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    The Scourge of Pesticides Overuse in Mauritius – How Far are we in the Ongoing Ecological Disaster?

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    Illustrates pesticides overuse

     

    Nitin Rughoonauth, Department of Physics, Faculty of Science, University of Mauritius

     

    Mauritius is the biggest user of pesticides per area of cropland in the world. Given the scarcity of research on the impact of continued overuse of pesticides on the environment and people’s health on the island, it is urgent to raise awareness about the possible implications of this issue so we can find ways to avert a major ecological disaster.  In this article, Nitin Rughoonauth enquires about the environmental and health impact of pesticides overuse in Mauritius and proposes some possible ways forward.  

    The latest report from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on global trends in pesticide use puts Mauritius at the top of the list of countries that used the most pesticides in 2018 (see Figure 1), with 2795 kg of pesticides used per kmsq of cropland (the latest 2020 statistics gives a record figure of 3418 kg /sqkm, which is a 22.3% increase over the past 3 years).

    Top 10 countries for pesticides use per area of cropland in 2018.

    Figure 1: Top 10 countries for pesticides use per area of cropland in 2018

    A priori, most of us may not make sense of those figures, but once we realise that this is over 10 times the amount of pesticides utilised per area in France, and that the use of pesticides in Mauritius has increased fivefold[1] over the past half century (see Figure 2), we may begin to understand the extent of the abuse of pesticides in the agricultural sector on the island.

    Agricultural use of pesticides in Mauritius (1971-2020) in kg /  of cropland.

    Figure 2: Agricultural use of pesticides in Mauritius (1971-2020) in kg /kmsq of cropland.

    The Overuse of Pesticides in Agriculture

    Pesticides (which include insecticides, fungicides and herbicides) are agrochemicals that have proved to be extremely useful in fighting pests and diseases. Given the atmospheric and soil conditions in Mauritius as well as the decline in natural defences (itself mainly caused by pesticides), these would have otherwise proliferated and affected our crops, thus putting our food security and economy at risk. The promotion and expansion agricultural practice in Mauritius, together with an almost complete absence of integrated pest management, have meant that pesticides have been used in often unregulated and disproportionate quantities. The first legislative measures to control the use of pesticides in Mauritius were taken in the 1970s with the passing of the Pesticides Control Act . A Pesticide Control Board was set up to regulate the importation, manufacture, sale and distribution of pesticides, as well as to promote safe pest-control practices. However, extensive surveys[2] carried out among local vegetable and fruit producers and reports by local and international authorities[3] have revealed the extent of a misuse and abuse of pesticides over the years.

    Declining Soil Fertility

    The potential economic, environmental and public health impacts of high levels of agrochemical use are well known. Soil fertility may be reduced through the adverse effects of excessive pesticide use on beneficial soil microorganisms as well as by extreme leaching of nutrients. Over the years, planters have tried to remedy this situation by using large amounts of chemical fertilisers to maximise food crop yields (amount of food crops per cultivated area) (see Figure 3) while the soil was being depleted of its natural nutrients.

    Use of fertilisers and food crops yield in Mauritius (1982-2020) in tonnes /.

    Figure 3: Use of fertilisers and food crops yield in Mauritius (1982-2020) in tonnes /kmsq.

    Large increases in use of fertilisers would only contribute to relatively modest increases in food crops yield, which may indicate that cropland has been rendered significantly barren over years due to overuse of pesticides. According to available information, there is, to this day, no facility at the Food and Agricultural Research & Extension Institute for chemical and microbiological analysis of soil to monitor the state of agricultural strata. Over the period 2009-2020, a 49.8% decrease in fertiliser use would in large part account for the 21.3% decline in food crops yield, but the 23.5% increase in pesticide use (see Figure 1) over the same period is intriguing and raises questions about the continued increasing use of pesticides when food crops yield has been decreasing.

    Water and Air Contamination

    Runoffs of pesticides and fertilisers from treated plantations during heavy rains can contaminate our surface and ground water with toxic chemicals. A 2-year monitoring study funded by the Mauritius Research Council found residues of herbicides washed from cropland in ground and surface water, with traces present almost a year after application. It is known that degradation products of such herbicides could be more important contaminants in soil and water environments[4]. This type of study indicates that no fresh water source in Mauritius is sheltered from pollution by pesticides used on cropland[5]. Pesticide sprays can drift or volatilise from treated areas and contaminate the air. A study investigating the presence of 27 pesticides in air samples collected around cropland areas in the region of Réduit between 2010 and 2018 showed the presence of 12 pesticides, some of which are not legally allowed in Mauritius since 2004. It is known that drift can account for substantial loss in the amount of applied chemical, which can spread over a distance of a few metres to several hundred kilometres, and as much as 80-90% of an applied pesticide can be volatilised within a few days of application. The transportation of pesticides in water and air poses a serious environmental risk since it can lead to spread of contamination and loss of biodiversity in Mauritius [6] .

    Inadequate Legislations

    Reports from the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agro-Industry had, by 2018, revealed an undeniable overuse of pesticides, which prompted the introduction of the Use of Pesticides Act (UoPA) to regulate levels of pesticide residues in agricultural produce. However, frustratingly, the legislation remains insufficient to effectively address the problem of residues in agricultural produce. In 2019, 20% of the 500 agricultural produce samples collected from farm gates, supermarkets and importers contained residues of pesticides (many of them illegal) in excess of legally allowed maximum residue levels (MRLs). The lists of regulated pesticides are not exhaustive (L’express, 2018a) and the MRLs for these pesticides do not cover all fruits and vegetables, e.g. nearly 40% of imported fruits (apples, pears, kiwifruits, peaches and apricots) are not concerned (L’express, 2018b).

    At present, three legislative acts – the Food Act (FA)  (including the Food Regulations), the Dangerous Chemicals Control Act (DCCA), and the UoPA – are together meant to regulate the importation, processing, production, distribution and use of pesticides. However, the FA and UoPA were passed by different ministries (the Ministry of Health and Wellness (MoHW), and the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security, respectively), and both happen to regulate separate (but not mutually exclusive) lists of pesticides. This may lead to institutional encroachment between the Pesticides Regulatory Office (PRO) (set up under the UoPA) and the MoHW. More worryingly, of the 54 pesticides allowed by the UoPA for use on fresh fruits and vegetables, only 31 are overseen by the DCCA. As such, there is a priori no control on the importation and distribution of the other 23 pesticides, half of which are classified as hazardous), while 17 (of which half are hazardous) are not even inventoried in the FAO Codex Alimentarius[7].

    The DCCA restricts 112 pesticides, but the MRLs of only 54 (about 50%) of those are provided in the UoPA, which is a serious inconsistency.  Even more confusing is the fact that, of the 84 pesticides regulated by the FA, 20 of them are outright prohibited by the DCCA, while 37 are not listed in the Codex. Furthermore, the Guide Agricole, which is published for the benefit of producers, recommends the use of 48 pesticides, of which only 29 are regulated by the UoPA while 11 are neither listed as prohibited/restricted under the DCCA nor regulated by the UoPA. Finally, penalties for similar types of offences under those acts differ. The incongruencies and fragmentation in the regulatory framework need to be addressed urgently if we are to effectively regulate pesticide use in Mauritius.

    There is a real concern about the number of pesticides that are used on certain agricultural produce. This directly and worryingly links with the common practice, by a significant number of producers, of mixing pesticides because they find such “cocktails” more effective in fighting certain pests. The UoPA provides MRLs for a number of pesticides that could be used on a number of fruits and vegetables, but this could easily be construed by planters as encouraging mixing of pesticides. For example, no less than 42 pesticides can be used on tomatoes, 38 on potatoes, 30 on green beans, and 25 on onions, to name a few. The multiplicity of pesticides, together with the widespread tendency of producers to apply pesticides to their crops several times a year and not respect dosages, can lead to serious toxicity risks, to pests developing resistance against pesticides, and the pests’ predators being eliminated, which lead to a greater use of more pesticides. This may explain why the use of pesticides has increased to such an extent over the years (Figure 2).

    Overuse of pesticides and health

    That the indiscriminate use of pesticides is a health hazard is well documented[8]. The accumulated amount of pesticides used in Mauritius over the past half century or more is cause for serious concern for the population[9], given the largely undocumented but prolonged exposure to the cumulative effects of pesticides and their residues, derivatives, and metabolites. The causal link between exposure to certain pesticides and incidence of some forms of cancer is still being studied since it is difficult to control for other possible causes. However, it is possible to establish fairly robust correlations between increase in use of pesticides and the development of some cancers, particularly those of the brain, breast, colon rectum, kidney, prostate, as well as leukemia.

    Correlation coefficients between use of pesticides and age-standardised rates (ASR) of incidence of certain forms of cancer in males and females in Mauritius (Pat et al., 2019) were found (see Figures 4 & 5) for the period 1991 – 2015 (with data for 2020 included). Statistically significant (p<0.05) correlations (see coefficients in parentheses in the chart legends – a coefficient of 1 means perfect correlation) can be seen between use of pesticides and cancers of colon rectum, pancreas, brain, prostate, kidney, and leukemia in males, while in females, these cancer forms are lung, breast, corpus uteri, colon rectum, and leukemia. These suggest connections that seem to corroborate findings from studies and systematic literature reviews on the link between the development of some cancer types and pesticides. The Government acknowledged that the wide use of pesticides needed better monitoring and control as part of a National Cancer Control Programme Action Plan[10] . The latest data shows that Mauritius ranks in the top three in the African region in incidence of cancers of the breast, corpus uteri, colon rectum, and leukaemia. It is urgent that extensive research studies be carried out to explore the possibility of causal relations.

