Anya Schiffrin, Director of the Technology, Media, and Communications Specialization at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs

Dylan W. Groves, Assistant Professor of political science at Lafayette College

Joseph E. Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank and University Professor at Columbia University and a Nobel laureate in economics.

NEW YORK – Although news consumption soared during the COVID-19 pandemic, subscriptions have since fallen, and news outlets around the world have been laying off reporters or even shutting down altogether. That is bad news for all of us.

Our new UNESCO brief highlights recent research that demonstrates just how important high-quality information is to a well-functioning economy, society, and democracy. New studies in economics and political science use rigorous methods to confirm what journalists already knew: that their work has a positive influence on democratic norms, civic engagement, and governmental and corporate accountability. By building social trust and promoting human rights, serious, credible reporting also supports economic performance and sustainable development.

The 2021 UNESCO Windhoek+30 Declaration – which reaffirmed the importance of information as a public good (one from which everyone benefits, and none are excluded) – was based on numerous studies from Africa, India, Latin America, and the United States. This literature shows that high-quality news and journalism promotes accountability and responsiveness even amid rising tides of misinformation and disinformation. Fact-checking can indeed counter the lies and distortions now flooding societies around the world.

Moreover, high-quality journalism remains more effective than social media in disseminating accurate, trustworthy news. While technology can enhance the spread of good information, it is currently doing the opposite. Large digital platforms regularly downrank news, claiming that users are more interested in other categories of content. But Pew Research Center data suggest that news consumption across platforms has remained stable (at least in the US) since 2020. And with more people voting in elections this year than ever before, there has never been a greater need for quality reporting.

Everyone – even those who do not invest in journalism themselves – benefits from the investigation, curation, and dissemination of trustworthy and useful information. But this public good is unlikely to be adequately provided in a free market, even with the help of public-spirited philanthropists, aid organizations, media companies, and governments. In many markets, their support is not enough.

Governments, especially, have a responsibility to ensure the provision of public goods. Enabling high-quality journalism requires legal regimes that protect free expression and the “right to tell.” But that is not enough. For journalists to do their jobs, there also must be laws and enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure the right to access information: the “right to know.” While many countries have passed such laws, they are rarely enforced. When public authorities even bother to respond to information requests, they often do so only after long delays, and with extensive redactions.

Legacy media outlets are a key part of the media ecosystem and require continued support; but so do smaller outlets and those targeting underserved areas. Some promising ideas for supporting journalism include providing special funds or tax breaks (such as payroll tax credits or targeted value-added-tax (VAT) reductions) and issuing news-subscription vouchers. During the pandemic, governments around the world launched variations of these policies, thus producing a wide range of models that can now be emulated.

Another crucial step is to ensure that journalists are appropriately compensated for their work. Big Tech (the proprietors of search engines, social media, and most artificial-intelligence platforms) relies on news media to engage users and improve its products. Since tech firms do not produce news themselves, they have no way to fulfill users’ demand for high-quality news and search results without the content provided by journalists. However, they have long used content produced by journalists without providing much (if any) compensation, thus depriving media outlets of a major revenue source: advertising. This cycle is destroying the information ecosystem on which they, and our society, depend.

Many countries have helped sustain high-quality journalism through investments in independent public broadcasting. Healthy public broadcasting institutions build social trust and generate an important spillover benefit: competition that forces private media companies to hold themselves to a higher standard. The institutional structures that facilitate the development of public broadcasting are well-known; what is required is the political will to establish the necessary frameworks.

A general principle in economics is that without public support, there will be an undersupply of public goods. Unfortunately, quality journalism is fast becoming Exhibit A for this principle, despite rigorous scholarship demonstrating its importance. Journalism’s business model is threatened by the rise of AI and the power of tech monopolies that distribute news without paying a fair price for it, and this is happening just as misinformation, disinformation, and political polarization are magnifying the dangers of journalism’s decline.

Around the world, there is a growing sense that democracy is in decline. An important step toward reversing this is to enhance support for quality journalism, starting immediately. The costs of inaction may be enormous.

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s). 

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024.
www.project-syndicate.org

Main Photo by The Climate Reality Project on Unsplash

Bhaso Ndzendze, Associate Professor (International Relations), University of Johannesburg

Some three decades since the end of the Cold War, the world order is undergoing a structural transformation. At the heart of it is the challenge posed to the hegemony of the US. This is primarily being led by Russia and China which are discontented with Washington’s excesses across the global stage. The most recent example of this rebellion was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Fiona Hill, a British-American foreign affairs specialist, observed that the war was a “proxy for a rebellion by Russia and the ‘Rest’ against the United States”.

