David King, Founder of Centre for Climate Repair at Cambridge and Chair of Climate Crisis Advisory Group (CCAG), University of Cambridge

Jane Lichtenstein, Associate Researcher, Climate Crisis Advisory Group (CCAG), University of Cambridge

While global governments have agreed to work towards limiting global temperature increase to 1.5°C, little in their behaviour suggests they are taking the challenge seriously, as emissions continue to rise year after year. The most recent climate analysis report by the IPCC, published on April 4, warns that this pattern is set to continue – with a projected global rise of 3.2°C or more by 2100 – if emissions aren’t drastically reduced and excess CO₂ removed from the atmosphere.

It’s time to turn to our oceans for help, an approach consistent with the IPCC’s climate objectives, yet which remains relatively overlooked. Current research at the Centre for Climate Repair at Cambridge University tackles how we can reinvigorate the world’s largest potential carbon sinks, which cover more than 70% of our planet’s surface, and have already been working to remove CO₂ from our atmosphere for millions of years.

At just 1.3°C above pre-industrial levels, the world is currently struggling to cope. Unprecedented droughts, wildfire, floods, storms and heatwaves batter the planet. SwissRe, one of the world’s largest insurance companies, has estimated that natural disasters cost the world US$190 billion (£146 billion) in 2020.

Each incremental temperature rise brings more unpredictable conditions. By 2050, coastal cities such as Jakarta and Kolkata could be unliveable due to rising sea levels causing floods and storm surges.

The IPCC report makes clear that cutting down on the use of fossil fuels is crucial to reducing emissions. Technical innovations to help us make this transition – alongside wind, solar and tidal power – include using methane from landfill sites to heat buildings (something already successfully implemented in Sweden) and building clean mass transportation systems that free up pavements and public spaces (as demonstrated in Bogota). Wealthy nations must step up to make these changes, at the same time funding poorer nations’ plans to sidestep fossil fuel reliance.

But although this is clearly a necessary plan of action, politics and policy are still responding slowly, with governments failing to align their efforts with the required scale and urgency of solutions.

Capturing carbon

An equally key part of bringing CO₂ levels down is putting atmospheric carbon back where it came from. Carbon capture and storage technology is a vital tool in sectors where CO₂ emissions are essentially unavoidable, such as in heavy industrial processes like steel works. But its high costs and energy usage make it an imperfect solution.

Using nature to store carbon on a large scale is more promising. The IPCC report puts faith in the farming industry unrolling dramatic changes to help sequester more carbon in soil over the next decade. Yet although methods of doing this have been successfully trialled across the world, policy hasn’t caught up, and vested interests in current farming methods also create inertia.

Extensive tree planting also offers scope for increasing carbon sinks, as do peatland preservation, mangrove reforestation and rewilding. But using land alone won’t be enough to sufficiently reduce greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. This is where oceans come in.

Storing carbon in the sea

Much of the deep ocean that’s now desertified thanks to human activity was once a thriving aquatic ecosystem. Our current research explores how whales form an important part of rebuilding that system, acting as “biological pumps” that circulate nutrients from the depths of the ocean to its surface through their feeding and excreting behaviours.

What’s more, CCRC experiments are exploring the potential for regenerating ocean biomass as a way to store more carbon. Ocean biomass refers to communities of plants, fish and mammals that thrive near the surface, but send their shells, bones and decomposing vegetation permanently to the deep ocean, locking huge amounts of carbon into the seabed. Expanding their numbers could bolster biodiversity, shore up fish stocks and provide income opportunities for marginalised communities across the world – as well as capturing tens of billions of tons of CO₂ from the atmosphere.

A third aspect of tackling the climate crisis involves fixing parts of the climate system that have already passed their “tipping point”: starting by refreezing the Arctic. Rapid Arctic melting has already caused many of the extreme weather events we’ve seen recently, from snow in Texas to floods in China, thanks to its distorting effects on the polar jet stream. Reversing this process – for example by artificially increasing cloud cover over the region to reflect more sunlight away from Arctic ice – would allow the jet stream to return to normal, buying us more time to work on reducing atmospheric greenhouse gas levels.

The challenges of reducing emissions by switching away from fossil fuels are largely political, not technical. The almost-immediate benefits of cleaner air, better health and new jobs for millions in the alternative energy sector should outweigh short-term fears. Meanwhile, we must also use our greatest natural resource to remove the excess carbon already released into the atmosphere if we are to create a manageable future for humanity.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Main Photo by Mike Doherty on Unsplash.