    Cancer incidence (ASR (per 100,000)) & use of pesticides (kg / ) – MALE.

     Figure 4: Cancer incidence (ASR (per 100,000)) & use of pesticides (kg /kmsq) – MALE

    Cancer incidence (ASR (per 100,000)) & use of pesticides (kg / ) - FEMALE.

    Figure 5: Cancer incidence (ASR (per 100,000)) & use of pesticides (kg /kmsq) – FEMALE

     

    A Threat to Food Security

    For decades, pesticide overuse in Mauritius has been the norm. The recent FAO report sets the alarm bells ringing with food safety as a national priority under threat. Here are three proposed ways forward:

    • A review and harmonisation of existing legislations are needed to rationalise and strengthen the judicial and institutional framework that regulates the importation, production, distribution, and use of pesticides in agriculture.
    • Authorities concerned should invest more in training planters in sound agricultural practices and systematically monitor the presence of pesticide residues in agricultural produce.
    • Three years after the promulgation of the UoPA, no Pesticides Code of Practice has been put in place by the PRO, and there seems to be no indication that Mauritian authorities follow guidelines of the FAO and WHO International Code of Conduct on Pesticide Management[11]. Despite being the signatory of a number of conventions and protocols[12], Mauritius has not respected its engagements. Mauritian authorities need to better honour their commitments and work towards ensuring the systematic implementation, compliance, and effective monitoring of these commitments.

    Ultimately, unless we are able to truly understand what is being used on the food we eat and what goes into the water and air that we drink and breathe, we will not feel safe.

    I dedicate this article to Didine, who so lovingly taught me to be mindful of and care deeply for the environment of this precious island, and the one on which she was born, Rodrigues. 

    Main Photo by Arjun MJ on Unsplash

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).


    [1] Statistics Mauritius (SM) (1982 – 2020). Digest of Agricultural Statistics. URL: https://bit.ly/3xML7oR

    Statistics Mauritius (SM) (2021). Environment Statistics 2020. URL: https://bit.ly/2VGo6Gz

    [2] Fagoonee, I. (1984). Pertinent aspects of pesticide usage in Mauritius. Insect Science and Its Application, 5(3), 203 – 212. URL: https://bit.ly/3gbFD0X

    Fagoonee, I. (1987). Pesticides practice among vegetable growers in Mauritius. In Management of Pests and Pesticides (pp 175 – 181). CRC Press. URL: https://bit.ly/3iAhPVN

    Le Bellec, F., Scorbiac, M. & Sauzier, J. (2017). Les pratiques phytosanitaires des producteurs de légumes de l’île Maurice: impacts et perspectives de changement. Cahiers Agricultures, 26, 55001. URL: https://bit.ly/3Aydbhu

    [3] World Bank (WB) (1988). Economic development with environmental management strategies for Mauritius. Report no. 7264-MAS. URL: https://bit.ly/3iBUrr5

    Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MoESD) (2011). Mauritius Environment Outlook Report 2011. Government of Mauritius. URL: https://bit.ly/3CCmzSO

    Ministry of Health and Quality of Life (MoHQL) (2014). National chemicals profile of the Republic of Mauritius. URL: https://bit.ly/3yLcfpu

    [4] e.g. see Baluch et al. (1993)

    [5] See Li (2016) for a comparative analysis of the worryingly high maximum allowed concentration levels of pesticides in drinking water in Mauritius

    [6] Safford, R.J. & Jones, C.G. (1997). Did organochlorine pesticide use cause declines in Mauritian forest birds? Biodiversity and Conservation, 6, 1445 – 1451. URL: https://bit.ly/3yGiDxZ

    [7] The Codex is an internationally recognised benchmark for food safety standards.

    [8] Sarkar, S., Gil, J.D.B., Keeley, J. & Jansen, K. (2021). The use of pesticides in developing countries and their impact on health and the right to food. European Union. URL: https://bit.ly/3AKMbvb

    [9] Laniece, I. (1995). Pesticide usage and associated health hazards in Mauritius – Descriptive report. URL: https://bit.ly/3AES2SI

    Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (MoESD) (2011). Mauritius Environment Outlook Report 2011. Government of Mauritius. URL: https://bit.ly/3CCmzSO

    [10] See also Ministry of Health and Quality of Life (MoHQL). (2009). National Plan of Action for Nutrition (2009 – 2010). URL: https://bit.ly/3D78gpN

    [11] Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) (2021). Codex Alimentarius International Food Standards – Pesticides Index. URL: https://bit.ly/37GuoZq

    Food and Agricultural Organization & World Health Organization (FAO & WHO) (2014). The International Code of Conduct on Pesticide Management. URL: https://bit.ly/3gw5kcq

    [12] e.g. the Rotterdam Convention (since 2005, to multilaterally promote shared responsibilities in relation to importation of hazardous chemicals); the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants (since 2001, although Mauritius still consents to import the banned DDT); the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (since 1992); and the Basel Convention (since 2004, to prevent transfer of hazardous waste from developed to less developed countries).

    CALL FOR PAPER SERIES 2022 : Building Back Towards a Resilient and Sustainable Recovery

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    CALL FOR PAPERS 2022 – DEADLINE 17TH DECEMBER 2021

    Building Back Towards a Resilient and Sustainable Recovery      

    The COVID-19 crisis has been a wake-up call for the planet with a rising consensus on building a post-crisis world that is durable, resilient, and fair. A return to ‘business as usual’ with environmentally destructive and socially divisive economic activities is put into question as the planet is getting closer to a point of no-return. Within that context, Mauritius finds itself in arguably one of the biggest economic crises since the 1980s, with the triple challenge of building back an economy that is sustainable, fair, and innovative within a rapidly evolving regional and global context. The potential is real. Arguably, Mauritius has many assets that could position the country at the forefront of innovative and sustainable recovery solutions aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): a parliamentary democracy with an educated multicultural workforce, quality infrastructure, and institutions, an economic history that combined openness, resilience and adaptability and strong international ties with Europe, China, and India. Yet, the challenges are also many: declining governance, stagnating productivity, poor sustainability performance, increased inequality exacerbated by the current crisis, stagnating innovation, rising public debt, and declining institutions.

    The latter is set in a context where global environmental crises could cause social and economic damages far beyond those caused by COVID-19. As such, recovery will require more than getting economies and livelihoods back to previous levels. Recovery policies will need to encompass innovative investments, behavioural changes, and human-centered development models more likely to reduce future shocks and increase resilience.

    Call for Papers

    To address Mauritius and the region’s challenge in their recovery effort our paper series for 2022 accepts articles within our four core themes. The suggested sub-themes below are not prescriptive, and we welcome submissions in any topics related to our four main themes provided they are pertinent to Mauritius and the region (Indian Ocean).

    We support inquiry using diverse kinds of evidence, relying on a variety of methodological approaches (including comparative case studies) and cutting across academic disciplines, as well as practitioners’ projects insofar as they are in line with our editorial guidelines. Articles are in a blog-like format and can be written in French or English.

    Abstract/Pitch submissions will need to reach us by 17th December 2021.  You will need to submit:  

    • An up-to-date CV
    • An abstract/pitch not exceeding 300 words summarising the research questions and key findings.

    The publication of articles will be spread over 12 months in 2022. We invite contributors to read our editorial guidelines, for more information.

    Proposals and enquiries should be sent to ctcentre@telfair.ac.mu

    Background

    The Centre publishes data and evidence on topics relevant to Mauritius and the region’s development prospects. Our articles are in a blog format and we welcome contributions from both researchers and practitioners (private sector, NGO, and government).

    Mauritius and the imperative to safeguard resilience for peace

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    Illustrates peace

     

    Scott M. Weber, President of Interpeace, the International Organization for Peacebuilding

     

    The 21st of September is a day devoted to strengthening the ideals of peace and building a world that is more equal, more just, and more inclusive. As we celebrate the International Day of Peace, Scott M. Weber, President of Interpeace reviews how Mauritius successfully maintained a remarkable level of peace and security and developed a dynamic economy that is the envy of many larger nations. Yet, Mauritius’ social contract and democratic political culture, both key to Mauritius’ sustainable peace, are sliding.  He discusses the imperative for Mauritians to focus on building resilience for peace by identifying peace risk factors and tools for resilience. 

    Over its 53-year journey since independence, Mauritius has maintained a remarkable level of peace and security and developed a dynamic economy that is the envy of many larger nations. In a multi-ethnic society rife with social and economic inequalities, Mauritius has thus far weathered the winds of populism and xenophobia and found creative methods to protect its unique brand of democratic pluralism. But how long can this culture of unity last? Is this beacon of peace, stability, and democracy beginning to dim or flicker?

    A global study of trends in democracy places Mauritius among the “Top-10 most autocratizing countries in the world”, together with the likes of Poland, Hungary, Turkey, and Brazil, to name a few. Sadly, a backsliding of democracy on the island is in keeping with a wider, global trend. The last decade has seen a precipitous increase – from 48% to 68% – of the world’s population living under autocratic regimes.

    Indicators of the decline of the island’s social contract and its lauded democratic political culture are clearly visible: the rise of bald-faced identity politics, recent incidence in the parliament, calls for the abolition of the country’s Best Loser system that has preserved political pluralism for decades. As a peacebuilder working to strengthen peace and stability in countries further along the path of polarization and authoritarianism, I must caution readers to take these early warning signs very seriously and to act before it is too late. After all, apathy is the handmaiden of autocrats.