The African continent is an obvious contender for major power courting as this realignment takes place. This is for at least four reasons.

Firstly, it is the largest regional bloc in the United Nations, representing some 28% of all the votes in the General Assembly. Secondly, it possesses some crucial raw minerals that are found only in the continent. Thirdly, it possesses some important sea trade routes, particularly in east Africa. Finally, the continent is home to the fastest-growing youth demographic, and will account for about 42% of the world’s youth by 2030.

I am a scholar of geopolitics and have conducted research on the continent’s trade ties to the major powers. My findings have led me to the conclusion that Africa can gain more by being neutral than by picking sides.

The drivers

Africa’s size in the UN General Assembly can’t be overstated. The continent sometimes struggles to respond in a co-ordinated way. Nevertheless, it has, in the past, been able to vote in sync in a way that has proved influential. The most notable example of this was the 1971 vote for the resolution that brought mainland China into the UN and replaced Taiwan. In total, there were 76 votes in favour, of which 27 came from African member states.

In today’s UN, having this large grouping on one’s side helps countries the most when it comes to passing – or defeating – resolutions. With the UN Security Council in gridlock because the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) have veto power, there has been a shift towards the UN General Assembly, which works on one-member-one-vote. General Assembly votes are mainly symbolic. But they are a useful indicator of where the international community stands, and are a powerful moral weapon for any major power.

Africa’s other major attraction is, of course, its resource wealth. This has become even more pronounced and taken on extraordinary importance in the push towards alternative sources of energy, both renewable and non-renewable. And in the production of products driven by the rise in technological innovation, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo’s cobalt, which is needed to make device screens among other things. The DRC is the world’s leading producer of this crucial mineral.

At the same time the oil reserves of Algeria, Angola and Nigeria will become increasingly important as countries look to diversify away from Russia for natural gas, and from fossil fuels more broadly.

Then there are the trade routes. The Red Sea route, which straddles northeast Africa and links it to the Indian Ocean, constitutes 10% of annual global trade .

The Red Sea route passes countries such as Eritrea and Somalia. Both have been actively courted by Russia.

For its part, China has earmarked the route through its Maritime Silk Road initiative. Its aim is to boost port infrastructure among countries with Indian Ocean coastlines.

Lastly, Africa is home to the fastest-growing youth population. This will be important in the search for future markets, particularly in sectors such as technology and education.

The US and Europe are also keen to tap this human capacity as their own populations age above the global average. Many are looking to Africa as a source of inward migratory flows.

Africa’s ties with the major powers

In 2022, the continent as a whole exported US$43.1 billion worth of goods to the US and imported goods worth US$30.6 billion.

By comparison, China exported US$164.1 billion to Africa and imported US$117.5 billion worth of African goods, in the same year. With African exports totalling US$661.4 billion, the US accounts for 6.5% and China 17.7%.

China, the notable growth story of the past half-century, has thus become the African continent’s single biggest trading partner, though the combined power of the European Union’s trading bloc of 27 countries still leads.

China’s ties with the continent are the result of decades of diplomatic and commercial efforts to woo the continent through the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. Part of this has been driven by its desire to counter the US. The other driving force has been to sustain its economy, given Africa’s untapped potential.

Russia has pursued a different strategy. Given that its trade with the continent is at a minimum – exports and imports were around US$18 billion in 2021 – it has rather sought to become a security partner, drawing on sentimentalised Soviet history.

Washington’s principal instrument for growing trade, and encouraging good behaviour, in Africa is the African Growth and Opportunity Act, set to expire in 2025. The framework is a lever. But, as the data show, trade is in evident decline.

The general picture can obscure some nuances. Some African states are more deeply intertwined with the US than others. For example, Djibouti has an American military base (along with other states, though not Russia at this point). And Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa are also among the top recipients of US direct investment.

On the other hand, Eritrea, which was the only African state to brazenly vote against the UN General Assembly to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, seems to have no aspirations to be in America’s good graces. This notorious outlier aside, the world is deeply intertwined, with high interdependence even among the competing major powers.

The US and China, despite their trade war, have struggled to decouple from one another, with their bilateral trade reaching new heights as recently as last year.

In light of the comparatively diminished US-Africa trade, the US may be looking to make use of third parties. It could potentially influence the EU to influence Africa. The Huawei issue demonstrates this. The US has successfully pressured quite a few of its allies to halt doing business with the Chinese technology giant. According to Unctad data, France (US$60 billion) and the UK (US$65 billion) are the principal holders of African assets.