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Noam Vogt-Vincent, DPhil Candidate in Earth Sciences, University of Oxford

April Burt, Research Associate, University of Oxford

More than 1,000km southwest of Mahé, the main inhabited island in Seychelles, lies a ring of coral islands called the Aldabra Atoll. The islands are a UNESCO World Heritage Site and support a huge diversity of marine species including manta rays and tiger sharks. The atoll is also a breeding site for endangered green turtles.

Aldabra has long been protected from threats to its biodiversity by its remoteness. But now plastic debris is strewn across Aldabra’s coastlines, threatening nearby marine ecosystems. Research finds the likelihood of coral disease increases from 4% to 89% when coral are in contact with plastic.

The Seychelles Islands Foundation, who are responsible for managing Aldabra, conducted a plastic clean-up operation in partnership with Oxford University in 2019. Roughly 25 tonnes of plastic waste were removed from the islands.

A new study that we co-authored modelled the flow of plastic debris in the Indian Ocean between 1993 and 2019 and traced it to its source. We found that none of the plastic that washes up on Aldabra comes from the islands themselves.

Simulating plastic flow

Using data on plastic waste generation and fishing activity, we generated hundreds of billions of virtual plastic particles entering the Indian ocean. We then simulated their movement based on ocean currents, waves and winds.

Bottle caps and other low-buoyancy items sink fast and plastic loses buoyancy as it fragments or becomes covered in waterborne organisms. Items that remain buoyant for longer are transported further distances. To reach Aldabra from the eastern Indian Ocean, our model estimates that debris must be floating for at least six months.

We determined the likelihood that this debris would wash up on the coast by analysing the rate at which scientific “drifters” (instruments that record ocean currents) and GPS-tracked floating fishing devices become “beached”. Free-floating instruments such as these behave well as proxies for floating plastic. These observations indicate that around 3% of the debris that is within 10km of a coast beach each day.

Four-year simulation of highly buoyant marine debris transport in the Indian Ocean.

Island under siege

Our model predicts that Indonesia is responsible for most of the plastic debris, including as flip-flops and plastic packaging, that beaches across Seychelles. Various other countries including India, Sri Lanka and the Philippines are also major sources.

But Seychelles is also contaminated with plastic waste from other places.

Almost half of the plastic bottles found on Aldabra during the initial clean-up had been manufactured in China. But ocean currents do not flow directly between China and the western Indian Ocean. It is thus unlikely that a large number of bottles could float from China to Seychelles.

But Seychelles is close to a major shipping lane that connects southeast Asia to the Atlantic. If bottles were discarded from ships crossing the Indian Ocean then they would likely beach across Seychelles.

Research that we conducted in 2020 estimated that the fishing industry was responsible for 83% of the plastic waste on Aldabra. Most of the fishing gear abandoned by “purse seine” fisheries (a method of fishing that employs large nets to catch tuna) likely relates to regional fishing activity around Seychelles. But abandoned gear from longline fisheries may have drifted in from as far afield as western Australia.

Perhaps most importantly, our modelling also suggests that the rates at which plastic debris will beach in the Indian Ocean will follow strong seasonal cycles.

Winds tend to have a southerly (northward) component during the Indian Ocean’s summer monsoon season. But major debris sources such as Indonesia and India share similar, or more northerly, latitudes with Seychelles. During this period, debris from these sources tends to miss Seychelles and is transported further north.

By contrast, the winds reverse during the winter monsoons and transport debris directly towards Seychelles. We expect plastic debris accumulation to peak in Seychelles shortly after the winter monsoons (February to April). In the southernmost islands, almost all of the debris that beaches will do so at this point.

Planning effective mitigation

Seychelles is not responsible for generating this waste but face mounting environmental and economic costs. For example, 500 tonnes of litter remained following the initial clean-up of Aldabra’s coasts, which may cost up to US$5 million (£4 million) to remove.

The United Nations last year agreed to establish a global plastic treaty that will tackle plastic pollution at its roots. But negotiations only began recently and it may be a long time before the treaty has any meaningful impact.

Until then our modelling may help to establish other strategies to reduce the accumulation of plastic debris in Seychelles.

