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    African development banks need scale, urgently. Here’s how it can be done

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
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    0
    Banking and Finance

     

    Nimrod Zalk, Associate Professor at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town

     

    Developing countries in general, and African countries in particular, confront an enormous financing challenge to meet the UN’s sustainable development goals. This financing gap featured prominently at the 2021 United Nations climate change conference (COP26) and has been intensified by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Even prior to COVID-19 the prospects of mobilising the annual US$2.5 trillion needed to meet the sustainable development goals by 2030 was rapidly receding despite a global savings and liquidity glut.

    The bulk of funding is needed to close gaps in electricity, transport and water infrastructure. This must be done in ways that place the continent on a decisive trajectory towards net zero emissions. At the same time, substantial funding is required for agricultural modernisation and greener industrialisation.

    The moral case for international provision of large-scale concessional funding to Africa is overwhelming. Countries on the continent are projected to feel the impacts of climate change the most. This is despite the fact that they account for a minuscule share of cumulative global carbon dioxide emissions.

    Climate funding from multilateral development banks has been growing. But it comes nowhere near the estimated annual African financing gap of $200 billion to meet the development goals. Figures for the whole continent are not readily available. But the $7.4 billion of commitments by multilateral development banks to sub-Saharan African countries in 2019 is reflective of the scale of the gap.

    Ambitious recommendations have gained little traction. These include the proposal by the UN’s Task Force on Financing for Development for the development of long-term financing instruments. An example is the 40-50 year bonds, necessary to fund a global Green New Deal.

    Emphasis is also being placed on the role of “blended finance” to plug the financing gap by leveraging scarce low-cost funding via multilateral development banks and overseas development assistance. In the World Bank’s conceptualisation, billions of dollars of such concessional funding can be used to attract trillions of private investment by reducing the risk of projects aligned with the sustainable development goals to render them attractive to private investors.

    But blended finance projects have failed to take off at scale. They have only reached about $20 billion per annum for all developing countries combined.

    In my view, far more effort is needed to increase the capacity of African national and regional development banks to mobilise public and private investment for structural transformation.

    This has been done successfully elsewhere in the world. Examples include the European Investment Bank, Germany’s KfW, Brazil’s BNDES and China’s policy banks.

    The potential

    Development banks have played a pivotal role in mobilising long-term finance for industrialisation, developing new industries and project de-risking through developing capabilities to undertake project development, implementation and monitoring.

    Effective development banks act as important voices for shaping favourable economic policy for productive investments. They crowd in private finance directly and unlock private investment up and down-stream from catalytic projects.

    Africa in fact has a lot of development banks. There are 95 of them, representing 21% of national and regional banks worldwide. But a handful dominate assets and financing. They are the regional African Development Bank and African Export and Import Bank (Afreximbank) and national banks in Morocco, South Africa and Egypt.

    The rest are mostly small and under-capitalised. Hence African development banks collectively account for only 1% of development bank assets worldwide.

    African countries cannot afford to tread water waiting for the global multilateral and private financing system to become more equitable or responsive – although they do need to fight for this in the medium to long term. Rather they should rapidly raise the capitalisation of their development banks to enable higher levels of lending.

    How is this to be achieved when public debt in sub-Saharan Africa is at a two-decade high and viewed as unsustainable by ratings agencies and multilateral finance institutions?

    What needs to be done

    First, there is a strong case for the consolidation of fragmented and under-capitalised national banks into larger sub-regional development banks.

    Second, shareholding from other development banks in the global south with proven scale and expertise should be encouraged. A prominent example is the New Development Bank. Founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in 2014, it has rapidly scaled up loans to member countries.

    Third, proceeds from periodic commodity booms need to directed towards development banks. And there needs to be a clamp down on illicit financial flows.

    Fourth, governments can lower the cost of borrowing by guaranteeing repayment of bonds issued by their development banks.

    Fifth, budgetary transfers at appropriate points in the sovereign debt cycle should not be ruled out.

    Finally, if central banks are serious about ensuring long term financial stability they need to support financing instruments that address long term social and climate risks. For instance, they can lower the cost of climate finance by purchasing green bonds.

    Added bonuses

    The scaling up and consolidation of African development banks would also improve governance and developmental capacity. A broader range of shareholders would make it more difficult for crude political appointments at managerial level that are closely associated with poor performance. Other Southern development banks bring technical expertise critical to building capabilities needed to de-risk projects, including project development, monitoring and enforcement.

    In addition, the scaling up of African development banks could well induce multilateral development banks to raise their own financing efforts in Africa.

    Rather than crowding out private financing, the scaling up of African development banks offers the most promising route to attract long-term private finance to achieve the sustainable development goals and structural transformation.

    A version of this article was first published by LSE Business Review under the heading, Africa’s development banks: the urgent need for scale.The Conversation

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    Main Photo by Mike Lawrence on Flickr

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Workshop on Embracing the Challenge of a Sovereign Mauritian Food System: The Case for Regenerative Agriculturee

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
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    “Regenerative Agriculture describes farming and grazing practices that, among other benefits, reverse climate change by rebuilding soil organic matter and restoring degraded soil biodiversity – resulting in both carbon drawdown and improving the water cycle” (Regeneration International).

    Nearly 50 Mauritian and foreign professionals gathered for a “virtual workshop” on November 24th to discuss the potential for regenerative agriculture in Mauritius, a joint initiative of the Charles Telfair Centre and Regeneration Mauritius.  

    Food production systems in Mauritius urgently need to be rethought: with 70% of food products imported, overuse of phytosanitary products, impoverished soils, falling yields, dominance of intensive monoculture and lack of coordination between key stakeholders, the sector is ailing. Regenerative agriculture and its multiple solutions appear as an alternative of choice: its solutions propose simple and accessible technologies allowing soil regeneration, carbon storage, waste minimisation and thus a more sustainable and sovereign food system.

     

     

    The Need for Change

    The virtual workshop, organised for the second time this year by the Centre, allowed experts, economists, farmers, agronomists, academics, private and public companies, and NGOs to exchange and debate on the growing challenges faced by our food system. The workshop explored how we could rethink food systems in Mauritius in order to make them more sovereign and sustainable. Participants exchanged at length on the potential solutions offered by regenerative agriculture, their applicability to the Mauritian context and the opportunities made possible by technological developments.

    The issue of food systems is intimately linked to the climate emergency, Nathalie Venis, Stewardship Manager at Regeneration Mauritius, pointed:

    “Today, most agricultural practices are devastating for biodiversity: it is responsible for 2% of carbon emissions, is depleting our soil and has historically been the main source of deforestation. Regenerative agriculture is a way to reverse this trend and have a positive impact on the land and the planet while feeding us.”

    Reacting to the presentation of the Mauritian context and its agricultural practices, Stellio Prefumo, Agricultural Management Consultant, summarised the situation as follows:

    “Mauritius has moved from extensive agriculture to intensive agriculture focused on monoculture, which has had a considerable impact on our biodiversity: harmful chemicals have been overused, ecosystems have been disrupted and our soils, which take 500 years to build up, have been severely depleted by ploughing and the use of heavy machinery and equipment.”

    The Mauritius context

    The discussions during the workshop attempted to establish a mapping of the current context and practices in food production in Mauritius. Four main trends can be extracted form these exchanges:

    1. Agricultural practices in Mauritius, for both large and small-scale farmers, remain largely dominated by unsustainable practices with excessive use of harmful chemicals, field burning and, for sugar cane, the use of heavy machinery. The ways in which food is produced, stored and distributed is also relatively inefficient, resulting in significant food waste.
    2. Mauritius soil is of volcanic origin and is rocky to very rocky. The top soil is quite shallow, with an average depth of 20-25 cm, while in some regions the top soil can be as low as 10cm. MSRI research has shown that soil degradation is the main factor in yield loss in Mauritius, hence soil regeneration lies at the heart of the solution to improve agricultural yields.
    3. There are a number of isolated and fragmented sustainable initiatives in Mauritius, but they tend to be small-scale with limited data on yields and practices. In general, there is a lack of coordination, information and cooperation between different stakeholders.
    4. There is, however, an awareness of the urgency of the situation among key stakeholders: institutes and organisations such as FAREI, MSRI and the Chamber of Agriculture have been working for several years on more sustainable solutions for both the sugar and fruit and vegetable sectors. But the transition to truly regenerative food systems will require a more radical shift in consumer and producer behaviour towards local products and profoundly different agricultural practices.

    Pathways for Regenerative Food systems in Mauritius

    Building on the previous discussions, participants explored possible pathways for making regenerative practices a reality in the Mauritius context. They called, among other things, for a radical shift in behaviours across the value chain but also highlighted the need to better value the farming profession and attract a new generation of farmers.