As these and other European states seek to “de-risk” from China, there may be third-party consequences for Africa. This might include undue pressure on the continent to behave in certain ways towards China and towards Russia.

Picking sides isn’t the best option

Recent research, including my own on US-China trade “competition” over Africa, shows that the prevailing notion that smaller countries need to “pick sides” in polarised global contexts is false. Africa is best served when it conducts trade with as many partners as possible.

Indeed, as shown, the major contenders are themselves conducting record-breaking trade with one another.

All the while, Europe continues to conduct trade with Russia following the war against Ukraine (indeed, it is growing in some respects).

The continent can, therefore, afford to be neutral. What it cannot afford to do is pick sides and preclude any partnerships. In the oncoming multipolar order, there are no self-evident, African-specific needs to pick sides. All options can be on the table.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Main Photo by Lara Jameson on Pexel

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Rudo Kayombo, Regional Director of Africa at BRAC International.

NAIROBI – What do poverty, climate change, and conflict have in common? They are among the biggest challenges confronting Africa, and they all disproportionately affect women living in poverty or on the margins of society. Both research and experience have demonstrated that these women have enormous potential to improve the well-being of their families and communities.

African countries seeking to drive sustainable development – and address the triple challenge of poverty, climate change, and conflict – must help women in poverty realize their potential. By investing in and scaling up evidence-backed interventions that increase women’s control over income, ownership of productive assets, and decision-making in the household, policymakers can boost human capital, improve gender equality, and expand inclusive economic opportunities.

One approach that has been working in several countries is to provide people living in extreme poverty with a productive asset (such as cows, goats, or supplies for small-scale trade like a sewing machine), support to meet their basic needs, and intensive coaching for a roughly two-year period. Often referred to as the Graduation approach, this set of interventions was developed by the Bangladesh-based NGO BRAC (of which I am Regional Director of Africa for its international arm) to give people the multifaceted “big push” they need to escape poverty and build long-term resilience.

Women, in particular, have benefited greatly from the Graduation approach. For starters, there is rigorous evidence that it can increase women’s productivity. In Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, Graduation interventions contributed to an increase in women’s off-farm enterprise employment and, thus, the labor supply. In Bangladesh, they significantly increased earnings from women-led income-generating activities. Research has also demonstrated that enabling women in extreme poverty to build sustainable livelihoods can encourage positive behavior changes that help households prepare for and cope with temporary shocks.

Moreover, a multifaceted approach that includes gender-sensitive coaching, life-skills training, and community engagement can help women in poverty overcome the psychological and social challenges stemming from gender-based discrimination, social exclusion, and limited education. For example, women who received psychosocial support through the Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program reported improvements in psychological well-being and social cohesion, as well as a reduction in domestic violence. And after a Graduation pilot in Kenya provided women in poverty with mentorship and training (and engaged with male community members to assuage concerns about shifting gender roles), women’s empowerment – as measured by confidence, leadership, and local-committee membership – increased significantly.

Such progress in social and economic empowerment has had positive spillover effects. In Kenya, the two-year Rural Entrepreneur Access Program (REAP) – which provided training, mentorship, and asset grants to small groups of women to start businesses – yielded substantial economic benefits for both participants and their non-enrolled neighbors. This is partly because REAP increased the value participants placed on economic advancement, which they passed along to other women in their communities.

Recognizing the importance of a big-push approach, several African governments, including Kenya, Rwanda, and South Africa, are exploring Graduation-style programsand how to incorporate them into existing systems. For example, the government of Rwanda launched a national Graduation strategy in 2022 to empower people in more than 900,000 households in poverty to develop sustainable, long-term livelihoods, as part of a broader strategy to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030.

Another evidence-backed BRAC initiative that shows promise at scale is the Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents (ELA) model, whereby young women and adolescent girls work with “near peer” mentors who provide training sessions on life skills including reproductive and sexual health, as well as financial literacy and entrepreneurship. In Uganda, adolescent girls in communities with ELA programs were more likely to earn a livelihood, while their rates of teen pregnancy and early marriage fell sharply. This community-based model has already reached more than 200,000 participants across Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, and it is continuing to expand.