We identified fishing gear and shipping as being responsible for the majority of plastic pollution on Seychelles. Better enforcement of existing laws such as the 1983 ban on the disposal of plastic into the sea under the Marpol Convention should reduce the amount of plastic entering the Indian Ocean.

Predicting the peak of plastic accumulation in Seychelles will also maximise the effectiveness of beach clean-ups. Removing litter shortly after its arrival will minimise the time debris spends being broken down into unmanageable fragments.

Remote Indian Ocean islands are increasingly affected by plastic waste generated overseas. But by modelling the flow of plastic debris, we now have the chance to develop more effective strategies to reduce plastic accumulation and strengthen demands for stronger commitments under the global plastic treaty.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Main Photo by Naja Bertolt Jensen on Unsplash.

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor: Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

Julia Taylor, Researcher: Climate and Inequality, University of the Witwatersrand

There were high expectations for COP27, the 27th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

COP conferences broadly provide a platform for the negotiation of international climate change agreements. This was to be the first COP held in Africa since 2016. It was also framed as the implementation COP, which would lead to action.

COP27 was expected to make progress on “loss and damage”. This is financing to compensate developing countries for the harm to the climate that has been caused primarily by the developed world.

The outcome – the establishment of a new fund for loss and damage – is a relief for climate activists and developing countries.

Below we unpack this, and other key outcomes from this crucial climate change conference.

Urgency, justice and equity missing in negotiations

Outside the formal negotiations, there were clear and consistent messages about the urgency of climate action from scientists, NGOs and climate activists. They gathered at the event and in small, peaceful protests. The same urgency wasn’t seen among party negotiators.

Inside the formal negotiations, mostly wealthy country parties pushed back on immediate action in these areas:

• support for people displaced by extreme events caused by climate change
• strong and transparent governance of carbon markets
• the phasing out of all fossil fuels.

This disconnect was striking and has led to significant delays and setbacks in agreements relevant to climate justice.

Further, the decision-making process raises questions about the equity of different voices at COP, and whose reality counts. All decisions within COP are made by consensus, not a vote. Decisions can be overruled by one dissenting party.

There’s also inequality in representation of countries and the prevalence of lobby groups at COP27. Certain countries can support large teams of party delegates and technical support. Poorer countries can’t.

New fund for loss and damage

A significant achievement of COP27 was an agreement to establish a new fund for loss and damage finance.

This negotiation was very contentious, with some parties threatening to walk out at various points. The central tension was between developed and developing countries. Developed countries did all they could to avoid a new financing entity for loss and damage.

Developing countries are largely represented by the G77 and China. This is a negotiating group of 134 developing countries initially founded by 77 countries in 1964. Rich nations tried to divide the G77 and China negotiating group by arguing that China, India, and other less vulnerable countries should also have to pay for loss and damage.

It’s true that China and India are currently large emitters of greenhouse gases, but this approach shows a refusal to acknowledge the historical cumulative emissions mostly attributed to the early industrialisers.

The responsibility for cumulative emissions does vary based on which emissions are counted, how they are counted, and whether it is analysed on a per capita basis. However, North American and European regions stand out as the largest emitters.

While the agreement on a fund for loss and damage is a significant step forward, a lot of work needs to be done before it is set up. The parties agreed to set up a transitional committee to make recommendations for adoption at COP28, in November 2023.

Technical assistance to address loss and damage

An additional positive move was made with the agreement on the institutional arrangements to operationalise the Santiago Network, which was established at COP25 to help developing countries identify their technical needs and connect with providers of assistance to address them. For example, in the case of flooding, improved systems to prepare and implement early warning systems and evacuation processes.

The next step will be to identify the host for the Santiago Network Secretariat.

No decision on the governance of the Warsaw International Mechanism

The Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) was established in 2013 to provide coordination and encourage dialogue on loss and damage. Unfortunately, discussions on the governance of the WIM went nowhere.

Parties could not agree on whether it should be under the governance of COP or the Paris Agreement.

Developed countries want the mechanism to be governed under the Paris Agreement alone. Developing countries want a dual governance system.

Governance under COP would hold developed countries to account, whereas the Paris Agreement has a paragraph which excludes liability and compensation.

Carbon market governance

There were similar tensions in the discussions around the governance framework for carbon markets.