    A social contract often erodes in small, relatively unspectacular ways. It begins with leaders exploiting loopholes in the law, showing blatant disrespect for precedence and procedure, especially within institutions tasked with enforcing anti-corruption practices. Emboldened by the inaction of the public, such leaders will proceed to sow doubt in the credibility of elections themselves, attacking the media, stoking tribalism, and spreading deliberate falsehoods for political gain. And when the challenges to this behavior do come, state security services are often instrumentalized to protect the State from the people, rather than the people themselves.

    Beware of those who label such concerns as hyperbolic. The insurrection on the Capitol of the United States on January 6th, 2021 came within a hair of leveling the world’s oldest continuous democracy. Donald Trump’s presidency represented an unprecedented assault on the institutions of democracy through a concerted policy of undermining its guardrails, or, as his chief strategist, Steve Bannon, put it, of “deconstructing the administrative state”. Two hundred and thirty-two years of democracy were nearly undone in just 48 months.

    And yet, the conditions for a destructive political figure to emerge were long in the making. Social and political polarization and exclusion – especially on the basis of race – had been rising for years, aided by efforts to undermine electoral processes and voter rights. Pervasive apathy meant that these injustices and transgressions gathered silently below the surface, like sediment in a river, ultimately diverting the entire course of democracy and human rights in the United States.

    The beauty of democracy is its ability to instill confidence in the wisdom of the people to self-correct, to ensure that the pendulum of politics will eventually swing back towards the center. But when the safeguards of democratic institutions are weakened, a society can cross a threshold beyond which it is unable to reform itself. Is Mauritius approaching that threshold? What would such a threshold be?

    The management thinker, Peter F. Drucker, famously stated that “you cannot manage what you cannot measure”. If concerned Mauritians are committed to preserve, protect and enhance the social contract, they must begin to measure its contours and content in order to organize society’s energies towards those goals.

    The international organization for peacebuilding, Interpeace, that I lead has developed methods to assess the evolution of societal resilience. The framework we employ of “Resilience for Peace” differs from the traditional of understanding resilience in that it goes beyond the simple ability to withstand or “bounce back” from shock. Rather, it focuses on those social and political relationships that form the fabric of society and that are instrumental in transforming challenges into progress. At the core of it all is an assessment of what we term horizontal trust (between citizens and groups in society) and vertical trust (between the people and the State). It also focuses attention on the endogenous assets, qualities, attributes, resources, and actions that communities possess and that can potentially be drawn upon to manage risks and prevent crises. It is thus both about consciously drawing on social and political experiences from the past that can serve as precedence, but also a deliberate effort to anticipate threats to unity and the social contract and to take preventative actions.

    Whereas discussions of a country’s factors of fragility often closes doors to dialogue (after all, who would want to be labelled as “fragile”), a focus on resilience has an important convening power, even for those in positions of authority. The methodology behind this work brings all sectors of society together to define collectively the major risks (especially internal, but also external) that the country faces and may face in the future. Then those same stakeholders map out the factors of resilience (the guardrails of governance, the cultural practices, social bonds, and community leadership) upon which society will depend in order to meet those challenges. The act of discussing these risks and factors of resilience, of tracking them over time, and then designing tailored and collective strategies to minimize the risks and deliberately nurture resilience, not only brings people into a common cause but generates collective action. An annual barometer of risk and resilience can then keep this work at the forefront of the public’s attention.

    Mauritius is an unquestionable success story and deserves its recognition in the top ranking among African nations in the UN Human Development Index. And yet, many of those gains are at risk. If Mauritians are concerned about recent trends, take action now before the country crosses a dangerous threshold. After all, you fix your roof while the sun is still shining, not once the rains have come.

     

    This article was updated on the 28th September by the author to bring precision to the indicators of the decline of the island’s social contract.

    Main Photo by Oosman Exptal. on Unsplash

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Et maintenant … ? Feuille de route pour une économie mauricienne robuste et autonome

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    Jean-Luc Wilain, consultant en durabilité et directeur de WillChange

     

    L’indépendance en 2068 – les défis d’aujourd’hui, a été publié le 12 mars 2021. Tout un symbole. Au moment où la menace climatique se fait de plus en plus pressante, ce livre montre ce qui nous attend à l’horizon d’une génération et identifie nos ressources pour nous y préparer. Entre-temps, la publication du GIEC (Groupe d’experts Intergouvernemental sur l’Evolution du Climat) du 9 août a encore plus réduit nos marges de manœuvre. Cet article est le coup d’envoi d’une réflexion qui vise à établir une feuille de route jusqu’au centenaire de notre indépendance[1], pour laquelle nous serons guidés par la recherche des souverainetés dans les domaines alimentaires, énergétique et économique.

    Gouvernance climatique

    Maurice n’a jamais autant parlé de résilience depuis la pandémie de 2020. Or, des remises en question bien plus profondes et menaçantes nous attendent à un horizon plus proche qu’il n’y paraît. Nous subissons déjà les premiers effets du réchauffement climatique. Une humanité globalement toujours plus nombreuse et gourmande accentue ses pressions sur les ressources et la biodiversité. L’économie mondiale cherche un second souffle depuis le début de ce siècle. L’indépendance, énergétique, alimentaire et financière, doit impérativement être la boussole nationale des 50 prochaines années. C’est notre défi individuel et collectif. Cela doit se traduire par une feuille de route agressive et exigeante qui nous donne comme objectif clair de ne plus être dépendant des autres pour des choses essentielles quand ces dangers vont se matérialiser.

    Maurice est une petite coquille de noix posée sur l’océan en périphérie du monde. Nous représentons un peu plus de 1/10 000e de la population mondiale, des émissions de gaz à effet de serre et de l’économie mondiale, 1% de 1%…  Nous produisons peu d’émissions et subissons beaucoup. Mais nous sommes un pays. Nous avons une voix à l’ONU. Comme les grands. Elle ne peut être crédible et entendue que si nous sommes exemplaires dans notre gouvernance climatique et notre gouvernance tout court. Chacun, quelle que soit sa taille, doit faire sa part, c’est le sens de l’Accord de Paris. C’est cela qui nous donnera du soft power. C’est pour cela que nous devons travailler pour améliorer nos institutions et leur fonctionnement. C’est le premier sujet de cette feuille de route.

    Responsabilité Individuelle

    Cette exigence se décline aussi sur nos pratiques individuelles. Chacun d’entre nous est responsable de ses émissions et de ses choix de vie au même titre qu’un Chinois ou un Américain de niveau de vie équivalent. Tous les êtres humains à niveaux de vie comparables partagent la même responsabilité. C’est le deuxième sujet de cette feuille de route.

    Évidemment, ces sujets de souveraineté alimentaire et énergétique ont été identifiés et de nombreux individus et organisations ont commencé à y travailler. Mais la gravité et l’urgence de la situation, mises en perspective de l’inertie du système, ne ressortent pas dans les communications sur ce sujet. Or, il est indispensable d’insister sur deux éléments essentiels :

    1. L’urgence du Réchauffement Climatique

    La première concerne l’extrême gravité des conséquences du réchauffement climatique. Elle n’est pas encore intégrée par l’écrasante majorité de la population et des dirigeants, à Maurice comme ailleurs. Nous déréglons le climat depuis le début de l’ère industrielle, alors que sa stabilité a permis le développement socio-économique de notre espèce depuis sa sédentarisation. En ce moment même, les dirigeants mondiaux « négocient » pour savoir si la CoP 26 doit retenir comme objectif de maintenir l’augmentation de la température de la planète depuis l’ère préindustrielle en dessous de 2°C ou de viser à la limiter à 1,5°C. Ceci paraît un débat surréaliste quand on sait que nous nous dirigeons vers un réchauffement de la planète de + 5 degrés actuellement en dépit de leurs discussions précédentes, que les engagements de Paris (non respectés) nous emmèneraient vers un réchauffement de 3 degrés[2], et que nous serons déjà à +1,5 degré entre 2030 et 2040[3]. Ce dont ils devraient discuter est de prendre les mesures les plus radicales possibles le plus rapidement possible. Chaque dixième de degré gagné économisera un coût terrible pour l’humanité. Les dégâts augmentent de façon exponentielle avec la température. Si nous ne changeons pas radicalement de cap, le pire que craignent les scientifiques va se matérialiser. Dans ce scénario, les trois-quarts de l’humanité vivront dans des conditions de température et d’humidité pouvant entraîner la mort pendant plus de 20 jours par an[4]. Notre agriculture intensive et spécialisée sera bouleversée, ce qui se traduira par des famines massives et répétées. La montée des eaux repoussera progressivement plus de la moitié de l’humanité et de ses infrastructures vers l’intérieur des terres[5]. Elle érodera notamment une part importante du territoire mauricien déjà exigu. Des migrations non moins massives se produiront, car ce sera la seule façon d’échapper à ces fléaux, provoquant inévitablement des déstabilisations politiques et des conflits majeurs. Un monde « à 3 degrés » ou plus sera un monde extrêmement dangereux[6]. Le monde de demain sera le bûcher des vanités[7]. C’est surtout un monde dans lequel la lutte pour les ressources essentielles va devenir de plus en plus féroce. Et nous sommes un Petit Poucet. Tout petit.