Building on these proven approaches, BRAC, in partnership with the Mastercard Foundation, has devised Accelerating Impact for Young Women. This five-year program aims to equip adolescent girls and young women with age-appropriate entrepreneurship, employability, and life-skills training, as well as the tools they need to start and scale up their own businesses. In 2023 – the first year of implementation – more than 70,000 participants enrolled in the program in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda, and more than 630 savings groups were formed. Participants have collectively saved $140,000, and nearly 20,000 of them have received support to start their own livelihoods.

The evidence is clear: investing in marginalized women and girls can lead to transformative change. By embracing proven approaches, African countries can improve their economic future and help build a better, more equitable world. They already have the resources, the evidence, and the technical knowledge. All that is needed now is the political will to act.

Main Photo by Eva Blue on Unsplash

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024.
www.project-syndicate.org

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Samuel Samiái Andrews, Professor, University of Gondar

Around the world, people commonly associate certain foods and products with particular geographical areas. These products are known for characteristics like aroma, flavour, and the traditional knowledge systems used to make them. Legal and agricultural scholars speak of these characteristics as terroir.

For example, coffee from Ethiopia’s Yirgacheffe, Sidamo and Harrar regions is famous for its quality. The Ijebu people of western Nigeria call their processed cassava Ijebu garri. Roquefort cheese and Darjeeling tea are also products associated with certain places.

These kinds of products, which have characteristics unique to their source, can be identified and protected by a type of intellectual property right called Geographical Indications (GI). This right gives economic and financial advantages to the place of origin. The products can be registered with a global treaty registry like the World Intellectual Property Organization. This helps to counter fake products in the international market.

Developed economies, especially in Europe, have benefited from GI protection and promotion since 1994, when they adopted the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. And as early as 1883, the geographical origin of products was recognised as as aspect of industrial property in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. It accords them protection due to their value in national economic growth.

According to a 2020 European Commission study, Europe’s economy gained about 75 billion euros in the 2017 sales value of GI products. This means GI products accounted for 7% of the total sales value of Europe’s food and drink sector. The study also shows that the sales value of GI products doubled on average, when compared with similar products without GI certification. People attach value to buying authentic products from their sources.

As a predominantly agrarian region, Africa could adopt this strategy to boost the economies of rural communities. The second phase of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) focuses on intellectual property rights and trade. It’s an opportunity to take steps towards recognising the economic value of GI.

Treaties

There are two main treaties currently regulating Geographical Indications. They include the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their International Registration (Lisbon Agreement), and the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications (the Geneva Act). Together, they are called The Lisbon System.

Most African countries have not signed these GI treaties. Accession to these treaties carries political and economic benefits. Not even Ethiopia and Nigeria – countries with great agricultural potential – have done so. GI status attracts higher revenue streams because of the customary assumption of quality that accrues to these products.

Joining the Lisbon Agreement and the Geneva Act would aid African countries in extending their products beyond their shores. Member countries have treaty obligations to protect GI products from misappropriation and abuse.

For example, Oku white honey from Cameroon, South African Rooibos tea and South African lamb are certified GI products. They enjoy protection outside the continent, leading to enormous financial benefits to their places of origin.

The local producers of GI products and services have inadequate knowledge of intellectual property and economics. Identifying GI products and including them in a formal database requires learning and experience. Therefore, private and public institutions should intervene in guiding producers and farmers. They can do this through the formation of cooperatives and educating members about GI. Producers and farmers should form GI management organisations to help members manoeuvre through the legal landscape. These include registration of products and collection of royalties and licensing revenues.

African nations should also streamline their regional intellectual property bodies. Two major African IP regional bodies – the African Intellectual Property Organisation and the African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation – could be merged into a single organisation for efficiency. The Anglophone and Francophone dichotomy in African intellectual property rights management shouldn’t exist. With the AfCTA encouraging a single trade market, a divided IP regional management structure may not be effective.

Nigeria and Ethiopia, like most African countries, do not have a single governmental institution that deals with GI. Although Nigeria’s trademark laws regulate registration, they do not cover GI registry. Ethiopia does not have any law for geographical indications nor a registry.

A specialised governmental office should regulate GI in each African country. For example, Zimbabwe has its Geographical Indication Act. South Africa has its Geographical Indications Regulation of 2019. It sets up its GI registry and guidelines to protect GI agricultural products.

African countries could position GI to help global IP rights enforcement for developing economies. Registration and export of GI products will improve the economy of rural African communities.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

Main Photo Eva Bronzini, CC.  