    1. In-depth transformation: Moving towards sustainable food systems requires some critical change, including in how we grow and consume food, how we use, conserve, process and transport natural resources, but also how we recycle, and how we finance and organise our key activities and actors.
    2. Vision and Leadership: because it is a medium to long term process and because it involves profound changes in our practices and behaviours, the transition to regenerative agriculture will require strong leadership from public authorities and the private sector: consumers will only turn to local, seasonal and local products if the change is visible and if they are well informed.
    3. Valorisation, Coordination and Regulation: The complexity of food systems calls for a coordinated and concerted approach to agricultural land planning, farmer training, financing, access to knowledge and technologies that actively promote transformation towards regenerative agricultural practices across the value chain. Valuing the profession of farming, the introduction of more binding regulations and the definition of clearly defined objectives and timeframes must be part of the solution.
    4. Solutions exist: Many solutions and technologies are already being explored, used or being researched in Mauritius: mechanical weeding, crop rotation, use of predators to control pests, regenerative grazing of livestock, drone technologies, AI and precision farming, and reduced tillage are some examples. The tools and solutions are there: it is now up to Maurice to make choices, set targets and implement them.
    5. There are fundamental questions that remain to be explored: Is regenerative agriculture possible on a large scale? In what form? Does it have the same production capacity as current conventional agriculture? And if so, how much does the transition cost? What funding is needed to make the transition? Is food from regenerative agriculture more nutritious than food from conventional agriculture?

    Myriam Blin, Director of the Charles Telfair Centre, concluded the workshop by underlining that “the conclusion of today’s discussion is that we cannot afford not to change, we are called upon not only to change our behaviours as consumers and producers, but also to act as champions of regenerative practices”.   

     

    Note : The main findings and the proposed avenues highlighted by the participants were presented at the Knowledge Exchange Event on National Food Systems in Mauritius and Seychelles organised by the United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office for Mauritius and Seychelles (UNRCO) on 3 December 2021.

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    The Mascarene Islands, identified as an Important Marine Mammal Area

    By
    Violaine Dulau
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    Sperm whale in Mauritius
    Mauritius' sperm whale (photo credit: Hugues Vitry, MMCO)

     

    Violaine Dulau, PhD, Executive Director, Globice & Associate Researcher, Université de La Réunion

    Lana Barteneva, Biologist, MMCO

    Since early 2020, the Mascarene Islands have been identified as an Important Marine Mammal Area (IMMA). In this week’s article Violaine Dulau and Lana Bartheneva review the importance of such demarcation for biodiversity preservation but also as a tool for policy makers and private decision makers to mitigate the impact of their activities in the demarcated areas. Already several important research projects are under way, both in Mauritius and la Reunion, on the population of endangered marine mammals in the area.    

     

    In early 2020, scientists announced the approval of 37 new “Important Marine Mammal Areas” (IMMAs) in the Western Indian Ocean and Arabian Seas. These IMMAs identify key habitats for marine mammals, including several endangered species such as the Indian Ocean humpback dolphin and the dugong. The delimitation of these IMMAs constitutes an important first step for the conservation of these species. In particular, they could serve as a basis for the implementation of management measures, such as the creation of marine protected areas.

    The identification of IMMAs is based on scientific knowledge and represents the most complete and exhaustive review possible of the distribution of marine mammals and the use of their habitat in the region. Each area of interest is evaluated by the experts on the basis of (1) Vulnerability of the species or population, (2) Distribution and abundance (small resident population, aggregation), (3) Life cycle (breeding habitat, feeding habitat, migration routes), (4) Special attributes (distinctiveness, diversity). Areas that are valued as IMMAs are published on an online eAtlas and can be used to guide effective conservation measures by a variety of stakeholders.

    It is hoped, for example, that industry will be able to use this information to effectively mitigate the impact of their planned activities in these areas, and that governments will be able to use this information to help guide their deliberations on the location of marine protected areas or other coastal zone management efforts.

    As such, the Mascarene Islands (Reunion and Mauritius) and the associated underwater seamounts and banks have been identified as an Important Marine Mammal Area. The area meets several IMMA criteria. It hosts a high diversity of cetaceans, with 22 species of whales and dolphins reported. The inshore waters of Reunion and Mauritius islands sustain small resident populations of Indo-Pacific bottlenose dolphins and spinner dolphins that might be threatened by increase interactions with human activities and coastal habitat degradation.  The coastal waters also represent a breeding habitat for humpback whales. Each year, from June to October, humpback whales are migrating into the area to calve, nurse and mate, using the shallow waters around the islands, but also Le Perouse seamount and Saint Brandon shoal. Further offshore, the insular slope of Mauritius also sustains an important concentration of sperm whales, with groups of resident females and their young being observed year-round.

    Important Marine Mammal Areas
    Map showing the Important Marine Mammal Areas identified in the south-west Indian Ocean.

    The identification of the Mascarenes as an IMMA has been made possible thanks to the research conducted over the last decades by local organizations, such as Globice in Reunion and Mauritius Marine Conservation Society (MMCS) and Marine Megafauna Conservation Organization (MMCO) in Mauritius, and a large-scale aerial survey conducted in the region (REMMOA). Collaborative research programs are ongoing to further assess species diversity in the oceanic waters of the Mascarene which are still largely unexplored.

    In Réunion, GLOBICE is leading a regional program on humpback whales with the aim of increasing our understanding of their movement within the south-western Indian Ocean breeding ground, and their migration routes to their feeding ground in Antarctica. This research program involves the deployment of satellite tags to track individual movement over serval months. Among the main findings of this program, the results have shown that some whales from Reunion are travelling to the Mascarene Plateau, using Saint-Brandon shoals as a breeding habitat. A photo-identification catalogue is also being maintained to identify individual humpback whales and assess their sighting history at the basin scale, based on photographs of their fluke. Research on humpback whale connectivity involves the long-term deployment of acoustic recorders in several locations of the Indian Ocean (Reunion, Madagascar, and along the African coastline) to detect humpback whale song and assess possible exchanges between breeding sites. In 2021, a hydrophone has been deployed in Mauritius waters for the first time, in partnership with Drop of Blue and the Marine Discovery Center, to contribute to this program and further assess connectivity within the Mascarene islands.

    Humpback whale from Réunion
    Humpback whale from Réunion (Photo by Violaine Dulau, Globice)

    In Mauritius, under MMCO leadership the MAUBYDICK Project has been carried out for about 10 years. This Project is aimed at preserving the local population of sperm whales by population estimates, its dynamics, and trends, identifying important habitats. The movement of sperm whales using satellite telemetry and the social structure of the local population are being studied in collaboration with French partners (MEGAPTERA, Longitude 181). The results of the project showed that the resident population of sperm whales is less than 40 individuals, and although the population has a high growth rate, there are signs that the population is very vulnerable. Resident sperm whales spend most of the year in Mauritius waters, time to time visiting the neighboring islands of Rodriguez and Reunion. Migrating sperm whale pods and adult solitary males also visit Mauritius waters. A constantly updated ID-catalog of both resident sperm whales and migratory individuals has been created. Another ongoing MMCO Project, “Whales of Mauritius”, aims to study the species composition of all cetaceans in Mauritius waters and identify important habitats for integration into Marine Spatial Planning and the introduction of mitigation measures. Within the framework of this Project, the mapping of species and their habitats is being carried out, as well as the creation of ID catalogs of small cetaceans, in particular melon-headed whales. In addition to biodiversity conservation, both projects will allow to expand knowledge about cetacean populations and movements in the south-western Indian Ocean through interregional cooperation.

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Main Photo by Hugues Vitry, MMCO

    Lecture by Professor Philippe Sands: Chagos Archipelago, the last British Colony in Africa

    By
    Thanjelie Aran
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    Thanjelie Aran, Editorial Assistant, Charles Telfair Centre

    On the 10th of November, the Charles Telfair Centre in collaboration with the Prime Minister’s Office organised a lecture on the history of the decolonisation of the Chagos Archipelago. Entitled: A Short History of Colonialism, a Modern Crime against Humanity? – Chagos Archipelago: The Last British Colony in Africa, the lecture was delivered at the Charles Telfair Campus by the internationally renowned human rights lawyer Professor Philippe Sands, QC, GCSK who represented Mauritius during the Chagos Islands dispute hearings.

     

    Reviewing the history of the Archipelago over the last 50 years, Professor Sands presented the circumstances under which the Chagos Archipelago was taken away from Mauritius and how its 2000 inhabitants were then forcibly deported to Mauritius and the Seychelles. The tragedy behind this deportation was poignantly evocated through the testimonial of Mrs Lyseby Elysé, a Chagosian who was uprooted from her home and who still yearns to go back to her native island. She recounted, with emotion, the day she was forced to leave her island:

    “My heart is suffering, and my heart still belongs to the island where I was born. Nobody would like to be uprooted from the island where he was born, to be uprooted like animals. It’s heart-breaking, and I maintain justice must be done and I must return to my island where I was born,” Lyseby Elysé

    Many attempts by Mauritius to regain sovereignty were left unsuccessful which prompted the then government, under the Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam, to retain services of lawyers who became part of a legal team tasked with challenging Britain’s actions under international law.