Carbon markets allow countries or entities that can reduce or absorb emissions to sell them as carbon credits to high emitters. The markets can therefore reduce emissions and increase flows of climate finance if held to high standards of integrity and transparency.

However, new language in the decision text allows for confidentiality around the details of carbon credits. This could jeopardise transparency and accounting processes and reduce the likelihood of carbon markets contributing to mitigation.

New climate finance goal

This COP was supposed to develop a new collective quantified goal on climate finance, to replace the US$100 billion annual target which has not been met. It was also supposed to develop an action plan to double adaptation finance, which has not materialised.

The new finance goal has been delayed to next year, along with a status report on the commitment to double adaptation finance by 2025.

Various parties pointed out that climate finance should not worsen the indebtedness of developing countries. For the first time, the decision document acknowledged this issue. It also encouraged reform of the way multilateral development banks support climate finance.

Phasing out fossil fuels

This COP failed to get a commitment from all parties to phase out all fossil fuels.

Instead of committing to this obvious solution to reduce emissions, parties insisted on using the wording “accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.”

“Unabated coal power” insinuates that coal (with carbon capture technology) could be continued. Specifying “inefficient fossil fuel subsidies” may allow for loopholes due to the definition of “inefficient.”

Moving forward

While COP27 has delivered significant progress on finance for loss and damage, it remains to be seen whether this will translate into action. The lack of progress on mitigation and adaptation is a worry. In failing to deal with the central challenge of reducing fossil fuel use and reaching agreement on further reducing carbon emissions, COP27 has not addressed the key challenges of climate change.

The UN multilateral processes that govern climate change need developed countries to seriously commit to loss and damage. And treaties must be given greater enforcement capabilities. The parties will also need to find a mechanism to place common interests at the top of the agenda, above that of party interests.

It may also be time to assess the equity of representation and power in these processes. It has taken 30 years to make progress on loss and damage finance. Existing treaties are inadequate to hold parties to account on mitigation and adaptation targets.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Main photo by Scotland & Carbon (Creative Commons).

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Nicholas P. Simpson, Senior Advisor, Africa Lead for Knowledge & Practice, Africa Climate Mobility Initiative, Global Centre for Climate Mobility, University of Cape Town

Adapting to a world that is warmer than today is a huge undertaking, even if the most ambitious temperature ceiling is met. Increasing climate risks mean that millions of Africans could be uprooted or trapped where they are due to climate change.

Unfortunately, the world has made little progress on what it takes to adapt safely to life on a warmer planet. We still lack the scale and urgency of both collective and transformative action necessary to cut greenhouse gases as per the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.

Heatwaves from human-caused climate change have already reduced global economic growth by up to US$29.3 trillion between 1992 and 2013. Africa’s gross domestic product has been particularly hard hit. One estimate shows gross domestic product per capita for 1991–2010 in Africa was on average 13.6% lower than it could have been if climate change had not occurred.

Global heating may rise to between 2.4℃ and 2.6℃ by 2100. That presents uninsurable risks, even for rich countries.

For Africans, these changes will increase inequality and disrupt businesses. They will also undermine agricultural systems and decades of development gains in health and education. In addition, the changes are set to cause losses and damage to Africa’s unique heritage of outstanding and universal value. These impacts will increasingly affect those moving, staying, and communities receiving people on the move due to climate change.

All life on Earth will have to adapt if any industries are to survive for Africa’s future generations. There is a narrow window left to prepare and shift to adaptation in Africa.

A new report called African Shifts documents the current realities of climate-forced migration and displacement in Africa. The report paints possible scenarios for future population movements resulting from increasing climate impacts. It also revises the discourse of migration and climate change. It uses the term “climate mobility” to capture the movement motivated by the adverse effects of sudden or slow-onset climate impacts.

The report, launched by the Africa Climate Mobility Initiative, aims to provide evidence, knowledge and policy recommendations to leaders gathering at the COP27 climate change negotiations in Egypt, where climate adaptation strategies are high on the agenda.

African Shifts, of which I am the lead drafting author, provides research, data and projections that support locally anchored solutions for climate adaptation in communities across Africa facing the impacts of forced migration. It uses likely and optimistic climate change and development scenarios to provide projections of climate mobility that are appropriate to Africa’s development trajectory over the next 30 years.

Several new findings have been made and key actions proposed.