    2. Vers une dynamique économique et institutionnelle plus autonome

    La seconde est l’impérieux besoin de construire une économie mauricienne dont la santé dépende moins de celle du reste du monde. Indépendamment de la crise du SARS-COV2 qui a mobilisé, voire occulté, les esprits, l’état de l’économie mondiale n’est pas celui que nous montre l’indicateur PIB[8]. En effet ce dernier est artificiellement gonflé par les Assouplissements Quantitatifs très à la mode depuis 2008. Clairement la crise du SARS-COV2 va être le bouc émissaire idéal. Cette erreur d’analyse conduit à penser que les problèmes disparaîtront avec lui et à trop attendre d’un rebond économique mondial qui ne se produira pas au-delà d’une reprise technique post-COVID [9]. Maurice doit apprendre à être prospère sur sa dynamique propre. Nous dépendons trop des bailleurs de fonds pour notre équilibre budgétaire, nous dépendons trop des autres pour le tourisme, nous dépendons trop des règlements internationaux pour notre global business : que des éléments que nous ne contrôlons pas, voire qui nous contrôlent. Maurice ne peut aller bien dans un monde qui va mal si elle en dépend pour tout, ce qui est le cas aujourd’hui. Maurice ne peut être un état souverain si les paramètres de son économie sont fixés par d’autres, ce qui est aussi le cas aujourd’hui. Évidemment cet appel ne remet pas en cause l’ouverture économique et les échanges dans le cadre d’un marché globalisé. Mais nous devons nous écarter des commoditisations et de leur corolaire les économies d’échelles afin de développer de la valeur ajoutée locale pour les besoins locaux.

    Souveraineté alimentaire et énergétique

    Dans l’histoire, les famines ont toujours été un facteur d’instabilité, voire de révoltes. Ventre affamé n’a pas d’oreille. Les risques que le réchauffement climatique fait peser sur les agricultures mondiales[10] doit nous inciter à organiser notre auto-suffisance à Maurice. C’est le troisième sujet de cette feuille de route.

    Enfin l’énergie est à la base de toute notre vie moderne et notamment celui de notre économie. Une énergie locale et décarbonée doit répondre aux besoins légitimes de la population. La transition vers une économie bas carbone ne comprend pas que la production d’électricité, mais aussi la mobilité et le transport, la production industrielle, la construction, etc. Tout un tas de facteurs qui vont constituer le quatrième sujet de cette feuille de route.

    Évidemment, nous avons d’autres dépendances : technologique, sanitaire, éducative, etc. Il ne s’agit pas de vivre en autarcie, mais au moins d’assurer ce qui pourrait à coup sûr détruire notre société et ce qui ne manquera pas de la mettre ponctuellement sous très grande tension. Il ne manque pas non plus d’autres défis propres à Maurice et à son fonctionnement. Mais il faut choisir ses combats. Nous choisissons ces deux thèmes en priorité car sans énergie, il n’y a pas d’économie et sans nourriture, il n’y a pas de société.

    Vers des projets locaux alternatifs

    Enfin, au-delà de ces aspects techniques, comment vivre avec une augmentation de température de 1,5 degré avant 2040 et très probablement supérieure à 2 degrés en 2100 ? Nous devons répondre dès maintenant avec des projets locaux alternatifs. Ils mettront du temps à se développer pour atteindre la masse nécessaire qui permettra de répondre efficacement à ce défi. Ils devront aborder tous les sujets ci-dessus exposés sans oublier le plus important : vivre ensemble en bonne intelligence. Et ce sera le cinquième sujet de cette feuille de route.

    Redonner de la valeur à l’humain et aux écosystèmes

    Notre éducation nous conduit à traiter les problèmes en silos[11]. Nos entreprises sont organisées en départements, notre gouvernement en ministères. Tout est fait pour privilégier une seule dimension de problèmes complexes, pour ensuite les ramener au seul critère financier. Il va falloir apprendre à penser autrement. Si un monde bas carbone était moins cher, on serait déjà dedans. On ne doit pas continuer à voir l’avenir à travers des modèles qui ont prouvé leur inadéquation. Par ailleurs, Maurice a l’échelle d’une ville d’un million d’habitants, échelle de laboratoire pour tester toutes les innovations, mais trop petit pour toute économie d’échelle ou stratégie de mutualisation. C’est dans ce contexte, qu’il s’agira de définir notre plan. Ce facteur est transversal à toute approche, à toute solution. La Blue Economy[12] de Gunter Pauli nous enseigne une autre façon de voir. Elle nous invite à considérer les choses dans leur ensemble, les interactions vertueuses, les multiples cash-flows qui peuvent être produits par des portefeuilles d’opportunités. Et surtout, à redonner de la valeur à l’humain et aux écosystèmes dans nos équations.

    Nourris de cette inspiration, nous nous emploierons à proposer une feuille de route qui aura pour ambition de répondre à ces défis avec des projets concrets pour notre île. Nous devrons certainement faire fi de nombreuses contraintes existantes liées à des conventions humaines actuelles, culturelles, juridiques ou réglementaires. Il ne faudra y voir aucun mépris de notre part, mais seulement le fait que les lois naturelles, biologie, physique, chimie, s’imposent à l’Homme et non le contraire. La nécessité devra éliminer les obstacles que nous avons nous-mêmes dressés. Tous ces sujets techniques prennent leurs sources dans l’humain.

    Cet article est donc introductif d’une série d’articles suivants qui se positionneront en faveur d’une nouvelle donne économique et sociale par rapport au référentiel suivant :

    • gouvernance,
    • responsabilité individuelle,
    • souveraineté énergétique,
    • souveraineté alimentaire,
    • vivre ensemble.

    Des contributeurs se sont déjà manifestés afin d’avancer sur tous ces sujets. D’autres peuvent encore le faire. Le temps est compté, la planète entière parle du dernier rapport du GIEC et de l’urgence d’agir. Peut-être cela est-il enfin compris. C’est la première fois qu’une publication du GIEC suscite autant de commentaires. Peut-être sommes-nous dans ce que nous appelons ici un tipping point. C’est le moment de pousser, partager, écrire, agir, faire et faire savoir. Victor Hugo aurait certainement dit en ces circonstances :

    Sonnez, sonnez toujours, clairons de la pensée.

     

    Main Photo by Robert Bye on Unsplash

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).


    [1] Wilain, J-L (2021) L’indépendance en 2068 – les défis d’aujourd’hui, voir appel page 289

    [2] Indépendance en 2068. Page 64. EDGAR V3.4.2 FT2016 (OLIVIER ET AL., 2017)

    [3] Rapport IPPC / GIEC AR6

    [4] Mora, C., Dousset, B., Caldwell, I. et al. Global risk of deadly heat. Nature Clim Change 7, 501–506 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3322

    [5] Au-delà de2100

    [6] Jens Stoltenberg, secrétaire général de l’OTAN. Die Welt. 27 Septembre 2020.

    [7] Tom Wolfe – 1987.

    [8] Ibid 1, Page 179.

    [9] L’indépendance en 2068. Page 171 et suivantes, notamment L’âge d’or de la monnaie de singe.

    [10] L’indépendance en 2068. Page 158 et suivantes.

    [11] À commencer par l’école qui nous enseigne des matières comme étant indépendantes les unes des autres.

    [12] Rapport au Club de Rome. Publié en Juin 2010.

     

    The diet of invasive toads in Mauritius has some rare species on the menu

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    Toads

     

    James Baxter-Gilbert, Postdoctoral Fellow, Centre for Invasion Biology (C·I·B), Department of Botany & Zoology, Stellenbosch University

    The guttural toad (Sclerophrys gutturalis) is a common amphibian found in much of sub-Saharan Africa, from Angola to Kenya and down to eastern South Africa. With such a wide geographic range, and a liking for living in human-disturbed areas, it’s often seen in people’s backyards. Around gardens it can be thought of as a helpful neighbour, as it is a keen predator of insects and other invertebrates that may try to eat plants. Yet it also has the potential to be ecologically hazardous outside its native range – and this toad is an accomplished invader.

    In the Mascarene Archipelago in the Indian Ocean, far from mainland Africa, these toads have been an established invasive species for almost 100 years. In 1922, the director of dock management in Port Louis, Mauritius, deliberately released guttural toads in an attempt to control cane beetles – a pest of the country’s major crop, sugar cane. This attempt at biocontrol failed, but the toads appeared to thrive and rapidly spread across the island.

    Mauritius had no native amphibian species for it to compete with, and no native predators with a recent evolutionary history with toads. In mainland Africa these toads would have to divide resources, like food, with a host of native amphibians and deal with an array of native birds, mammals and snakes that evolved feeding on them. But without these challenges on Mauritius, the toads colonised the entire island rapidly.

    Most toads are generalist predators and hunt a wide variety of prey, more or less eating whatever they can fit in their mouth. So as the guttural toad’s population numbers grew through the decades, so too did the concerns from Mauritian ecologists about the impact on native fauna. Anecdotal accounts as early as the 1930s suggest that the toads were having a negative impact on endemic invertebrate populations. In fact it has been suggested that the toads may have been a driver in the decline, and possible extinction, of endemic carabid beetles and snails.

    But it’s only recently that the toad’s diet in Mauritius has been examined closely. In our new study we examined the stomach contents of 361 toads collected in some of the last remaining native forests of Mauritius.

    By knowing more about what species the toads are eating, and which groups they favour, our research may help inform toad control actions to protect areas with known sensitive species.

    In the belly of the beast

    Through our research we were able to identify almost 3,000 individual prey items, encompassing a wide variety of invertebrates like insects, woodlice, snails, spiders, millipedes and earthworms.

    This research also went one step further to examine the prey preference of the toads. In general, they seemed to favour, some of the more abundant and common prey species. These included ants and woodlice, which made up about two-thirds of their overall diet.

    These findings may suggest that the toads were able to identify a readily available food source, and this may have fuelled their invasive population growth. Yet they are also eating prey that represents a more serious conservation concern.