    During 50 years of various legal battles, Professor Sands stressed on four key milestone events:

    1. The UN decision which granted Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960
    2. The UN general assembly adopting a resolution seeking International Court’s advisory opinion on Pre-Independence Separation of Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 2017.
    3. The delivery of a landmark advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice in February 2019 in favour of Mauritius whereby it was concluded that “the process of decolonisation of Mauritius was not lawfully completed” and that “the United Kingdom was under an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible”.
    4. The International Court of Justice’s decision was confirmed by the UN General Assembly (Resolution 73/295) in May 2019, thereby summoning Britain to leave the Chagos within 6 months.

    For him, the vote of the 22nd May 2019 was “one of the most remarkable moments in my professional life.” With 116 countries voting in favour of the resolution and only 6 Against plus 56 Abstentions; the vote was a serious setback for Britain on the international scene.

    “The general assembly’s membership board lit up green in favour, red against, yellow for abstention, black for absence. Resolution 73/295 passed with a big majority […] including many abstentions that were significant: China, Russia, and France. Only Croatia and Hungary of the EU supported Britain along with only three of the 54 members of the Commonwealth, and significantly, not a single country from Africa, Latin America, or Caribbean voted with Britain.” 

    The ruling implies that the detachment of Chagos was not based on the free and genuine expression of the will of the people concerned:

    “Britain’s occupation of Chagos is illegal and is a continuing international wrongful act. Britain must end its administration as rapidly as possible. Chagos is part of Mauritius […]” quoted Professor Philippe Sands.

    By November 2019, the Chagosians were entitled to resettle as a matter of urgency. The UN, its members, the specialized agencies, and all other international organisations are now required to recognize Chagos as part of Mauritius.

    The ruling has led to a powerful visual change: the UN has issued a new world map (Map No 4170 Revision 18.1 of 20 February 2020) whereby Chagos is marked as being Mauritian territory – a confirmation of Mauritius’ sovereignty on the Chagos Archipelago.

    Chagos Archipelago presented as Mauritian territory
    Source : www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/world.pdf

    So far, the UK has chosen to ignore both the International Court of Justice and the United Nations. Yet, in terms of international diplomacy, the UK is now much weaker. Professor Philippe Sands is confident that the UK will one day change its position. Ambassador Jagdish Koonjul, GCSK, in his closing statement, further added “sooner or later UK will have to come to some kind of an agreement” despite the fact that recent alliance between the USA, Australia, and the UK on submarine may suggest a united front to block progress when it comes to Chagos.

    On the question of the compensations that had been paid to Mauritius, Professor Sands reminded the audience that the court gave an absolutely definitive view that the 1965 Lancaster House Agreement was reached under duress. He explained that the buyout construct had been illegal from day one and the issue of compensation was thus irrelevant:

    “[…] The court is concerned only with the question of consent putting in another way, you can’t buy consent with a handful of pounds and shillings”.

    Professor Sands closed his lecture by sharing how it had been an honour and privilege for him to work for Mauritius and its people and to be associated with the cause of the Chagosians:

    “They will return to the outer islands of Mauritius’ Chagos Archipelago. It is not a question of if, it is a question only of when.”

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Understanding the impact of multiple stressors: how COVID-19 and the Wakashio oil spill affected coastal community resilience in Mauritius

    By
    Josheena Naggea
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    Josheena Naggea, Doctoral Candidate, Emmett Interdisciplinary Program in Environment and Resources, Stanford University, USA

    Amandine de Rosnay, Sustainability Consultant, Dynamia Associates & Developers

     

    While the world faces the first major global pandemic in over 100 years, Mauritius also suffered the worst ecological disaster in its history. On the 25th of July 2020, the Japanese owned, Panama flagged vessel, MV Wakashio bulk carrier tanker wrecked off the island’s southeast coast, spilling around 1000 tonnes of fuel oil along more than 30km of the south-east coast of Mauritius two weeks later. The region is known for its artisanal fishing villages and concentration of ecologically sensitive areas and nature reserves. This incident which occurred while the island was still dealing with the impacts of COVID-19 has disproportionately affected coastal communities who were active in the fisheries and tourism sectors. To explore the impact of these compounding shocks on coastal communities, between September 2020 to January 2021 our team undertook a study involving seven community meetings attended by 120 community members, 22 key informant interviews and 792 random household surveys across the oil spill impacted sites and reference sites [1]. Our findings show that the oil spill further eroded the resilience, i.e. the capacity to recover quickly from shocks, of vulnerable populations on the southeast coast of the island who are highly dependent on fisheries and tourism for their livelihood. It remains an open question the extent to which some of these households will recover lost income as the economy opens up, but the road to recovery is likely to be complex for those who have accumulated debt, exhausted personal savings and sold productive assets such as boats.

     

    It has been over a year since the devastating oil spill in Mauritius, one of the worst environmental disasters the country has faced. While the oil spill clean-up operations have officially been completed and the visual horror of the oil in our lagoon has faded, communities are still feeling the brunt of the double whammy of COVID-19 and the oil spill, particularly for households who had been relying on small scale fishing and tourism.

    Study Overview

    To better understand the financial impact of the compounding COVID-19/oil spill shocks and the coping strategies developed by the affected coastal communities, the research team gathered qualitative and quantitative data to empirically assess socio-economic impacts. This study consisted of 792 in-person household surveys, 22 key informant interviews, and seven community meetings held between September 2020 to January 2021. The household surveys were conducted across 12 oil spill-impacted sites and four reference sites (in the northern and western coast of Mauritius) at Village Council Area (VCA) level [2].

    Significant Financial Impacts on Households

    The financial impact of the COVID-19 lockdown/oil spill shocks is substantial. Our results indicate that post the first COVID-19 lockdown in 2020, reference households experienced an average reduction in earnings of 41% compared to their earnings prior the shock, while oil spill sites households experienced an average reduction in earnings of 48%.

    By November 2020, whilst earnings in the reference sites had partially recovered with a reduction in earnings prior to the lockdown up to an average of -32%; earnings in the spill sites continued to decline reaching an average reduction in household earnings of 57%. Those most affected, such as those involved in seasonal labour, fishing and gleaning, saw a decline in household earnings of up to 71%, while the reference sites began to recover from the effects of COVID-19 from June to December 2020.

    In contrast, the sites associated with the oil spill show a continuous decline across the assessed socio-economic indicators, suggesting that vulnerable respondents in this area will likely struggle to recover financially. It remains an open question the extent to which some of these households will recover lost income once the economy opens up, but the road to recovery is likely to be complex for those who have accumulated debt, exhausted personal savings and sold productive assets such as boats.

    Poverty Traps

    Beyond the financial impact, the study uncovered evidence of worsening compounding factors including the psychological impact of the double shocks, food insecurity, reduced school attendance, health impact and unequal distribution of assistance. Respondents have also shared about a ‘loss of the future’ which is an inability to see a way out for themselves.

    The combination of these factors as well as spent savings and taking on debt, has sent families back years in terms of accrued financial security and may cause some to fall into long-term poverty traps. This in turn leads to the long-term fragmentation of the social fabric of the region, should there be no remediation. Without local assistance and support, coastal residents will continue to suffer from the combined impacts of both incidents.

    Gendered Impacts

    In the oil spill-impacted sites, the compounding crises of the pandemic and the oil spill have highlighted an important policy gap: the needs of women from coastal communities often go unnoticed. Our meetings with community groups and community leaders revealed that hundreds of people fish for subsistence. These subsistence fishers are not formally recognised through any registration process. Women especially tend to be largely unregistered artisanal fishers who walk along the coast at low tide to forage for food sources: shellfish like “Tek” (Donax spp.), “Mangouak” (Isognomon spp.), “Betay” (Trachycardium spp., Gafrarium spp., Asaphis spp., Tellina spp.), “Bigorneau” (Littorina spp.), “Gono” (Pleuroploco trapezium) as well as invertebrates like octopus, and a variety of fish, a  process known as gleaning. Of the 1,902 registered fishers in Mauritius[3], only 35 are women. And of these 35, more than 50% are located in the oil spill-affected region. Although applicants of fisher licenses were eligible for the Rs10,200 monthly oil-spill compensation, unregistered fishers and gleaners who have not previously applied for a registration license failed to receive such financial support. This has led to not only economic loss but also food insecurity within their households, and an emotional loss of a way of life from not being able to glean anymore. Previously, they could generally just “catch their food from the sea” right before a meal, but since the oil spill, they were having to spend more money to buy canned goods and other less nutritious food.

