Policy Brief by the Charles Telfair Centre
In October 2025, the Charles Telfair Centre convened 25 senior professionals and experts from the government, private sector, diplomatic corps and academia for a workshop on A Diplomacy Strategy for SIDS and Mauritius. The objective was to explore the next diplomatic steps for Small Island Developing States (SIDS), particularly Mauritius, as they navigate the current evolving global landscape. This document presents a formal analysis of their discussions and offers strategic recommendations for SIDS and Mauritian diplomacy.
The Current Context
Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
To set the context, Ambassador Wilson, Permanent Mission of Barbados to the UN, Geneva, shared an analysis of the current challenges and opportunities for Small Island Developing States’ (SIDS) in our new world order. For decades, Small Island Developing States’ (SIDS) diplomacy has been marked by a continuous effort to carve out space and voice in a global system not built to their scale. Historically defined as “policy takers rather than policy makers,” SIDS are the front-line victims of a climate crisis they did not create and remain inherently vulnerable as small economies constrained by size and geography and high reliance on external trade.
They have nonetheless refused to be passive. Through powerful collective advocacy, they have consistently punched above their weight, driving paradigm-shifting conversations through initiatives like the Barbadian-led Bridgetown Initiative, which calls for a fundamental rewrite of the global financial architecture.
Their leadership in climate negotiations and ocean governance has made it clear that their moral and diplomatic footprint is significant. As T. Long (2020) argues, small states can indeed develop outsized influence through coalition-building and norm entrepreneurship in the context of a rules and principles-based based multilateral system.
Whilst this strategy has been successfully used by SIDS in the past, this legacy of effective advocacy is now faced with “a brick wall” constituted of a fractured and increasingly hostile global order prone to great power competition and a resurgence of nationalism. This decline of multilateralism has tangible consequences: traditional development assistance, a critical enabler for island economies, is dwindling as donor countries redirect funds towards domestic priorities and defense. Global Supply chains have been challenged, and a new wave of protectionism and tariff escalations from major trading partners has created deep uncertainty, affecting the Micro, Small, and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSME) that are the engine of SIDS economies.
This erosion of the multilateral, rules-based order that has long provided small states with a platform for their collective voice creates a vacuum, leaving SIDS even more exposed at a time when worsening natural disasters (e.g. Hurricane Melissa in Jamaica) and other climate impacts are affecting tourism-dependent islands. Elusive financing, trade uncertainties, rising nationalism and the looming threat of a deepening digital divide in the age of AI are reshaping dynamics. The world has become, as one workshop participant described it, a pendulum swinging between conflict and cooperation, forcing SIDS to navigate a landscape of unprecedented complexity where traditional alliances are fraying and neutrality is no longer a simple proposition.
Mauritius
It is within this unstable context that Mauritius is re-affirming its role as a diplomatic heavyweight among its island peers. With a “long and storied history” of influence on multilateral trade issues, Mauritius has a deep well of experience to draw upon. Its post-independence diplomacy, marked by its skilful negotiations for access to European markets through the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, was foundational in securing its economic future. This history, as outlined by H. F. Srebrnik (2004), demonstrates a long-standing capacity for pragmatic and effective foreign policy. The recent intense engagement of Mauritius on the world stage has further raised its visibility and empowered its diplomatic conversations and orientations.
Participants highlighted that this renewed commitment of the current government is framed by a strategic shift from purely “economic diplomacy” to a more holistic “developmental diplomacy.” This approach integrates economic interests with broader national priorities, including sovereignty, maritime security, and sustainable development. The government’s recent high-level interaction with the Member States of the African Union, India, Japan, France, and the United States, the United Kingdom signals a clear intention to build a diverse network of partnerships and reclaim its leadership mantle.
The unprecedented diplomatic victory with respect to the sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago was the result of a successful campaign, waged over decades through international legal and diplomatic channels. This win has strengthened credibility and “clout” of Mauritius within the international community. As one participant highlighted, this success stands as a potent symbol of how a small island state, through persistence, strategic litigation, and moral persuasion, can skillfully use diplomatic instruments and institutions created by the international community to have its rights respected and obtain justice even when faced with powerful opponents.
Identity and agency
SIDS have long successfully used their collective moral authority to place unique challenges on the international agenda. However, in the face of waning multilateralism, a strategy based primarily on highlighting vulnerability may need some rethinking.