    Inside the toads we found 13 different species of native snail, most of which were island endemics. Four species are listed as being vulnerable to extinction and one, Omphalotropis plicosa, being critically endangered – having been presumed extinct until it was rediscovered in 2002. Understandably, we found it very troubling to find a “Lazarus species” within the stomach of an invasive predator.

    Unanswered questions

    These early insights into the native species now being hunted by a widespread and voracious predator raise new research questions. To understand the greater impact the toads are having on native species much more work is required to understand their prey’s population dynamics so we can determine if the toad’s invertebrate “harvest” is contributing to declines.

    Furthermore, how does the toad’s invasive diet in Mauritius compare with that of other invasive populations, like those in Réunion or Cape Town – is their invasive success linked to a common prey type? And how does it compare with their diet in their own native species range?

    Our study could only examine what they are eating currently, but Mauritius has seen numerous species decline over the past 100 years. What role did the toad play in these losses? Perhaps they historically fed more readily on creatures that were more abundant in the past, but had to switch their favour to ants and woodlice when the populations of other species dropped. We may never know.

    What is clear is that there is much to learn about the habits of this far-from-home amphibian and its impact on the ecosystems it has invaded.The Conversation

    Main Photo by Christa R. on Flickr

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    How to put women at the centre of Africa’s food systems

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    food systems

     

    Elizabeth Mkandawire, Network and Research Manager: ARUA – UKRI GCRF FSNet Africa, University of Pretoria 

    Melody Mentz-Coetzee, Senior Researcher FSNet-Africa, University of Pretoria, University of Pretoria

    The number of hungry people in the world grew by a staggering 161 million people in 2020 to 811 million. More than one third of these people live in Africa. One of the main reasons for this increase is the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the cost of healthy diets and high levels of income inequality.

    More concerted efforts are needed to address the problem of food security. Empowering women is often said to be the key. In the past, researchers have looked to their specific disciplines to suggest how women could be empowered to improve food security.

    Some have focused on increasing women’s income because women spend more of their income on household nutrition. Others have focused on providing women with nutrition education because women carry the primary responsibility for preparing food.

    While these studies are valuable for improving food security and nutrition, we also need to consider what shapes women’s participation in different aspects of the food system.

    Globally, experts are beginning to recognise that focusing on one aspect of food overlooks the trade-offs or sacrifices people make. For example, women’s economic empowerment may mean that they spend more time on economic activities, and less time preparing food.

    Studies have shown that as a result, many women rely on convenient fast foods to feed their families. This food is typically low in nutritional value.

    The need to look at food in its entirety has put more attention on the concept of food systems. That includes the inputs used to produce food, its production, how it is transported and consumed, and the type of food that people choose to eat.

    While some frameworks exist to describe food systems, we could not find one that considered these issues from a gender perspective. We aimed to develop a framework that could help show how to improve women’s participation in and benefit from all areas of the food system.

    Our study

    Our study enhanced an existing food systems framework by integrating a gender perspective. A food systems framework is a set of things you need to think about when looking for ways to make better food available to more people.

    It helps us understand how things interact – making it easier to see how one intervention might negatively or positively influence another aspect or activity in the system. We chose to work on the Global Panel on Agriculture and Food Systems for Nutrition (Glopan) framework because it was user-friendly. Glopan is a global panel of experts on food security and nutrition.

    This framework looks at agricultural production, market and trade systems, people’s ability to buy food, how to transform food, the types of food people are likely to consume and healthy diets. The framework does not integrate gender issues.

    We studied 18 global and pan-African commitments – such as the Sustainable Development Goals and Africa Agenda 2063 – to identify gender policy actions that could be taken in each of the areas of the Glopan food systems.

    We found that generally, there is a consensus in the documents on specific actions that can be taken to advance gender equality in the food system. Our study brings together these policy actions to provide a way of understanding how they fit together and interact.

    We also found that governance and social systems constraints – that are not necessarily part of the food system, but affect men’s and women’s capacity to participate in the food system – need to be addressed.

    For example, maternity leave policies are important to ensure that women can work without experiencing discrimination or pay cuts. Paternity leave is also important to challenge the idea that only women are responsible for child care.

    We developed an enhanced framework that helps policy makers identify how gender can be integrated into parts of the food system.

    An enhanced framework

    The framework we developed is an initial step to understanding the interactions between existing policies and the potential trade-offs. For example, improving women’s access to markets might have implications for the amount of time they can spend at home. Limited time spent at home may reduce breastfeeding – which is critically important for children’s health. Policy makers might consider building daycare facilities close to markets to support women to breastfeed.

    Many of the policy options proposed in our study are consistent with study findings across African agriculture and nutrition research. These show that women face constraints in access to land, services and markets.

    Our framework proposes several priority actions for policymakers:

    • Improving women’s access to markets and trade systems. An example would be daycare facilities near markets.
    • Improving women’s social protection. Social grants or food parcels are examples.
    • Improving women’s access to nutritious food. This makes an important difference to maternal and child health, particularly during pregnancy.

    Unlocking food security

    One challenge our study identified was that globally, policies still overemphasise the role of women in agricultural production and diets. Their role in markets, consumer demand and consumer purchasing power is not as highly prioritised.

    Women’s access to resources and services is also overemphasised, overlooking issues of control. For example, policies may promote women’s access to agricultural technologies. But cultural restrictions prevent women from using these technologies.

    Eliminating hunger will require that research and policies empower women to participate effectively in the food system. Research or policies that focus on one discipline will not suffice to achieve this goal. It’s also essential to understand what gender policy actions can be taken.

    Main photo by EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid on Flickr

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).The Conversation

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    A Blue Economy Sustainable Future for Mauritius?

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    Dr Adam Moolna, Lecturer in Environment and Sustainability at Keele University, UK

     

    Global society is attempting to reconcile economic development with social progress, environmental sustainability, biodiversity conservation, and climate change action. Within that context, ocean and coastal economic development approaches commonly called “Blue Economy” are typically presented as reconciled with sustainability. Yet, how the Blue Economy is conceptualised warrants critical scrutiny, notably in better understanding its interconnections with sustainable development, conservation, and climate action.  This article highlights some of the contradictions between Blue Economy approaches in Mauritius and sustainable development objectives and hence recommends some ways forward for a genuinely sustainable Blue Economy in Mauritius and the Western Indian Ocean.

     

    Blue Economy means different things to different people

    “Blue Economy” refers to a spectrum of ocean and coastal economic development approaches that, superficially at least, align with a prosperous, environmentally sustainable, and socially equitable future. Such a future is set out by Agenda 2030 (United Nations, 2015) and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Alongside is the Paris Agreement of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) , through which SDG 13 Climate Action is addressed[i]. Finally, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) addresses biodiversity conservation with an updated post-2020 global biodiversity framework due to be finalised in 2022.

    With ocean and coastal resources core to their development, Small Island Developing States (SIDS) made “Blue Economy” a key term at the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20). This advocacy brought the preparatory document “Green Economy in a Blue World” (UNEP, 2012) alongside “Towards a Green Economy” (UNEP, 2011) – and led to the post-conference Blue Economy Concept Paper (United Nations, 2013). In line with these developments, Blue Economy approaches have been adopted around the world. For example, the European Union adopted a Blue Growth Strategy in 2012 and recently set out a vision for a “sustainable blue economy” (European Commission, 2021). Similarly, Mauritius has established a Ministry of Blue Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping, and adopted various World Bank recommendations in that area.

    Blue Economy is largely presented in political rhetoric as essentially synonymous with sustainable development. Blue Economy, however, means different things to different actors and can be contradictory to key elements of sustainability. Treating it without critical analysis as “the solution” for a sustainable future is therefore problematic. Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2021) analyse the use of differing definitions of Blue Economy, Marine Economy, Blue Growth, and Ocean Economy. Voyer et al. (2018) draw out ambiguities and conflicts in different interpretations – identifying four categories treating the ocean as natural capital, livelihoods, good business, or a driver of innovation – and note, for example, consensus around economically valuing nature but conflict over what activities are legitimate components of the Blue Economy.

     

    Connecting Blue Economy, sustainable development, conservation, and climate action

    Blue Economy, as currently implemented and understood in general, has aspects contradictory to Agenda 2030, the UNFCCC, and the CBD. The assumed exploitation of hydrocarbons, such as the discussion on hydrocarbon prospects for Mauritius by the UN Economic Commission for Africa in 2014, is an example of a key contradiction. Whilst generally included with renewables under the euphemism of “blue energy” because ocean-based, pursuing fossil fuels directly conflicts with SDG 13 Climate Action and the spirit of the Paris Agreement. Hydrocarbons illustrate the primacy of “economy” and the disconnect between national interests and global cooperation. The concentrated economic gains a nation can make from hydrocarbon exploitation might from a national perspective greatly outweigh the costs of less effective climate action, as the burden of climate impacts is diffused around the world. Without bridging the economic disconnect between responsibility for fossil fuel exploitation and climate adaptation costs nations cannot justify foregoing the economic gains.

    Discussion of Blue Economy links to Agenda 2030 has generally been dominated by SDG 14 Life Under Water (“Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”). The literature has linked Blue Economy to additional SDGs, but substantively only to SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals, SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, and SDG 15 Life on Land. Biodiversity conservation, whilst often treated as synonymous with sustainable development by the public and policymakers, is distinct and risks being ineffectively delivered with a societal focus on the predominantly socioeconomic SDGs. Zeng et al. (2020) analyse “environment-related” indicators across the SDGs and argue they are actually socioeconomic, having little relationship to biodiversity conservation.