    Although there is an equal to larger number of unregistered fishers compared to registered ones, fisherwomen and gleaners are overwhelmingly unregistered and far less likely to be recognised. As such, a system that does not account for unregistered, subsistence fishers inadvertently accentuate gender inequalities. Following the study period, we have been informed that gleaners were back to collecting mollusks in the oil spill impacted areas, which raises concerns about the safety of consuming sessile seafood from such areas.

    The gendered impact of the pandemic has been highlighted in the Gendered Voices Issues 1-4 by UNDP Mauritius. COVID-19 has the potential to accentuate the feminisation of poverty in Mauritius with 11% of the poorer segment of the population constituting of women living under the poverty line, compared to 9.6% males in the same category. Women are not just highly represented in sectors most impacted by the pandemic (hospitality and tertiary sectors), but are also often the de-facto carers for children who are unable to attend school, forcing many to either reduce their working hours or to become unemployed as they shoulder their caregiving responsibilities. The report concludes that COVID-19 could exacerbate inequalities between men and women. Both COVID-19 and the oil spill impact have demonstrated the dangers of gender-neutral policies, which exclude women from receiving relief, and have exposed vulnerabilities embedded in our systems and economies.

    Coping mechanisms

    We asked respondents about the different coping strategies employed to deal with financial difficulties and food insecurity following both events.

    Coping strategies across all coastal residents have included:

    • Engaging in new economic activities, usually in the daily labour sector, with skippers and fishers being hired by the oil spill clean-up crews
    • Spending savings
    • Taking on more debt
    • Selling productive assets (boats, motors, cars, etc.)
    • Relying on cheaper food, decreasing protein intake, especially fish
    • Increased dependency on the generosity of family and friends

    Out of those who faced financial difficulties, 70% of respondents from spill sites used their savings compared to 24% from reference sites. Respondents mentioned spending the savings they had accumulated to build a house or buy land. Other strategies used in the spill sites included reduced spending on non-essential items, the accumulation of more debt, and selling off productive assets (boats, engines, motorbikes etc.).

    Figure 1 Coping strategies used by households as a response to financial difficulties 

    From the households facing issues with food insecurity, the most common approach was:

    (1) to rely on less preferred and less expensive food, with respondents commenting that they were eating more vegetables/canned food and less meat or fish to save money, with 64% respondents using that approach in spill sites compared to 16% in reference sites;

    (2) 63% of respondents started backyard gardening in spill sites vs 22% in reference sites.

    (3) 22% from spill sites and 6% from reference sites relied on help from friends and family; and

    (4) 20% from spill sites reduced meal portions compared to 3% from reference sites.

     

    Figure 2 Coping mechanisms used as a response to lack of food access

     

    Assistance

    Out of respondents who required assistance, more respondents (58%) from the oil spill sites received assistance than the reference sites (35%). Most of the assistance received was in the form of monetary compensation and food packs across all sites, with over 50% of respondents in oil spill sites receiving some form of external assistance. In most cases, the majority of assistance came from government entities, except for the distribution of food packs where NGOs played an important role.

    Following the Wakashio oil spill, the Government through the MV Wakashio Assistance and Support Cell offered different categories of allowances to affected persons: (i) a Solidarity Grant, plus Bad Weather Allowance of Rs 425 daily where applicable for registered fishers and applicants of fisher registration (ii) a Solidarity Grant of Rs 10,200 for fishmongers (iii) Rs 15,300 (Solidarity Grant and Self-Employed Assistance Scheme of Rs 5,100) for self-employed persons in Pleasure Craft; and Rs 20,400 (Solidarity Grant and Wage Assistance Scheme of Rs 10,200) for workers in Pleasure Craft as from August 2020.  In order to benefit as a fisher, a beneficiary must show a valid proof of registration. Existing applicants of the fishing registration cards in the impacted region were also eligible for the Rs 10,200 monthly package. Other forms of assistance included the Business Continuity Grant to provide financial assistance towards maintenance costs and/or running expenses e.g. utilities, waiving of administrative fees, waiving off refund of wage assistance paid under the Government Wage Assistance Scheme, loan and lease moratorium, protection from asset repossessions by banks and  financial institutions so as to avoid loss of assets and closure of businesses,  express loan assistance to help businesses remain afloat and prepare for recovery or to support reorientation towards alternative activities and duty free facilities to provide incentives for investment in support of recovery

    There is a clear demarcation in the level of satisfaction of the respondents with respect to the help received from the government for the pandemic in 2020 versus the government’s response to the oil spill. Respondents were mainly satisfied with the response to the pandemic, but mostly dissatisfied with the oil spill response. A number of issues were highlighted, including (1) a slow response at the start of the spill, (2) increased distrust due to lack of scientific information about response measures and environmental impacts of the disaster (3) not being eligible for financial support following the oil spill where impacts were deemed indirect or due to COVID-19 (e.g. guesthouses, small businesses)

    Policy Implications

    Our study has shown the need for a stronger gender focus in supporting communities impacted by COVID-19 and the oil spill, the need for long term environmental monitoring, along with communities whose livelihoods depend on those resources, and continued monitoring of physical and psychological health impacts of residents in the oil spill affected sites. We list below some key recommendations:

     

    Acknowledgement

    The authors wish to thank the Tiffany & Co. Foundation for funding this study through the NGO, Wildlife Conservation Society. We especially thank Dr Tim McClanahan, Dr Nyawira Muthiga and Dr Jennifer O’Leary for their invaluable contribution in the conceptualization of the study, Prof. Krish Seetah and Dr Pricila Iranah for their contribution in the study design and Thierry Le Breton for his invaluable help in conducting this study. We also thank Professor Larry Crowder, Dr Sangeeta Mangubhai and Dr Natalie Ban for their support with the survey design. We extend our gratitude to the UN Resident office and the UNDP-GEF- Small Grants Programme for helping us reach out to key contacts to understand the responses to the oil spill. We acknowledge the support of Dr Pramod Kumar Chumun, Dr Ranjeet Bhagooli, Vasisht Seetapah and Sandy Monrose during field visits in the aftermath of the oil spill. We thank all our field assistants without whom this work would not have been possible. We would like to specially acknowledge all our interviewees and survey respondents who offered their time and partook in the study despite their challenging circumstances.

    Link to the full report here.

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Main Photo by International Maritime Organization on Flickr

    [1] The reference sites were sites which were only impacted by COVID-19 but not the oil spill and are situated in regions where communities also rely heavily on artisanal fishing and tourism.

    [2] The reference sites were sites which were only impacted by COVID-19 but not the oil spill and are situated in regions where communities also rely heavily on artisanal fishing and tourism.

    [3] Mauritius Fishermen Cooperative Federation Ltd, 2019

    What is COP26? Here’s how global climate negotiations work and what’s expected from the Glasgow summit

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
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    Portraying climate change for COP26

     

     

    Shelley Inglis, Executive Director, University of Dayton Human Rights Center, University of Dayton

    Over two weeks in November, world leaders and national negotiators will meet in Scotland to discuss what to do about climate change. It’s a complex process that can be hard to make sense of from the outside, but it’s how international law and institutions help solve problems that no single country can fix on its own. I worked for the United Nations for several years as a law and policy adviser and have been involved in international negotiations. Here’s what’s happening behind closed doors and why people are concerned that COP26 might not meet its goals.

     

    What is COP26?

    In 1992, countries agreed to an international treaty called the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which set ground rules and expectations for global cooperation on combating climate change. It was the first time the majority of nations formally recognized the need to control greenhouse gas emissions, which cause global warming that drives climate change.

    That treaty has since been updated, including in 2015 when nations signed the Paris climate agreement. That agreement set the goal of limiting global warming to “well below” 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 F), and preferably to 1.5 C (2.7 F), to avoid catastrophic climate change.

    COP26 stands for the 26th Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC. The “parties” are the 196 countries that ratified the treaty plus the European Union. The United Kingdom, partnering with Italy, is hosting COP26 in Glasgow, Scotland, from Oct. 31 through Nov. 12, 2021, after a one-year postponement due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Why are world leaders so focused on climate change?

    The U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s latest report, released in August 2021, warns in its strongest terms yet that human activities have unequivocally warmed the planet, and that climate change is now widespread, rapid and intensifying.

    The IPCC’s scientists explain how climate change has been fueling extreme weather events and flooding, severe heat waves and droughts, loss and extinction of species, and the melting of ice sheets and rising of sea levels. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres called the report a “code red for humanity.”

    Enough greenhouse gas emissions are already in the atmosphere, and they stay there long enough, that even under the most ambitious scenario of countries quickly reducing their emissions, the world will experience rising temperatures through at least mid-century.

    However, there remains a narrow window of opportunity. If countries can cut global emissions to “net zero” by 2050, that could bring warming back to under 1.5 C in the second half of the 21st century. How to get closer to that course is what leaders and negotiators are discussing.

    Guterres standing at a podium with #TimeForAction on the screen behind him
    U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres called the latest climate science findings a ‘code red for humanity.’ UNFCCC

    What happens at COP26?

