term prosperity, the UK squandered revenue  as a budget subsidy. Dubai was not afforded petroleum reserves on the same scale as its fellow emirates such as Abu Dhabi but used an initial boom (providing 50% of Gross Domestic Product) to develop a diverse economy in which petroleum now represents less than 1% of total wealth creation.

    Potential petroleum reserves or annual production rates for Mauritius are unknown, and need much more exploration, so we can only speculate on possible financial and carbon implications. Importantly, exploitation of petroleum will only be possible if extraction of such deep-water reserves proves technically and economically viable. Revenue depends on royalty and tax regimes, differences in oil grades, extraction costs, and volatile prices. CO2 emissions depend on variable factors upstream and downstream of production. We could, however, contextualise possible scenarios using credible figures of US$15 revenue and 500kg CO2 emissions per barrel of crude oil and the approximately US$3.3bn revenue in the 2022-23 Government of Mauritius budget. Mauritius has a carbon budget of approximately 75 million tons CO2 from 2021 forwards (a share of the 460 billion tons globally  budgeted by population) and envisages spending US$2bn to reduce projected annual emissions of 7 million tons in 2030 by 40%.

    Annual production on par with UK and Norway experiences (representing 10% of government revenue) would see US$300m from 20 million barrels with 10 million tons of CO2 emissions. An initial boom equivalent to Dubai would see annual revenues of US$1.5bn from 100 million barrels with 50 million tons of CO2. With consideration of broader greenhouse gas inventories and carbon offsetting, lucrative petroleum exploitation can align with climate responsible development.

    Towards a greener, fairer, and more prosperous Mauritius

    From political and academic consensus, a sustainable society has: (1) environmental management to protect and enhance the natural environment; (2) economic development to increase people’s livelihoods and society’s wealth; and (3) social progress to reduce poverty and inequality of wealth and opportunities. Mauritius should invest petroleum revenue in substantial financing and rigorous expert planning for an ambitious transformation of economy, society, and environment. Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) or Triple Bottom Line approaches could help frame credible business and finance models.

    Petroleum wealth invested properly in a sustainable future can both reduce total carbon emissions and improve prosperity, social equality, and the environment. Mauritius can take control of its development path and build capacity and expertise for informed choices to be made and delivered. Sustainability should be part of the lived experience of all, with comprehensive and inclusive development that considers synergies and trade-offs. The current outlook for petroleum management is underwhelming, however, with limited consideration of sustainable development opportunities. The likely trajectory is for revenues to be absorbed into current spending plans and, without investment in decarbonising the economy, increased emissions will exacerbate climate change.

    Effective policy measures importantly require strong political will and commitment to deliver impact. Long-term institutional management of petroleum revenues should be independent of political parties with a sovereign wealth fund controlling investment for a sustainability revolution. Petroleum exploitation should not begin until government puts in place irreversible, transparent, and robustly planned arrangements to use revenues for a zero-carbon sustainable future.

    Main photo by Jan-Rune Smenes Reite on Pexels.

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

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