    Blue Economy approaches typically fit aspects of biodiversity conservation around economic use and tend to focus on increasing Protected Area coverage in explicit link to Aichi Target 11 of the CBD’s Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020. Recognition of carbon capture by seagrass, mangroves and other “Blue Carbon” sinks is emerging as a useful argument for their protection and enhancement. Seychelles, for example, has included Blue Carbon in its updated Nationally Determined Contribution towards the Paris Agreement. Whilst positive in recognising one dimension of value, this, however, risks distorting biodiversity conservation objectives and being used to offset and excuse hydrocarbon use (for a critique of treating carbon as a commodity see Moolna, 2012).

    Different understandings of “Blue Economy”, while easing consensus despite conflicting motivations, risk contradictory actions and failing to make a genuine transition to a sustainable ocean-focused future. Challenges of misunderstanding and resulting contradictory aims and activities also exist across sustainable development and biodiversity conservation. This “dialogue of the deaf”, due to lack of shared meaning in a common vocabulary, is discussed by Sauvé et al. (2016), who set out to clarify how differently understood concepts across environmental science, sustainable development and circular economy relate. Jefferey (2019) explores (mis)conceptions of sustainability in Mauritius, including environmentalist critiques of the Maurice Ile Durable (“Sustainable Mauritius”) programme and how a narrow government focus appears to have shaped an understanding in urban populations that sustainability is principally about energy efficiency and economy.  The need to reconcile Blue Economy approaches with Agenda 2030, the UNFCCC and the CBD is recognised in Seychelles’ Blue Economy Strategic Policy but shared understanding and effectively integrating approaches remains a challenge.

    Ambiguous concepts, each with echo chambers of misunderstanding, makes progress cognitively, and politically, complex and challenging. Different actors have conflicting values and interests. Problems and solutions are differently perceived by those parties and the views of others are poorly understood. This makes connecting Blue Economy, sustainable development, conservation, and climate action a very wicked problem from a public policy perspective[ii].

     

    Policy versus meaningful impact

    Mauritius’ Ministry of Blue Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping states a vision to “double our blue GDP to 20 percent in the medium term, while realising social economic development and dynamic balance of resources and environment”. Beyond rhetoric, what mechanisms for delivery and tangible work packages are set out and how do they align Agenda 2030, UNFCCC and CBD action?

    Mapping and thematic analysis of policy and related documents is an important step for a transparent evaluation. An initial examination is not promising. The Government of Mauritius programme 2020-24 proposes an Offshore Petroleum Bill which conflicts with climate action and a Seabed Mineral Bill which has questionable environmental prospects. The 2020-25 Industrial Policy and Strategic Plan includes the term “blue economy” just once while referencing fish exports.

    Yet even if such a robust mapping of policies, laws and plans is done we must recognise gaps between what these state, what happens in practice, and what is reported. “Paper parks”, for example, refers to designated protected areas that are ineffective in practice. We need to consider implementation, rather than just policies, programmes and plans that may exist only on paper. The Wakashio oil spill was an illustration of the potential discrepancy. Mauritius was thought to be well prepared in oil spill contingency planning but the authorities failed to manage the wreck to prevent the oil spill and then to deal effectively with the spill when it happened.  The Wakashio incident, context, and key lessons for improving future real preparedness are discussed by Raghoo (2021).

    How can we assess evidence of delivery? We can look at reports of government and non-governmental organisations, individual projects, and media reporting. For example, an overview of Marine Protected Areas, marine parks and fishing reserves in Mauritius is included in a recent regional outlook report. There are broader analyses such as the Africa SDG Index and Dashboards Report. Yet, these reports generally cannot escape the complex and various pressures of the institutional and political context and tend to steer clear of the more controversial issues. Independent analysis, accessing the actual experiences of Mauritians and allowing dissenting voices, is therefore crucial for a reliable picture (such as by Rambaree, 2020, on corporate social responsibility in coastal communities). We can, for example, look beyond rhetoric around promoting social equity and see evident marginalisation of Mauritians amidst coastal developments and the emergence of movements such as Aret Kokin Nu Laplaz (“stop stealing our beaches”).

     

    A sustainable future through the Blue Economy?

    How might Mauritius move forward translating rhetoric into reality? There are various well-argued Blue Economy recommendations in the literature, typically identifying improved governance, social equity, environmental considerations, and monitoring of implementation (see, for example, Bennett et al., 2019).

    Drawing on a previous discussion paper, Mauritius should collaborate with other Western Indian Ocean states to: (1) embed Blue Economy within a regional framework of broader sustainability; (2) move from non-binding policies to legislation for long-term commitment; (3) coordinate sustainability actions considering externalities and trade-offs; (4) engage communities with local activities and benefits to mainstream sustainability; (5) reshape engagement with universities and independent perspectives; and (6) push for a global financial mechanism so states can afford to forego hydrocarbon exploitation.

    Ocean and coastal development is key to a prosperous Mauritius. A Blue Economy approach could achieve prosperity in an equitable and environmentally beneficial way if it is aligned with sustainability, climate action and conservation. Mauritius can only do this, however, by turning rhetoric and projects into a meaningful society-wide transition.

     

    [i] For a critique of the Paris Agreement see Gomez-Echeverri, 2018

    [ii] For a conceptual framework see Alford & Head, 2017

     

    Main Photo by Adam Moolna (waterfront development at Mahébourg, Mauritius)

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    In a world first, South Africa grants patent to an artificial intelligence system

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    Artificial Intelligence & AI & Machine Learning

     

    Meshandren Naidoo, PhD Fellow and LexisNexis Legal Content Researcher and Editor, University of KwaZulu-Natal

     

    At first glance, a recently granted South African patent relating to a “food container based on fractal geometry” seems fairly mundane. The innovation in question involves interlocking food containers that are easy for robots to grasp and stack.

    On closer inspection, the patent is anything but mundane. That’s because the inventor is not a human being – it is an artificial intelligence (AI) system called DABUS.

    DABUS (which stands for “device for the autonomous bootstrapping of unified sentience”) is an AI system created by Stephen Thaler, a pioneer in the field of AI and programming. The system simulates human brainstorming and creates new inventions. DABUS is a particular type of AI, often referred to as “creativity machines” because they are capable of independent and complex functioning. This differs from everyday AI like Siri, the “voice” of Apple’s iPhones.

    The patent application listing DABUS as the inventor was filed in patent offices around the world, including the US, Europe, Australia, and South Africa. But only South Africa granted the patent (Australia followed suit a few days later after a court judgment gave the go-ahead).

    South Africa’s decision has received widespread backlash from intellectual property experts. Some have labelled it a mistake, or an oversight by the patent office. However, as a patent and AI scholar whose PhD aims to address the gaps in patent law created by AI inventorship, I suggest that the decision is supported by the government’s policy environment in recent years. This has aimed to increase innovation, and views technology as a way to achieve this.

    Creativity machines

    Creativity machines can process and critically analyse data, learning from it. This process is known as machine learning. Once the machine learning phase has occurred, the machine is able to “autonomously” create without human intervention. As has been seen in the COVID pandemic, as just one example, AI is able to solve problems humans were unable to – and also much faster than people can.

    Over the years there have been many kinds of creativity machines. Prior to DABUS, Thaler built another AI which created novel sheet music, and which he credited with inventing the cross-bristle toothbrush design. He filed a patent for the cross-bristle design, and it was granted – proving AI’s ability to generate truly novel inventions that meet the standards for patents. However, Thaler listed himself, rather than the AI, as the inventor at that time.

    When it came to the food container invention by DABUS, Thaler, assisted by Ryan Abbott of the University of Surrey, decided instead to list DABUS as the rightful inventor, as the invention was entirely devised by the AI. This was the start of their push for AI to be recognised as inventors the world over.

    The United States Patent and Trademark Office and the European Patent Office rejected these applications in the formal examination phase. They gave three reasons. First, their respective patent laws only provide for human inventors – not AI – as indicated by the use of pronouns such as “him” and “her” in their text. Second, ideas, for the purposes of patents, require the element of “mental conception” – something of which only a human mind is capable. Finally, inventorship comes with rights, which AI is not legally capable of possessing.

    Much to the surprise of the global community, South Africa’s patent office, the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission, granted the patent, recognising DABUS as an inventor. It has not yet explained its reasons for doing so.

    This patent was published in July 2021 in the South African Patent Journal, with major news agencies including The Times reporting on the matter.

    The granting of the DABUS patent in South Africa has received widespread backlash from intellectual property experts. The critics argued that it was the incorrect decision in law, as AI lacks the necessary legal standing to qualify as an inventor. Many have argued that the grant was simply an oversight on the part of the commission, which has been known in the past to be less than reliable. Many also saw this as an indictment of South Africa’s patent procedures, which currently only consist of a formal examination step. This requires a check box sort of evaluation: ensuring that all the relevant forms have been submitted and are duly completed.

    Critics feel that if South Africa instead had a substantive search and examination system in place, the DABUS patent application would have been rejected.

    I disagree.

    Enabling policy environment

    While it is possible that the commission erred in granting the patent, South Africa’s policy environment in recent years suggests otherwise.

    The first relevant policy was the Intellectual Property Policy of the Republic of South Africa Phase I of 2018. It marked the beginning of patent reform in the country. Since then, from 2019 to 2021, three other notable instruments have been published: the Department of Science and Technology’s White Paper on Science, Technology, and Innovation; the Presidential Commission on the Fourth Industrial Revolution; and the proposed National Data and Cloud Policy in terms of the Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005.

    The core message of all these documents is that South Africa’s government wants to increase innovation to solve the country’s socio-economic issues. There is clear worry about issues such as poor innovation levels, lack of funding and lack of suitable infrastructure which is necessary to really capitalise on the fourth industrial revolution.