    During the first days of the conference, around 120 heads of state, like U.S. President Joe Biden, and their representatives will gather to demonstrate their political commitment to slowing climate change.

    Once the heads of state depart, country delegations, often led by ministers of environment, engage in days of negotiations, events and exchanges to adopt their positions, make new pledges and join new initiatives. These interactions are based on months of prior discussions, policy papers and proposals prepared by groups of states, U.N. staff and other experts.

    Nongovernmental organizations and business leaders also attend the conference, and COP26 has a public side with sessions focused on topics such as the impact of climate change on small island states, forests or agriculture, as well as exhibitions and other events.

    The meeting ends with an outcome text that all countries agree to. Guterres publicly expressed disappointment with the COP25 outcome, and there are signs of trouble heading into COP26.

    Greta Thunberg raises an eyebrow during a session at COP25
    Celebrities like youth climate activist Greta Thunberg add public pressure on world leaders. UNFCCC

    What is COP26 expected to accomplish?

    Countries are required under the Paris Agreement to update their national climate action plans every five years, including at COP26. This year, they’re expected to have ambitious targets through 2030. These are known as nationally determined contributions, or NDCs.

    The Paris Agreement requires countries to report their NDCs, but it allows them leeway in determining how they reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The initial set of emission reduction targets in 2015 was far too weak to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

    One key goal of COP26 is to ratchet up these targets to reach net zero carbon emissions by the middle of the century.

    Another aim of COP26 is to increase climate finance to help poorer countries transition to clean energy and adapt to climate change. This is an important issue of justice for many developing countries whose people bear the largest burden from climate change but have contributed least to it. Wealthy countries promised in 2009 to contribute $100 billion a year by 2020 to help developing nations, a goal that has not been reached. The U.S., U.K. and EU, among the largest historic greenhouse emitters, are increasing their financial commitments, and banks, businesses, insurers and private investors are being asked to do more.

    Other objectives include phasing out coal use and generating solutions that preserve, restore or regenerate natural carbon sinks, such as forests.

    Another challenge that has derailed past COPs is agreeing on implementing a carbon trading system outlined in the Paris Agreement.

    Are countries on track to meet the international climate goals?

    The U.N. warned in September 2021 that countries’ revised targets were too weak and would leave the world on pace to warm 2.7 C (4.9 F) by the end of the century. However, governments are also facing another challenge this fall that could affect how they respond: Energy supply shortages have left Europe and China with price spikes for natural gas, coal and oil.

    China – the world’s largest emitter – has not yet submitted its NDC. Major fossil fuel producers such as Saudi Arabia, Russia and Australia seem unwilling to strengthen their commitments. India – a critical player as the second-largest consumer, producer and importer of coal globally – has also not yet committed.

    Other developing nations such as Indonesia, Malaysia, South Africa and Mexico are important. So is Brazil, which, under Javier Bolsonaro’s watch, has increased deforestation of the Amazon – the world’s largest rainforest and crucial for biodiversity and removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.

    What happens if COP26 doesn’t meet its goals?

    Many insiders believe that COP26 won’t reach its goal of having strong enough commitments from countries to cut global greenhouse gas emissions 45% by 2030. That means the world won’t be on a smooth course for reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 and the goal of keeping warming under 1.5 C.

    But organizers maintain that keeping warming under 1.5 C is still possible. Former Secretary of State John Kerry, who has been leading the U.S. negotiations, remains hopeful that enough countries will create momentum for others to strengthen their reduction targets by 2025.

    Line chart showing pledges and current policies far from a trajectory that could meet the 1.5C goal.
    The world is not on track to meet the Paris goal. Climate Action Tracker

    The cost of failure is astronomical. Studies have shown that the difference between 1.5 and 2 degrees Celsius can mean the submersion of small island states, the death of coral reefs, extreme heat waves, flooding and wildfires, and pervasive crop failure.

    That translates into many premature deaths, more mass migration, major economic losses, large swaths of unlivable land and violent conflict over resources and food – what the U.N. secretary-general has called “a hellish future.”

    Main Photo by Riccardo Maria Mantero on Flickr
    The Conversation

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Africa should start preparing for the global climate emergency

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
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    Dr Uche Igwe, Senior Political Economy Analyst and Visiting Fellow at the LSE Firoz Lalji Centre for Africa.

     

    For Africa’s voice to be heard in climate debates, it must take bold action in pursuit of green economic growth. Dr Uche Igwe, LSE Fellow at the Firoz Lalji Institute for Africa, argues Africa’s position should no longer be dictated by transatlantic stakeholders, overturning long-standing stereotypes of dependency.

    Growing up in a rural village in southeast Nigeria, the challenges of climate change used to be a distant reality. We did not concern ourselves much with extreme weather or future predictions. Our preoccupation as poor rural dwellers was more about what to eat day by day. It was not until I visited Imiringi, near Yenagoa in Bayelsa state, that I witnessed first-hand the effect of 24-hour daylight, which elders informed us was due to gas flaring from a nearby crude oil field. My friends and I saw it as an opportunity to play soccer endlessly. The roofing sheets covering the house I visited, and many others in the community, were brown and rusty, while rainwater was uniquely different and acidic. The air outside was filled with soot, which made the atmosphere hazy.

    Those were the footprints of the exploration and exploitation of crude oil in Nigeria, carried out mainly by multinational corporations. It was like visiting another planet. Those pictures have stuck in my memory for more than twenty-five years. To date, very little has changed.

    Many African countries are suffering from climate change

    Recently, the effects of climate change appear to be getting closer to daily life, with flooding causing extensive damage and disruption around me regularly. Migration patterns are now altered with less rainfall and desert encroachment in arid parts of the Sahel region. There is evidence of diverse and wide-ranging consequences, including threats to health, food security, water availability and other sensitive sectors such as agriculture. According to the International Monetary Fund, adverse consequences of climate change are concentrated in regions with relatively hotter climates, where a disproportionately large number of low-income countries are located.

    Indeed, climate change tends to affect developing countries with low carbon footprints more adversely. The recent experience in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe reinforces our understanding of many African cities’ vulnerabilities. According to the World Bank, the average annual loss from floods induced by cyclones in Mozambique alone stands at $440 million.

    Reimagining farmers-herdsmen conflicts through a climate lens

    The current conflict between farmers and pastoralists in Nigeria has origins that politicians have deliberately ignored ­– the result of the movement of people for survival as a consequence of climate change. The political conversation in the country is between those who favour as a solution either open grazing or ranching. But any solution can only be sustainable when the conversation becomes scientific and acknowledges the ecological dimension of the conflict; increasing studies are showing linkages between civil war and increases in temperature in Africa. Climate change alters competition for scarce natural resources, leading to desertification, drought, land degradation and water scarcity. As these issues deepen, further inter-communal grievances and other vulnerabilities will be triggered. As in the Southern Darfur region in Western Sudan, where Arab nomads move to more fertile lands inhabited by settled farmers from the Fur tribes, Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria move southwards.

    Framing partnership options on the road to COP26 in Glasgow

    At the end of October, world leaders will assemble in Glasgow to review action and improve upon various commitments in the 2016 Paris Agreement and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. There is some rational hope that a new framework will be proposed for a sustainable ‘climate economy’ that could deliver USD26 trillion worth of economic benefits through to 2030, according to a report of the Global Commission on Economy and Climate Change. This would require targeted sacrifices and ambitious action across critical economic systems to create energy transition conditions, reduce carbon emissions, scale up food production and reform land-use systems.

    African policymakers must frame future partnerships between the continent and the rest of the world as one that delivers clear benefits at home while bestowing upon itself necessary responsibility. A new climate-focused economy is a potential source of opportunity, which will require openness to building strategic North-South relations. For this to happen, the continent must not remain on the fringes of the conversation.

    African leaders can tag along or chart an alternative course

    The transition to a low carbon world for governments and businesses will require bold choices and far-reaching sacrifices. Those who oppose outright divestment from fossil fuels propose the recognition of economic differences between countries, often without the suggestion of divergent pathways. Nigeria’s erudite Vice President Yemi Osinbajo made such a point in a recent article, arguing that banning fossil fuel investments would crush Africa.

    Osibanjo may be correct that fossil fuels have played a role in powering growth in Africa. However, arguments for continued dependence on fossil fuel exports are pedestrian; the world’s biggest consumers of fossil fuels are preparing to move into renewable energy generation, limiting the potential for producers.

    That the continent itself does not yet generate a high carbon footprint is not a compliment. It simply exposes the continent’s lagging economy – all the more reason Africa’s voice must be reflected in the climate debate. Indeed, the moral position that developed countries should wait for Africa to catch up developmentally is a barrier towards a green energy transition. In a competitive, globalised world, you either fall in line or step aside.