Célestin Monga, a former managing director at the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and a former senior economic adviser at the World Bank, teaches public policy and economics at Harvard Kennedy School. He is the co-editor, (with Justin Yifu Lin) of The Oxford Handbook of Structural Transformation (Oxford University Press, 2019) and the co-author (with Justin Yifu Lin) of Beating the Odds: Jump-Starting Developing Countries (Princeton University Press, 2017).

Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)

The tensions between the US and China made the global economy shudder in 2023. The ramifications of the Ukrainian war echoed beyond the country’s border. In Africa, the coup d’état in Niger and Gabon contributed to the global democratic retreat of recent years and the Hamas/Israel conflict has so far resulted in thousands of deaths.

Such trends of global power tensions, open war, democratic decline and extreme job market fluctuations are likely to continue in 2024. With this in mind, here are five global geopolitical and economic trends to watch out for.

Power shifts

As the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) organisation expands to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, its growing economic influence could dramatically change the global balance of power.

From January 2024, Brics will represent about 46.5% of the world’s population, US$30.8 trillion (£23.7 trillion) about a third of global GDP and 45% of global oil production. A related economic consequence is that the Brics’ expanded trade network can reduce their dependence on western markets, particularly through preferential trade agreements and possibly the use of a common currency.

For countries that have been sanctioned by the west, such as Iran, becoming a Brics member increases their diplomatic options. This may make Brics attractive to other sanctioned countries. The Brics’ expansion can also enable members to strengthen their impact by pursuing their political and economic interests more easily. Challenging the west may not take the form of direct confrontation, but occur by gradually moving away from current institutions such as the IMF.

Global election cycle

The list of general elections in 2024 includes countries from all continents and the participation of billions of people. At the core is the US election where former president Donald Trump is likely to be the Republican candidate. If re-elected, he may continue with his policy of “global engagement abstention” as evidenced by his past willingness to disengage from Nato.

Such a stance may weaken the global economic and political system and contribute to the rise of other countries searching for greater global clout. Another important aspect emerging from the cornucopia of general elections is the potential erosion of democracy. In the US, for instance, there is talk of a possible Trump dictatorship. In Russia, a win by President Vladimir Putin can see him remaining as president until 2030 with the possibility of a further sixth term up to 2036 (or about 32 years in power).

In other countries, such as El Salvador, some politicians are willing to circumvent their constitutions to be re-elected or to ban efforts to monitor elections, as is happening in Tunisa. Such practices are likely to weaken democratic institutions or constrain their development.

Heightened tensions in the Middle East

The Israel/Hamas war will continue to have repercussions beyond the Middle East. The risk of further escalation of the conflict regionally has intensified after an air strike in Beirut. Some nearby states, for example, have strongly condemned Israel’s overall response to Hamas’ attack. Jordan called that response a “war crime” and Egypt a “collective punishment.” The war is likely to compound regional uncertainty and instability.

Some evidence suggests that increasing political instability will also affect the health of the region’s financial institutions.

In turn, greater instability could increase refugee flows to the US and Europe. The latter will exacerbate the already tense political debate over immigration policy. The Israel/Gaza war is also likely to discourage investment in the Middle East and disrupt trade routes leading to increasing shipping costs.

China’s economic pressures

Recently, China’s economy has been described as a “ticking time bomb” as a result of slow economic growth, high youth unemployment, the property sector crisis, lower Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and weaker exports. Growth prospects are expected to remain “structurally weaker” with low consumer confidence and spending and declining external demand.

Lower internal Chinese consumption means lower demand for raw material and commodities which, in turn, will affect larger exporters such as Australia and Brazil.

Multinational corporations are likely to experience some negative impact on their profits as relocation of production and supply chain diversification continues as a result of trade frictions and armed conflicts. This may have a knock-on effect, not only on their suppliers but also on their workforce in terms of salary growth, if not, downsizing and job losses.

More generally, the increased risks for China’s economy will hit global growth, according to the OECD.

Ageing populations

In 2022, Japan, Italy, Finland and Germany were among the countries with the greatest share of populations over 65 years of age and by 2050 it is projected that the list will include Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. By 2050 the percentage of the world’s over 60 population will increase from 12% to 22%. At the same time, life expectancy is increasing. Such a population trend has implications for social security and other parts of the economy.

Demands on governments and health providers to deliver greater volumes of care will grow because of potential escalating risks of disease among the elderly. The ratio of workers to pensioners is falling which is also putting pressure on the sustainability of current pensions systems.

In addition, there is evidence that the ageing of the population affects labour productivity and labour supply. It can, therefore, have an effect on economic growth, trade, savings and investment. All in all, 2024 could be another rocky year.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).