    Given the policy environment and the vast potential of AI, the granting of the patent makes sense. Perhaps this will turn out to be a strategic masterclass by the South African office which will lead to a much more innovative nation.

    The Conversation

    Main Photo by Mike Mackenzie on Flickr

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    The Role and Importance of Academic Boards in the Governance Framework of Australian Universities

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    Professor Dale Pinto, PhD (Law) (Melb), MTax (Hons) (Syd), Chair of the Academic Board, Curtin University and Professor of Taxation Law, Curtin Law School, Curtin University

     

    Academic boards represent a fundamental governance mechanism in the overall governance architecture of universities. This article examines the role and importance of academic boards in Australian universities. The article also makes observations about the future and continuing relevance of academic boards as part of the governance framework of Australian universities. Though the examination in this article is undertaken in the context of Australian universities, most of the commentary would be relevant to other higher education institutions, including those in the Indian Ocean region, as academic boards within universities generally exhibit common characteristics.

    Introduction

    In a 2007 thematic analysis of the role of academic boards in university governance, Dooley observed that:

    Universities have evolved from medieval communities of scholars, through the ivory towers of the Oxbridge of yesteryear to today’s large-scale business model. The tension between their traditional character, where reasoned argument holds sway and issues are debated thoroughly until there is scholarly consensus, and the modern imperatives of efficiency and accountability for the bottom line of the budget are palpable in most modern campuses[1].

    Dooley then argued that nowhere is this tension more keenly felt than at the level of the university academic board, variously referred to as the ‘academic senate’, ‘senate’ or ‘academic council’.  This body will be referred to in this article as the ‘academic board’ or ‘the board’ which represents the peak academic governance body in Australian universities.

    All Australian universities have a form of academic board, which is usually enshrined and created by or pursuant to an Act of Parliament that establishes the university itself. For example, Swinburne University in Victoria is established by the Swinburne University of Technology Act 2010 (Vic), and section 20 mandates that the Council must establish an academic board. My university – Curtin University – is established under the Curtin University Act 1966 (WA) and the academic board is established under Statute 21 which was created by the University Council under the powers conferred on it to make statutes by section 34 of the Curtin University Act 1966.

    This legislative underpinning demonstrates the significance of academic boards in Australian Universities.  However, despite academic governance being a crucial matter for all Australian universities, discussion of the role of academic boards is not widespread, as Baird observed:

    Even though universities are heavily dependent on academic boards for quality assurance in the core areas of teaching and research—on paper, at least—discussion of the roles of academic boards is not widespread[2].

    In addition to the significance of this legislative underpinning, it is both timely and relevant to examine the role and importance of academic boards in the governance framework of Australian universities as academic boards are central to the regulatory regime which governs universities. In Australia, this is overseen by the Tertiary Education and Quality Standards Agency (TEQSA)[3]. Other recent examples, including the Walker review which examined the  role of academic boards in promoting freedom of speech and  academic freedom,[4] demonstrate the timeliness of examining the role of such boards to ascertain if they are functioning as intended.

     

    Role of Academic Boards

    Traditionally, a tripartite governance structure operates at Australian universities in which the executive management of the university (led by the Vice-Chancellor) and the academic board contribute to academic decision-making within the context of the university council’s overall responsibility as the peak governance body in a university.

    This is neatly depicted in the ‘governance triangle’ below, which derives from models presented by Clark (1983),[5] Dooley (2006)[6] and Shattock (2012)[7].

    Figure 1: University governance triangle

     

    The governance of a university operating under this model involves:

    1. Corporate governance: ultimately rests with council as the peak governance body. Council is assisted by its committees (of which an academic board is typically one such committee) in the effective discharge of its responsibilities.
    2. Academic governance: academic boards typically function as the principal policy-making and advisory body on all academic matters pertaining to and affecting a university’s teaching and research. As such, an academic board is responsible for assuring academic standards and quality, and, in fulfilling this function, ensures academic integrity and high standards in teaching, research, assessment, and admissions[8]. It carries out these functions in partnership with, but independently of, the Vice-Chancellor’s executive management team referred to in the figure above as the ‘Executive Management’.
    3. Executive management: Led by the Vice-Chancellor who allocates roles and responsibilities to university management. The Vice-Chancellor typically has several advisory committees to provide advice and assurance in decision making and to assist in meeting the requirements of external bodies including regulators.

    An academic board is formally constituted and has a clearly defined role, normally enshrined in its Terms of Reference or Constitution which will specify, among other things, its functions and powers, membership, meeting protocols, powers to establish committees, review processes and reporting requirements.

    University academic boards are presided over by a Chair, who is normally elected and supported by a Deputy, again normally an elected role.  It is desirable, and almost universal, that the Chair is an ex officio member of the university council. Frequent and full communication between the Chair, Deputy Chair, Secretariat which supports the board, the Vice-Chancellor and council is essential for the effective functioning of the university governance structure as described above.

    Importance of Academic Boards: three key functions[9]

    Maintenance of Academic Standards

    The board and its standing committees shoulder an important responsibility for ensuring the quality and integrity of all academic endeavours is maintained, including learning and teaching, and research. The board has an established, accountable, and transparent framework for the implementation and review of policies as they relate to academic activities; for the development and review of academic quality assurance measures; for facilitating compliance with its policies and procedures; and for monitoring and ensuring remedial action is taken when it finds non-compliance.

    The board has delegated authority from the university council for approval, accreditation[10] and review of new and existing academic programs, including those offered by commercial entities owned or partially owned by the university and those offered in partnership with other institutions. The board has the responsibility and authority to determine compliance of academic programs with the Higher Education Standards Framework (Threshold Standards) 2015 (HESF) [11] which represents the basis for the regulation of higher education providers and courses by the regulator, the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA).  The board also must ensure compliance with individual institutional qualifications standards.

    In short, the board has the responsibility for the ultimate academic oversight of all academic programs, onshore and offshore, and its approving and monitoring functions play a key role in ensuring comparability of standards, both internally and externally, and in the maintenance of standards in academic partnerships.

    In terms of learning and teaching, the board has an important role in the assessment and evaluation of learning and teaching and in ensuring the quality of, and improvement in, teaching and learning practices as well as in approving new courses.  It also plays a key role in overseeing student experience and retention.

    The board also has an important role in approving research policies, and in encouraging and supporting research.

    Finally, academic boards themselves undergo periodic independent external reviews at least every seven years to align with the HESF in relation to Governance and Accountability (Standard 6.1 3(d)).  These reviews are important as they assess the effectiveness of the board and the academic governance processes of the university. Curtin most recently undertook such a review in 2018 and it resulted in a newly configured committee structure, changes in committee composition (e.g., to include more student representation) and a sharper definition of the role of the standing committees to better align their role to the board and to achieve a clearer line of sight to both faculties and Curtin’s global campuses.

    Involving and communicating with Internal Stakeholders

    As academic boards bring a whole of institution perspective to academic matters, it is important that it seeks wide input (including through its standing committees) before it makes decisions and communicates its decisions to maximise efficiency and quality and remove unnecessary duplication. Key stakeholders in this process include faculties, global campuses and council and it is important that academic boards maintain a clear line of sight to all these stakeholders.

    Key communication channels for academic boards can be classified as vertical – between the Council, academic board, and broader academic community, and horizontal – between the academic board, faculties, global campuses and other academic units and support units. The Chair of the academic board, along with the Secretariat which supports the academic board, both play a key role in maintaining effective vertical and the horizontal communications.

    Key mechanisms to ensure effective communication include:  timely preparation and distribution of agendas, meeting papers and minutes; summary reports of main outcomes – e.g., at Curtin the Chair and Secretariat prepare a high level summary of outcomes for communication across the university and to council; professional, respectful and robust meetings conducted in accordance with the university’s values; and clear and accessible information which should be available via a secure board portal for all members of the academic board.

    The academic board ensures that its committee structure supports open and transparent communications within the institution and plays a key role in coordination and oversight of its committees.

    Finally, the university’s staff induction processes educate staff about the academic board’s role within the university and is an important activity for members joining the board for the first time, particularly to assist some members (e.g. students).

    Accountability to External Stakeholders

    In addition to ensuring effective involvement of and liaison with internal stakeholders, academic boards have responsibilities to many external stakeholders.

    First, academic boards have a central role in setting and monitoring university admission and policies to ensure standards, equity, and diversity.

    Second, academic boards have oversight of academic policies that regulate academic credit transfer and articulation arrangements. Academic boards also need to have appropriate structures and quality assurance processes to foster and ensure high standards in community-engaged learning activities.

    The board provides substantial input for external audits by TEQSA, and it is often involved with accreditation processes of external professional accrediting bodies.

    TEQSA sees ‘academic leadership’ in higher education providers as a subset of the overall institutional or corporate leadership of the provider, differentiated mainly by its focus on ‘academic matters’ (including teaching, research and related matters).  It sees academic leadership as ‘the system of interdependent elements that together allow a provider to achieve (or at least support) and monitor its intended academic outcomes[12].’

    The importance of academic leadership is reflected in its prominence throughout the HESF. TEQSA expects the provider to demonstrate that overarching leadership mechanisms are in place at the institutional level (corporate governance, academic governance, and quality assurance) to provide academic oversight and monitoring at that level, as required under the HESF.

    As illustrated in Figure 2 below from TEQSA’s Guidance Note on Academic Leadership, the HESF aligns with the student experience or ‘student life cycle’[13]. The HESF is also grounded in the core characteristics of the provision of higher education and therefore, the Standards are intended to provide higher education providers with a framework for internal monitoring of the quality of their higher education activities which academic boards are responsible for overseeing[14].