    He who pays the piper dictates the tone

    Western governments’ rhetoric on the environment does not often match reality. Controlling the majority of the world’s state finances, the pursuit of their agenda limits choices for developing countries, which are less able to shape their own environmental programmes. Either African leaders negotiate in their interest or begin to chart a bold alternative course in the long-term by resolving the lingering energy imbalance between exports and domestic consumption. A continent that regularly genuflects before others to further their concern is no longer acceptable. It is time for an African continent willing to vigorously pursue sustainable green economic policies, like others, rather than painting a picture of itself that reinforces stereotypes of dependence. At the same time, the polluter-must-pay principle means that the pathway for one billion people in our continent who contribute less than 2.3% of global greenhouse emissions must be charted differently.

    Time for tough choices towards decarbonised development

    While admitting the wrongs of the past, Africa must face tough choices to pursue decarbonised development through adaptation and mitigation measures. Partnerships that position the continent to benefit from green economic growth must be built, particularly as much of the continent remains heavily polluted. The vast environmental debt owed to African countries is an important starting point that should be fought for, a position undermined by the continent emitting more carbon. Countries on the frontline of climate change’s effects, in particular, should be forthright in using the opportunity to leverage financing and sustainably unlock economic opportunities. In this regard, Africa’s position should no longer be dictated by the prescriptions of transatlantic stakeholders, however benevolent. Yet, the continent must listen and learn from others to bring forward feasible proposals on how to decarbonise.

    To create a more sustainable and economically prosperous world for the collective good, Africa must now rise and take the initiative to participate meaningfully or continue to lag behind. Africa can improve its economy fourfold in the next twenty years by implementing policies that help expand clean technologies and improve energy efficiency. The continent can halt its current trajectory of poverty and vulnerability, transition away from high carbon dependent economic opportunities by investing in low carbon options like renewables to meet the expanding energy needs of its fast-growing population and create green jobs. Time has come to steer Africa away from climate change-induced instability and subsequent social unrest. These choices are available. So are the benefits as well as the consequences of inaction.

    Main photo by YODA Adaman on Unsplash

    This article first appeared on Africa at LSE

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    After “Doing Business”

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
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    Illustrate doing business

     

    Mauricio Cárdenas,  Visiting Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.

     

    WASHINGTON, DC – Earlier this year, the World Bank commissioned me and five fellow academics to develop recommendations on how to improve the methodology behind its annual Doing Business report, which ranked countries on the quality of their business regulations and their overall business environment. The report had been a lightning rod for controversy since its inception in 2003. While it generated glowing coverage in the global business media, it was also subject to constant criticism for its perceived anti-regulation, anti-union, and anti-tax slant.

    On September 1, we submitted our final recommendations, calling for a major overhaul of Doing Business including ending the practice of ranking countries. Two weeks later, the World Bank announced that it was scrapping the report entirely after a separate investigation by an outside law firm concluded that data had been deliberately manipulated in order to alter some countries’ rankings, notably those of China and Saudi Arabia.

    Setting aside the debate over what really happened in the past, the end of Doing Business has important consequences. We have no doubt that the world needs a tool to measure countries’ conditions for business development and attractiveness for foreign direct investment, and that the data from such a project are highly relevant to both researchers and business and government leaders.

    The World Bank has already declared its intention to keep working on business-climate issues. But to re-establish itself in this domain, it will have to overcome a deep trust deficit and take drastic steps to restore public confidence in its data. Our ideas about how to fix Doing Business could now serve as minimum criteria that any new effort in this area should meet.

    First, the World Bank should not build a new index to rank countries, as Doing Business did. Such aggregate indices are inevitably arbitrary, and the rankings invoke normative judgments that go far beyond the available evidence. Even prior to the recent data manipulation scandal, it was clear that the methodology behind many of the individual Doing Business indicators needed to be overhauled.

    The core problem was that Doing Business did not actually survey businesses, or measure the real-world costs of doing business for a representative set of small and medium-size enterprises. Instead, it relied on subjective judgments from a small group of experts, who were invited to assess the costs of regulation for a hypothetical firm that was often quite unrepresentative in many of the countries the Bank evaluated. The emphasis on de jure assessments needs to be replaced with de facto conditions.

    As luck would have it, separate World Bank surveys have periodically asked actual firms’ managers some of the same questions posed by Doing Business: about the time required to register a business, get a construction permit, clear goods through customs, and so on. Firms’ own answers, it turned out, bore no relation to those of the Doing Business experts. If there is a successor to Doing Business, it has to start from real data, not hypotheticals.

    A second set of issues concerns assumptions about the right policies or regulations, which are implicit in any business-environment ranking. For some indicators, such as delays in registering a business, less is clearly better. But for others, like the corporate tax rate, the optimal policy is the subject of vigorous academic debate.

    The tax issue became increasingly awkward for the Doing Business report in recent years. As 130 countries finalized plans this year for a global minimum corporate tax rate, the index continued to encourage a race to the bottom in corporate taxation.

    Third, any serious attempt to measure a country’s business environment must consider government efforts to fix market failures and provide essential public goods. But the World Bank’s broad vision of how to promote a good business climate, as embodied in the Doing Business index, suffered from some severe blind spots. For the private sector to flourish, apparently, government mostly needed to get out of the way.

    This view made no allowance for public investments in basic infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications networks, and power grids, all of which are fundamental to doing business but were entirely absent from the report. Absent, too, was any reference to crime prevention and public order, a skilled workforce, or investments in research and development.

    Finally, there is the question of data credibility. Greater transparency would be a good start. The raw data underlying the Doing Business report were never publicly available, so the analysis could not be independently replicated. Excessive focus on rankings and lack of access to the data resulted in a product that was vulnerable to political pressures and data haggling.

    But transparency rules can never ensure against deliberate manipulation. Ultimately, the World Bank will have to convince data users that it has built a functional firewall between its analytical work and its lending operations. To that end, the Bank should abandon the practice of selling advisory services on how to improve outcomes in the statistics it directly measures.

    The demise of Doing Business presents the World Bank with an opportunity to reclaim its intellectual leadership in global development through a renewed commitment to collecting and analyzing credible data. Arguing that the scandal was unfortunate but that the methodology was right won’t cut it. The Doing Business rankings – that result from the aggregation of indexes – were always dubious, because they did not provide an accurate picture of conditions on the ground and left no place for crucial public investments, sensible taxes, or necessary regulations. Any future effort to assess the business environment in member countries must address these shortcomings.

     

    This commentary is also signed by the other members of the External Review Panel for Doing Business: Laura Alfaro, Alan J. Auerbach, Takatoshi Ito, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, and Justin Sandefur.

    Main Photo by Stephen Dawson on Unsplash

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2021.
    www.project-syndicate.org

    Pour une éthique de la mer

    By
    Anouchka Sooriamoorthy
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    Anouchka Sooriamoorthy, Docteur ès lettres de la Sorbonne

     

    Les hommes entretiennent un rapport paradoxal, voire schizophrène à la mer. Elle est vénérée, adulée, crainte, en même temps qu’elle est salie, dénigrée, pillée. Depuis aussi longtemps que les productions artistiques nous permettent de le constater, la puissance de la mer, son immensité, sa part inconnue, la diversité de son écosystème fascinent : la mythologie grecque, peut-être la première, a décrit la force incommensurable de l’élément marin[1], de nombreux écrivains et poètes[2] ont en fait leur muse, les peintres et les réalisateurs[3] ont voulu saisir son esthétique. La mer n’est pas uniquement l’apanage des artistes ; pour de nombreux hommes, elle est un lieu de ressources, de divertissement ou de recueillement. Il semble ardu de comprendre comment cette admiration mêlée de dévotion n’a pu empêcher la grande violence des actions humaines envers la mer : pollution massive, surexploitation des ressources marine, destruction irréversible de l’écosystème[4].

    Le constat n’est pas nouveau, il est même redondant : scientifiques et activistes écologiques prennent régulièrement la parole pour interpeller les dirigeants politiques, les industriels et les citoyens, mais cette parole est réduite à un cri inaudible au milieu de l’océan. Nous tenterons d’une part d’expliquer cette dichotomie schizophrène dans notre rapport à la mer, pour ensuite proposer une éthique de la mer ainsi que les modalités possibles de son application.

     

    Comprendre la violence humaine envers l’élément marin

    L’homme maître et possesseur de la nature

    Notre rapport à la nature est indissociable de notre lien à la connaissance. Pendant longtemps, l’homme se trouvait dans une position de soumission et d’acceptation des éléments naturels : l’ordre du monde était ainsi, il fallait le respecter et le perpétuer. Au XVIIème siècle, la fin du Moyen-âge et de l’obscurantisme a suscité une soif de connaissances. René Descartes est, en Europe, l’un des philosophes qui illustre le mieux l’esprit de l’époque. Toute son œuvre est animée par la volonté d’établir une voie sûre afin d’atteindre la vérité et de proposer des fondements solides aux sciences. En prouvant que l’homme est le seul être doté de la faculté de la conscience, faculté qui lui permet non seulement de penser le monde, mais aussi de se penser, Descartes prouve en même temps que l’homme est supérieur aux autres êtres vivants, ces derniers étant dépourvus de conscience[5]. Dans le Discours de la méthode, Descartes décrit la voie pour atteindre la vérité dans les sciences : les connaissances acquises permettent de vaincre la superstition et les croyances pour fonder des bases scientifiques sûres. Grâce à une telle entreprise, l’homme est désormais « maître et possesseur de la nature[6] ». Cette maîtrise et cette possession permettraient, selon Descartes, le contrôle des productions de la terre et donc de notre alimentation, ainsi que la « conservation de la santé[7] » grâce au déploiement de la médecine.