Findings

The report shows that:

• Most future climate-forced migration and displacement in Africa will take place within countries. This reflects current geographies of movement on the continent.
• The number of people moving to seek protection and better livelihoods will increase from 1.5% of Africa’s population today to as many as 5% by 2050. This amounts to about 113 million people.
• Up to 2.5 million people could leave Africa’s coastal areas due to sea level rise and other stressors. In the Horn of Africa, climate impacts could force up to 9% of the population – as many as 49 million people – to move in the decades ahead. This makes the case for adequate planning to build local adaptive capacity, especially in smaller cities and towns. Adapting could enable more people to stay in their home communities.
• The movement of people across borders in response to climate change is expected to be relatively small. Cross-border climate mobility is forecast to reach a maximum of 1.2 million people by 2050 under a high greenhouse gas emissions scenario. This will be a small fraction of the continent’s overall population and a small contribution to the total likely cross-border migration of 11 to 12 million people by 2050. This counters the prevailing narrative of populist leaders and media houses that peddle highly exaggerated numbers of people leaving Africa for high-income and distant countries.
• Importantly, for most on the continent, climate mobility is likely to be a response of last resort. Most Africans are attached to their land and homes and don’t aspire to leave their communities. Half of the men and 40% of the women surveyed expressed hope and optimism for the future, despite experiencing severe climate disruptions. For many people relocation is too costly. As a result, some of the most vulnerable people remain in place, risking forced evacuation or becoming stranded. Those who move or are forcibly displaced often settle in new locations where they remain vulnerable and exposed to climate risks.

Key actions

The Agenda for Action accompanying the African Shifts report proposes key actions for the next eight years. These actions can support countries in achieving the aspirations of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals set up by the UN under the Paris Agreement. They include:

Planning for mobility – Anticipate and plan for climate mobility. This includes permanent relocation, fostering social cohesion in affected communities, preventing immobility, driving economic growth, sustaining peace, and protecting people on the move. Next step is to integrate climate mobility in climate adaptation and finance commitments. This is achieved by recognising and supporting mobility as a legitimate strategy.

Empowering people – Inform people of climate risks. This includes building climate change literacy, co-production of actionable climate information services and access to early warnings. Specifically, countries should amplify women’s agency and harness the ambitions of the youth.

Transforming development – Build from the local by pursuing community-led solutions for climate-resilient development, disaster response and climate mobility across the continent.

Countries should also invest in resilient and connected cities. Build stronger ties across cities and with rural areas and economies.

Lastly, countries should pursue nature-positive development. Land, water, and other shared natural resources should be managed cooperatively and sustainably to support agricultural and ecosystem-based livelihoods and boost productivity. Reduce the environmental impact and harness ecosystems and biodiversity protection for economic development and climate resilience.

The report makes the case that inclusive development choices that reduce vulnerability and build climate resilience could enable people to stay in their home communities.

Hotspots

The report identifies potential “climate hotspots”. These include specific cities that will grow or shrink due to climate mobility; borderlands that will see an increase in climate mobility; and rain-fed lowlands and coastal areas.

These areas need to build resilience in near-term actions and long-term strategies.

The steps proposed in the report can avert and minimise the risk of displacement and prepare communities for future arrivals, preventing escalating loss and damage in a warmer future.

The research, modelling and analysis that form the basis of this report were the result of a unique collaboration between the Africa Climate Mobility Initiative, the Mixed Migration Centre, and a consortium led by the Center for International Earth Science Information Network of the Columbia University Climate School, including the City University of New York Institute for Demographic Research, and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Main photo by Jeff Ackley on Unsplash.

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor: Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, University of the Witwatersrand

Julia Taylor, Researcher: Climate and Inequality, University of the Witwatersrand

COP27 is the 27th Conference of the Parties (countries) that signed up to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The convention was established at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and has been ratified by 198 countries. They agreed to stabilise the production of greenhouse gases in order to prevent dangerous climate change.

Since then, the Conference of the Parties has been hosted in a different country each year. These conferences broadly provide a platform for the negotiation of international climate change treaties.

The very first treaty acknowledged that the responsibility for action was different for developed and developing countries, because developed countries were responsible for most greenhouse gas emissions.

Despite some gains, commitment to these treaties has not translated into the action necessary to shift the course of global climate change. The recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report states that global average temperatures have already reached 1.1°C above pre-industrial levels and that warming of over 1.5°C is all but inevitable unless drastic action is taken.