    Figure 2: Context of the HESF

    More specifically, academic boards must oversee the two parts of the HESF:

    Part A: Which prescribe standards for Higher Education.  These standards represent the minimum acceptable requirements for the provision of higher education in or from Australia, and

    Part B: Which sets out the criteria for Higher Education Providers.  These criteria enable categorisation of different types of providers and whether a provider is responsible for self-accreditation of a course(s) of study it delivers.

    These are significant responsibilities for universities to comply with and the role of academic boards in ensuring compliance with the HESF is therefore very important.

    Constructive Confrontation [15]

    In concluding, not everyone will agree with Professor Dooley’s view that academic boards should be the ‘engine room of the university’[16] but it can be seen from this brief article how important academic boards are in the overall governance architecture of Australian universities.

    Perhaps as Shattock advocates, the focus should not be so much about effective governing bodies but more about effectively governed universities[17]. As he notes, universities remain ‘communities of scholars’ and will not be able to chart a future satisfactorily unless they encourage and nurture those communities to contribute to institutional decision-making. As part of that process the voice of the academic community, which is strongly represented via academic boards, must be a critical element of an effectively governed institution.

    Robust, professional, and values-driven conversations should be encouraged within a governing body – referred to as ‘constructive confrontation’ by Shattock[18]– which is necessary and should be encouraged to produce well-reasoned and debated outcomes.

    From my own experience, academic boards do engage in robust but professional and respectful debate on significant issues.  Recent examples at my university include strong debates on changes to the academic calendar, changing the university graduate attributes and policies relating to freedom of speech and academic freedom.  All of these issues involved a series of consultations and discussions with students, the academic staff association (staff union) as well as academics across not only our Perth-based campuses but also soliciting views from our global campuses.  These consultations were effective in refining proposals put to the board by management by hearing the voices of the academic community and also the student voice which is greatly valued as part of the academic board’s deliberations at my university.

    On this basis, academic boards should continue to assert themselves to balance all voices in a university community and provide sound academic advice to executive management and university councils as part of the well-accepted tripartite governance model referred to at the start of this article.

     

    Main photo by Kookyrabbit

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    _________________________


    [1]
    Anthony H Dooley, The Role of Academic Boards in University Governance (AUQA occasional publications, No 12) 7.Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    [2] J Baird, ‘Taking it on board: quality audit findings for higher education governance’, Higher Education Research & Development (2007) Vol 26, No 1, 101–15.

    [3] Though the analysis in this article is undertaken in the context of Australian universities, most of the commentary would be relevant to other jurisdictions as academic boards within universities generally exhibit common characteristics.

    [4] Sally Walker, Review of the Adoption of the Mode Code on Freedom of Speech and Academic Freedom, December 2020.

    [5] B R Clark, The Higher Education System (Berkley, California University Press), 1983.

    [6] Dooley, above n 1.

    [7] M Shattock, ‘University governance: An issue for our time’, Perspectives: Policy and Practice in Higher Education (2012), DOI:10.1080/13603108.2011.645082.

    [8] See, eg, University of Queensland Academic Board Policy, paragraph 2.1 (c) (i) and (ii), available at <https://ppl.app.uq.edu.au/content/1.30.03-academic-board> (accessed 30 June 2021).

    [9] A comprehensive explanation of these aspects is contained in the following paper presented at the National Conference of Chairs of Academic Boards/Senates in November 2013: ‘The Purpose and Function of Academic Boards and Senates in Australian Universities’.  What follows on this point is based on this source.

    [10] Accreditation in this context refers the responsibilities universities have as self-accrediting institutions to ensure the learning outcomes of qualifications meet internal and external standards. Professional accreditation bodies also play a role in ensuring learning outcomes meet the needs for specific professions – eg CPA Australia and CA ANZ have their own accreditation requirements for accounting courses which are offered by universities.

    [11] The Commonwealth Minister for Education and Training promulgated new national standards for higher education in Australia – the Higher Education Standards Framework (Threshold Standards) 2015 (HESF). The HESF took effect from 1 January 2017. From this date, all providers of higher education in or from Australia must meet and continue to meet the requirements of the HESF.

    [12] TEQSA, Guidance Note: Academic Leadership (18 June 2019), 1-2.

    [13] TEQSA, Higher Education Standards Framework (Threshold Standards) 2015 – TEQSA Contextual Overview, Version 1.1, effective from 1 January 2017, 6.

    [14] Ibid.

    [15] Shattock, above n 6, 61

    [16] Dooley, above n 1, 5.

    [17] Shattock, above n 6, 61.  What follows here draws from this source.

    [18] Ibid.

    How to Reach Net Zero

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    Helen Mountford, Vice President for Climate and Economics at the World Resources Institute

    Mauricio Cárdenas, Senior Fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy

     

    WASHINGTON, DC/BOGOTÁ – The science is clear: to avoid the most damaging effects of climate change, the world must reach net-zero greenhouse-gas emissions around mid-century. That means reducing human-caused GHG emissions to the lowest levels possible, and balancing any remaining emissions by permanently removing an equivalent quantity of GHGs from the atmosphere. Thereafter, the world must ensure that GHG removal exceeds emissions.

    Achieving net zero will require a fundamental transformation of global energy and industrial systems, transport, and infrastructure, as well as of agriculture, forestry, and land use. The next 10-15 years are critical. While the world has many ambitious long-term climate targets, it lacks strategies to put the right investments and policies in place.

    Moreover, effective and sustainable emissions reduction should also contribute to broad economic development, including by protecting workers, local communities, and human rights. The world should not reach net zero at the expense of vulnerable groups, but rather in a way that ensures a just transition for them.

    The good news is that many countries, business leaders, and investors are stepping up. As of June 2021, 31 countries and the European Union have formally committed to net-zero targets, and more than 100 have proposed or are considering one. Almost 1,500 major corporations have set science-based emissions targets. And 160 banks, asset managers, and asset owners – with a combined portfolio worth more than $70 trillion – have pledged to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.

    The challenge now is to fulfill net-zero commitments with clear pathways and verifiable intermediate targets. An effective strategy, such as the one recommended by the World Bank’s Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition Task Force on Net Zero – representing national governments, the private sector, and civil society, and co-chaired by us – must include robust safeguards to ensure accountability and transparency.

    The task force underscores how carbon pricing can help to give public- and private-sector efforts the level of ambition needed to reach net zero. Although carbon pricing – including through emissions-trading systems (ETS), carbon taxes, and international carbon markets – is not a silver bullet, it can be a powerful tool in advancing a green transition.

    Our panel identified several factors that can promote effective efforts to achieve net-zero targets. The first is planning and transparency. Clearly defined short- and medium-term (5-15 year) objectives are needed to identify and prioritize the specific sectoral and technological transformations required, and to drive immediate action and investments. Governments and the private sector should also each adopt separate emissions-reduction and removal targets. This would bolster accountability by enabling the evaluation of each component, whereas a blended metric of progress might hide insufficient efforts to reduce emissions.

    The second factor is appropriate placement of carbon pricing within a broader green-development toolkit. Even when adopting explicit carbon prices is difficult, governments and firms should promote internal or shadow carbon pricing when evaluating investment decisions. This tool is crucial to support the right investment and infrastructure choices when implementing overall and sector-based net-zero strategies.

    But carbon prices alone will not do the trick, and complementary policies are needed to reduce emissions in some sectors. Efficiency standards – regarding energy in buildings or fuel in vehicles, for example – may be more effective in lowering emissions in industries that are not responsive to carbon price signals, or where monitoring and controlling emissions sources is difficult. Short-term government subsidies or investments in research and development may be appropriate to support technological transformation in sectors where emissions-reduction options are not available or are particularly expensive.

    Governments can also use complementary policies to reduce any negative effects of carbon pricing on particular groups, and to help distribute climate investments and benefits equitably. Revenues from carbon taxes or emissions-allowance auctions can finance climate investments in vulnerable communities, job training, or cash transfers to offset increases in the prices of energy, products, and services.

    Third, carbon prices will need to be set much higher than they are currently, and increase over time, in order to drive the reduction and removal required to reach net zero. This applies to the use of internal carbon pricing for decision-making, as well as to the carbon price under a tax or ETS in countries that use these schemes.

    Fourth, in a world where all countries are striving to achieve net zero, international carbon credit markets can play a crucial role in increasing the ambition of both buyers and sellers. But governments and businesses should aggressively cut their own emissions before investing in reductions and removals elsewhere. Any investments they make in carbon credits should complement, not replace, their emissions-reduction efforts.

    International credit markets can also support investments in transformative emissions-reduction and removal technologies in developing countries. Credit investments should help to protect local environments, and obtain buy-ins from affected and vulnerable communities.

    New models for international carbon markets that incorporate these broader objectives are starting to emerge. One such example is the LEAF (Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest finance) Coalition. Backed by a number of governments and companies, LEAF provides conventional carbon markets with additional demand- and supply-side guardrails, including for protecting local communities.

    Lastly, rigorous measurement, reporting, and tracking of emissions reduction and removal are crucial to ensure both accountability regarding commitments and real benefits to the atmosphere. Rules for crediting reduction and removal funded through international carbon markets toward buyers’ net commitments must prevent double counting. The same emissions cannot count toward the net-zero commitments of both buyers and sellers.

    The post-pandemic recovery presents a rare opportunity to accelerate climate action. The world can build back in a way that not only rapidly transforms and decarbonizes the global economy, but also promotes prosperity, resilience, and much greater equity.

     

    Main Photo by Matt Palmer on Unsplash

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    This article was originally published by © Project Syndicate 2021 and is not under a Creative Commons Licence.