     

    L’homme maître abusif et possesseur égoïste de la nature

    Cependant, les conséquences d’une telle affirmation ont probablement dépassé ce que Descartes aurait pu envisager : l’homme s’est transformé en maître abusif et possesseur égoïste de la nature. « Cette phrase est devenue le manifeste de la démesure humaine […], alors que pour Descartes, elle exprimait un rêve de libération de l’homme de l’emprise d’explications magiques de la nature, de voir enfin arriver le règne de l’homme qui allait pouvoir avoir une maîtrise de son environnement[8] »  L’accumulation des connaissances et le développement de la technologie ont généré une idolâtrie irrationnelle du progrès : il faut conquérir tous les territoires, laisser la trace de l’homme partout. Aveuglé par des innovations scientifiques et technologiques sans précédent, l’homme du XXIème siècle a oublié qu’il vient de la nature et qu’une exploitation sans limite de cette dernière engendrerait une disparition certaine de la nature, mais aussi de la nature humaine. Le désir de connaissances s’est transformé en arrogance de tout savoir. Au XVIIIème siècle, le philosophe Jean-Jacques Rousseau mettait en garde contre le demi-savant ou celui qui détient l’illusion de la connaissance :

    « Il est de la demi-science en fait d’esprit comme de l’hypocrisie en fait de mœurs. Le demi-savant n’a que le masque de la science, comme l’hypocrite a le masque de la vertu. Ils jouent l’un et l’autre, l’un la vertu, l’autre la science. Et comme l’hypocrite va au vice par le chemin de la vertu, le faux savant, le demi-savant, car c’est le même homme, va à l’ignorance par le chemin de la science. Il n’est pas nouveau de dire que la demi-science est pire que l’ignorance.[9] »

    L’homme s’est paré d’arrogance, oubliant les limites de sa conscience qui ne peuvent lui permettre de tout savoir, de toujours anticiper et de prévoir sur un long terme les conséquences de ces actions. Faisant fi des limitations, armé des outils de la technologie, l’homme s’est pris pour la puissance divine voulant tout contrôler, tout soumettre. C’est ainsi que nous sommes passés du statut d’adorateur à celui de destructeur de la nature.

     

    Poser un cadre éthique

    « La thèse liminaire de ce livre est que la promesse de la technique moderne s’est inversée en menace, ou bien que celle-ci s’est indissolublement alliée à celle-là. Elle va au-delà du constat d’une menace physique. La soumission de la nature destinée au bonheur humain a entraîné par la démesure de son succès, (…), le plus grand défi pour l’être humain(..).[10] »

    Ces phrases sont tirées de la préface de Pour une éthique de la responsabilité de Hans Jonas, ouvrage publié en 1979 qui peut être considéré comme le premier à aborder la notion d’éthique écologiste. Plus de quarante ans après sa publication, les propos de Jonas sont d’une édifiante actualité. La glorification de la technologie et de la modernité a été remplacée par le règne de la peur : marées noires, déversements de produits dangereux dans les eaux, destruction massive des fonds marins par les filets de pêche industrielle, surexploitation de la pêche et déséquilibre de l’environnement due aux grands complexes industriels.

    Là où, il y a quelques années encore, ces propos catastrophistes pouvaient être balayés d’un revers de main au nom d’une indifférence envers la nature et d’un égoïsme assumé, les multiples études et rapports[11] ne permettent plus une telle attitude, car parmi les victimes, se trouve l’homme : maladies environnementales, appauvrissement des familles de pêcheurs, migration économique forcée, détérioration de la quantité et de la qualité des ressources marines.  Si l’homme est un être égoïste, son égoïsme devrait créer un réveil de la conscience afin qu’il se protège des dangers qu’il a lui-même orchestrés. L’argument de l’ignorance (on ne savait pas) ou celui du relativisme (libre à chacun d’agir comme bon lui semble) ne sont plus, devant l’urgence de la situation, recevables.  Devant un constat aussi désespérant, si rien n’est mis en œuvre, le risque est de sombrer vers une lente et réelle misanthropie, jusqu’à souhaiter la disparition de la nature humaine pour permettre une réappropriation de ses droits par la nature, réappropriation à laquelle l’homme ne pourrait assister, car son absence en serait justement la possibilité.

     

    Une éthique de la responsabilité

    Jonas analyse que, devant l’ampleur de la menace, une éthique traditionnelle serait inefficace, il faudrait penser une éthique qui ne repose pas uniquement sur l’intention, mais sur les actes. C’est ainsi que Jonas propose de fonder une éthique de la responsabilité qui reposerait sur le principe suivant :

    « Agis de façon que les effets de ton action soient compatibles avec la permanence d’une vie authentiquement humaine sur Terre.[12] »

    A la violence de l’agir humain est opposé la responsabilité de la conscience : il y a une obligation d’agir pour pérenniser la vie humaine sur terre. Un rapide survol des études sur le sujet indique que cette pérennisation ne présente aucune garantie : 90% des gros poissons ont disparu depuis la pratique de la pêche industrielle et d’ici 2050 les mers pourraient être intégralement vidées de poissons[13]. A la peur alimentaire, se rajoute l’incertitude devant un tel dérèglement initié par l’homme, dérèglement d’une ampleur sans précédent dans l’histoire humaine. La maxime proposée par Jonas doit être appliquée par tous sans exception, condition sine qua non pour qu’elle puisse permettre une certaine efficacité. Cependant, l’égoïsme naturel de l’homme, son ignorance, son penchant à une forme d’aveuglement volontaire sont autant de travers qui peuvent faire douter de la mise en pratique universelle et sans condition de cette maxime. Une éthique sans modalité d’application demeure une coquille théorique vide.

     

    De l’éthique au juridique

    C’est au domaine juridique d’incarner l’application pratique du principe éthique. Dès les années soixante, surgit l’idée d’accorder des droits à la nature. En 2007, la constitution équatorienne est la première en son genre à reconnaître les droits de la nature. Cependant, une telle démarche ne parvient à s’écarter d’une perspective anthropocentrée : ce sont en effet les hommes qui décident du type de droits à accorder aux éléments naturels et des modalités de la mise en place de ces droits. Pour le philosophe et juriste François Ost, la protection juridique de la nature doit être mise en œuvre par l’attribution de devoirs imposés aux hommes. : « Des devoirs asymétriques de responsabilité, justifiés à la fois par la vulnérabilité des bénéficiaires et par la nécessité de respecter les symbioses biologiques dans l’intérêt de l’humanité entière.[14] » L’asymétrie des devoirs décrite par Ost n’est en rien injustice : celui qui détient une conscience plus élaborée détient en même temps l’obligation de l’utiliser de façon morale face à ceux qui en sont dépourvus (le monde animal, la mer, la nature). En adoptant une telle visée, la conscience ne peut plus légitimiser la violence ; au contraire, elle oblige une responsabilité en acte.