Everyone is affected by climate change, but some people and regions are more vulnerable than others. Regions that will experience the most adverse impacts of climate change are West, Central and East Africa, South Asia, Central and South America, Small Island Developing States and the Arctic. Populations living in informal settlements will have the worst of it.

Vulnerability to climate change impacts is driven by socioeconomic, political and environmental factors. African countries have already experienced loss and damage due to climate change. For example, food production, economic output and biodiversity have all declined and more people are at risk of dying due to climate change in African countries.

The COP27 is therefore important because that is where decisions are made about how to respond to climate change.

Climate change treaties

Three international treaties have been adopted on international climate change cooperation. They led to the development of different bodies which all convene under the banner of the COP. COP is where they meet, negotiate and evaluate progress, even though COP technically only refers to the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The first treaty was the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The second was the Kyoto Protocol, established in 1997. Countries made commitments to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol was based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. It acknowledged that because of their higher levels of economic development, developed countries could and should take greater responsibility to reduce emissions.

The third and most recent treaty is the 2015 Paris Agreement. It covers climate change mitigation, adaptation and financing and aims to limit the rise in temperatures to less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. All signatories need to develop a non-binding plan for climate change mitigation, including reducing emissions. They also have to report on progress.

A key weakness of the Paris Agreement is that it is non-binding. Also, the commitments are self-determined. A recent study found that even if all countries did meet their commitments, it would not be enough to limit warming to below 2°C.

It is important to understand and engage in these processes as the impacts of climate change are increasing globally. The increase in the global average temperature is one of several climate impacts. Others include increased likelihood of droughts or floods, and increased intensity of storms and wildfires.

The frequency of climate events will increase as temperatures rise. There is an urgent need for action to prevent global warming from rising above 2°C. Temperatures over 2°C will result in irreversible climate impacts such as sea level rise, and affect far more people than an increase of 1.5°C.

Responses to climate change

There are three policy areas which have emerged to respond to climate change.

The first is mitigation – the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to stabilise the climate. Examples of mitigation include replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy sources, or developing electrified public transport to replace private vehicles powered by combustion engines.

The second is adaptation – interventions which would support climate resilience and reduce vulnerability. Examples include improved water management and conservation to reduce risk of drought, initiatives to improve food security and support for biodiversity.

The last policy area deals with loss and damage. Loss and damage refers to “the economic and non-economic damages associated with slow onset events and extreme weather events caused by global warming and the tools and institutions that identify and mitigate such risks.” Interventions to address loss and damage can include risk management support and finance which is often framed as climate reparations.

Mitigation and adaptation are well understood and established within climate policy. And they have finance mechanisms within international treaties, even though existing commitments to these mechanisms have not materialised in practice, particularly when it comes to adaptation. Loss and damage, however, has received far less attention in international treaties and negotiations.

Highlighting loss and damage

The Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage was established in 2013 to provide a framework to address loss and damage. It aims to improve understanding of risk management approaches, increase coordination and dialogue among stakeholders and enhance action and support.

The issue of loss and damage was incorporated into the Paris Agreement, but without any specific commitments around it. During negotiations at COP25, the Santiago Network was set up to avert, minimise and address loss and damage for developing countries but it focuses mostly on technical assistance rather than finance. At COP26 (in 2021) there was an agreement to fund the Santiago Network, but the institutional framework is not yet finalised.

Loss and damage was raised as an important issue to be addressed during COP26. There were some promising moves, such as the Scottish first minister, Nicola Sturgeon, pledging £2 million towards a loss and damage finance facility. But many rich nations did not support this.

The negotiations led to the proposal to establish the Glasgow Finance Facility for loss and damage. But the wording of the decision was changed at the last minute to the Glasgow Dialogues, which committed to discussing arrangements for funding activities to avert, minimise and address loss and damage. This change has delayed any real financial support for loss and damage in the short term.

This was very disappointing for developing country parties, who will be pushing once more to secure financing for loss and damage at COP27, and holding other countries to account for the US$100 billion annual commitment towards climate finance which has yet to materialise.

Many climate activists from the global south feel that if a financing facility for loss and damage is not discussed at COP27, it will be a failed conference.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Main photo by Ma Ti on Unsplash.

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).