    Cependant, tant qu’un droit écologique international ne sera pas pensé, l’application stricte d’une telle éthique de la responsabilité avec les devoirs juridiques qui en découlent peut sembler relever d’une utopie. Devant la complexité d’harmoniser les pratiques juridiques dans les domaines commerciaux ou familiaux par exemple, nous pourrions afficher un certain scepticisme quant à la possibilité de la mise en pratique d’un tel projet juridique. Si l’instauration d’une telle éthique de la responsabilité ne peut être réduite à un niveau national (comment penser dans le cadre de frontières ce qui n’a pas de frontières ?), son application à l’échelle planétaire semble un doux rêve. Une telle mise en œuvre serait d’abord de la responsabilité des pays de la mer : les îles et les pays avec un littoral. Si la problématique marine concerne tout le monde, la mise en application d’une éthique de la responsabilité devrait débuter par ceux qui ont la plus grande proximité géographique avec la mer. Cette mise en pratique pourrait prendre au moins deux formes. Premièrement, celle de l’exemplarité : dans les comportements, dans les habitudes, dans les principes pédagogiques transmis, dans les visions politiques adoptées. Si ceux qui voisinent l’élément marin ne manifestent pas un souci constant de protection, il sera difficile d’exiger une telle attitude de la part des pays sans littoral. En se posant, non avec prétention, mais avec un souci d’universalité et de pérennisation, en exemple à suivre, les pays de la mer dessineront, il faut en faire le pari, les contours d’une posture nouvelle à adopter. Deuxièmement, une constitution marine commune aux 150 pays de la mer devra être pensée. Le fondement d’un tel texte juridique ne serait pas économique ou géopolitique comme l’est la plupart des regroupements actuels de pays (G20, OTAN, MERCOSUR etc.), mais reposerait sur le respect et la permanence de la mer. Interdisciplinaire et transversale, cette constitution se nourrirait de savoirs philosophiques, juridiques, scientifiques, mais aussi de l’imaginaire des artistes et du vécu des hommes de la mer. Une telle constitution marine illustrerait ainsi l’esprit de la phrase du poète caribéen Edward Kamau Brathwaite : « The unity is sub-marine[15]. »

     

    Main Photo by Jeremy Wermeille on Unsplash

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    [1] Si L’Odyssée d’Homère fait partie des premiers écrits sur la mer, le mythe de l’Atlantide illustre peut-être le mieux cette force marine contre laquelle on ne peut rien : l’île d’Atlantide est engloutie par les eaux le jour où ses habitants devinrent corrompus : « En l’espace d’un seul jour et d’une nuit terrible, tout ce que vous aviez de combattants rassemblés fut englouti dans la terre, et l’île Atlantide de même fut engloutie dans la mer et disparut. » Platon, Timée, 25d, Editions Flammarion, 2017.

    [2] Il serait peut-être impossible d’effectuer une liste exhaustive des productions littéraires ayant pour thème la mer tellement elles sont nombreuses. Le Vieil homme et la mer d’Ernest Hemingway (1952) et le poème L’Homme et la mer de Charles Baudelaire (in Les Fleurs du mal, 1857) dont le premier vers, « Homme libre, toujours tu chériras la mer ! », est un hommage exalté, demeurent parmi les plus connus.

    [3] L’immense succès rencontré par le film Les Dents de la mer, réalisé par Steven Spielberg, à sa sortie en 1975 en fera par la suite un classique du cinéma.

    [4] Le documentaire à charge Seaspiracy réalisé en 2021 par Ali Tabizi dénonce les conséquences des actions humaines sur l’élément marin. Malgré certaines critiques concernant la validité de certains faits énoncés, le documentaire a rencontré un important succès.

    [5] Il s’agit de la théorie du « Cogito ergo sum » traduite par « je pense donc je suis », exposée dans le livre 1 des Méditations métaphysiques.

    [6] René Descartes, Discours de la méthode, tome I, sixième partie, Editions Flammarion, coll. GF philo, 2020.

    [7] Ibid.

    [8] Marie-Frédérique Pellegrin dans l’émission « Les Chemins de la philosophie » du 24 février 2021, sur France culture

    [9] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lettres philosophiques, « Lettre XL », in Œuvres complètes, tome 32, 1796

    [10] Hans Jonas, Le Principe de responsabilité, Editions du Cerf, 1979

    [11] Le dernier rapport du GIEC (Groupe d’Experts Intergouvernemental sur l’Evolution du Climat), publié le 9 août 2021, indique une diminution du pH moyen des océans en raison de la dissolution du C02 dans l’eau, la conséquence étant une acidification des océans qui menace de nombreuses espèces de plantons, base de la chaîne alimentaire océanique.

    [12] Ce principe prend modèle sur les impératifs catégoriques du philosophe Emmanuel Kant qui visent à penser une morale universelle et irréfutable.

    [13] “Rapid worldwide depletion of predatory fish communities”, par Ransom Myers et Boris Worm, revue Nature N°423

    [15] L’unité est sous-marine.

    How to ensure global debates about inequality are informed by views from developing countries

    By
    Charles Telfair Centre
    -
    0
    Portraying inequality

     

    Imraan Valodia, Dean of the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, and Head of the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

     

    In the last decade inequality has been placed at the centre of the agenda for global social and economic policy. This has been driven in large part by the pioneering work of the British economist Sir Tony Atkinson, French economist Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, and the work of sociologists like Goran Therborn.

    All of the key United Nations development targets such as the Sustainable Development Goals are informed by, and have as their key targets, the need to address growing levels of inequality across the globe.

    Global attention on inequality is also informed by a set of issues that have given rise to more virulent right-wing politics in the US, the UK and much of Europe. This is the outcome of growing levels of inequality and high levels of discontent among so-called “blue-collar” workers, and the consequent rise of identity politics.

    But, in our view, debates about inequality have not been sufficiently informed by perspectives from the global South.

    If we are to address inequality across the globe the issue of inequality between countries – and the historical and political factors giving rise to this – cannot be ignored.

    Given this reality, we have identified four main issues that we believe should drive the research agenda in the global South. Notwithstanding the focus across the globe on the issue of inequality, in reality, very little has been achieved to fix the problem. This is most starkly shown by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has exposed massive inequalities across the globe.

    Part of the reason for this is that the realities of inequality in the global South, and the forces driving these patterns, aren’t sufficiently understood. For example, according to the International Labour Organisation in Africa around 85.8% of employment is informal. These workers do not form part of how labour markets are traditionally understood.

    Another big difference is that in much of the global North, fiscal transfers are able to improve inequality outcomes. The global South has limited fiscal scope because it lacks the ability to raise large tax revenues.

    Focus areas

    Based on our insights from setting up the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, and our first four years of research, we have identified four areas that we believe should be at the forefront of the research agenda of academics in the global South.

    We set them out below.

    Technical solutions: These include fiscal transfers. While important, they are not by themselves sufficient to address inequality. What is needed is a fuller understanding of the political, social and economic factors driving the growth in inequality. This includes how these forces may be different in the global South. Inequality is a global problem, but this does not mean its causes are universal. Inequality is in essence an issue of power, which is socially constructed. For this reason, context matters. While inequality is a global problem, its growth is most pronounced and the political, social and economic challenges it poses are most complex and pronounced in the global South.

    Money-metric assessments: One example of these assessments is the Gini coefficient, which measures levels of inequality. These assessments have been useful for measuring inequality but don’t offer useful solutions. Inequality studies and policies need to move away from a preoccupation with these measures. This is important if we are to understand inequality as a violation of human dignity. Here, a multidisciplinary approach is called for if we are to solve the inequality challenge. History, sociology, gender studies, anthropology, philosophy, the natural sciences, and health sciences have as much to contribute as economics.

    It is for this reason for example that UNAIDS executive director Winnie Byanyima will present the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies’ annual Inequality Lecture. Ms Byanyima was previously Executive Director of Oxfam International and director of Gender and Development at the UNDP.

    Differences in capacity: It’s important to understand the differences in the fiscal capacities of countries in the global North and the global South to address inequality. High-income countries can ameliorate somewhat the high levels of inequality because they have high levels of taxation and significant state capacity. But this isn’t possible in much of the global South – at least not to the same extent. This generates complex social and economic challenges which require policy attention.

    Joined at the hip: This points to the need to understand that inequality within countries is inextricably linked with the forces shaping inequality between countries. The problem can’t be solved simply in one geography. Inequality between countries needs to be tackled simultaneously.

    What next

    The COVID-19 pandemic has brought into sharp relief how very differently countries are experiencing the burden of the pandemic.

    The heaviest tolls have been exacted on the most economically marginalised countries. In South Africa, for example, job and income losses have been most pronounced. Low-paid workers, the young and workers in the informal economy and in service sectors have borne a disproportionate burden of job and income losses. Women, who make up a substantial portion of workers in the services economy, have been the hardest hit.

    Countries in the global North have been able to protect their economies from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic through a stimulus package of unprecedented levels. The US stimulus package has been estimated at US$1.9 trillion. Developing and emerging economies, on the other hand, have been thrown into a deep-seated economic crisis due to the pandemic.

    The COVID-19 pandemic has also highlighted inequality between countries. This is most starkly evident in the way in which access to vaccines has been determined. This is undermining the recovery in both developing and developed countries and points to the need for inequality to be tackled as a global issue, between countries and within countries.

    For all of the excellent academic research on inequality, the COVID-19 pandemic shows us that very little has been achieved at the policy level to actually address the challenge and to move to a more equal world. If we are to do that, global policies have to address the realities of how unequal economic and social patterns are across the globe.

    Moreover, the realities of inequality from the perspective of the global South need to inform these policy changes. If we don’t pursue such an ambitious policy agenda, the COVID-19 pandemic will be yet another shock, like the 2008 global financial crisis, that exposes the fragility and inequalities in our economic and social systems, but that we quickly forget about – that is, until the next global shock.

     

    Main Photo by World Bank Photo Collection on Flickr

    Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).

    This article is part of a media partnership between the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies’s and The Conversation Africa for its 2021 annual Inequality Lecture, which was presented on Thursday, 30 September. You can watch the full lecture here.The Conversation

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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