The term “SIDS” itself, while a useful political grouping at the UN, masks a deep heterogeneity. The well-coordinated blocs of the Caribbean and Pacific have institutional mechanisms for cooperation that the more disparate African Island states (AIS) group, to which Mauritius belongs, lacks. This fragmentation weakens their collective bargaining power.
This reality necessitates a strategic pivot towards reclaiming agency. For SIDS, exercising agency means transitioning from being passive “rule-takers” to becoming agile and proactive shapers of policy, as explored in literature on small state diplomacy (Cooper & Shaw, 2009). It involves leveraging their unique positions to become indispensable partners rather than mere recipients of aid and support. The key to this transformation lies in a deliberate shift in identity, powered by positive, asset-based language. The narrative of “smallness and vulnerability,” while factually grounded in frameworks like Briguglio’s (1995), has become a diplomatic trap, perpetually casting SIDS as aid receivers rather than as strategic actors with inherent value.
Participants highlighted how conceiving small island states as “Big Ocean States” could exemplify this new strategy. It reframes SIDS not by their limited landmass, but by the immense maritime jurisdictions, critical ecosystems and strategic waterways they steward. This is more than semantics; it is a fundamental reassertion of value that changes the diplomatic conversation from one of seeking assistance to one of offering partnerships in ocean governance, climate solutions, and regional security.
Climate Diplomacy
Climate and Environmental Action
For SIDS, the climate crisis is an escalating reality that underpins all diplomatic, economic, and security considerations. The global failure to meet the 1.5-degree target and the slow capitalisation of instruments like the Loss and Damage Fund have reinforced the idea that SIDS cannot stake their survival on the mitigation promises of others. This reality demands a diplomatic shift from primarily advocating for global emissions cuts to a dual strategy that pursues accessible finance for adaptation and resilience at home. As argued in numerous IPCC assessments on small islands (Klock, 2019), the focus must be on immediate, tangible action to protect coastlines, infrastructure, and populations.
This is where the strategic reframing from “Small Island” to “Big Ocean State” becomes a powerful diplomatic tool. This narrative pivots from a position of terrestrial vulnerability to one of oceanic stewardship and opportunity. By leveraging their vast Exclusive Economic Zones, SIDS can assert leadership in the burgeoning blue economy and blue finance international agenda. Diplomatic initiatives like the negotiation of a comprehensive Marine Protected Area (MPA) for the Chagos Archipelago between Mauritius and the UK, and early ratification of the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) treaty, are prime examples of this proactive, asset-based diplomacy. Participants highlighted the importance of ensuring that Blue dimensions are included across the sustainability ecosystem (e.g. Circular economy, Sustainable finance frameworks and taxonomy among others). These actions position SIDS as indispensable guardians of global marine biodiversity and crucial partners in ocean governance, a concept explored by scholars like Chan (2018). However, this potential can only be realised if backed by credible, evidence-based domestic policy, avoiding a repeat of missed opportunities where, for instance, Mauritius did not join key climate coalitions despite its high stakes.
Financial Instruments and Access to Finance
The success of any climate or development strategy hinges on finance, and for SIDS, the current financial architecture is broken. They face a dual crisis: the steady decline of traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the failure of the climate finance system to deliver on its promises. Participants highlighted that a country like Mauritius has received as little as 5% of pledged climate funds suggests the current global mechanisms are not working. Even accessible funds, such as the Green Climate Fund facility accredited to the Indian Ocean Commission, remain untapped due to a lack of capacity to develop bankable projects.
SIDS could become pioneers of financial innovation. The Bridgetown Initiative is the most prominent articulation of this new diplomatic agenda, calling for a fundamental redesign of the global financial system, but progress is slow. On the ground, this translates into a determined push for instruments that are fit-for-purpose: debt-for-climate swaps to address debt burdens while funding conservation (Steele & Patel, 2020), the development of blue and green bonds, and new de-risking instruments to attract private capital. Yet, even here, significant barriers remain. As the private sector experience from the workshop highlighted, international financial rules and taxonomies are designed for large, developed economies and are often wholly unsuited to the scale and context of SIDS, creating prohibitive barriers to market entry. The long-term diplomatic challenge, therefore, is not just to secure funds, but to reform the very rules of finance and build the regional capital markets capable of funding a resilient and sustainable future.
Mauritius is taking nascent steps to lead in this area. Current initiatives, such as the Mauritius Bankers Association’s work on de-risking instruments and the Ministry of Finance’s development of a national sustainable finance taxonomy, demonstrate a clear intent to build this capacity. This creates a critical opportunity for Mauritius to lead SIDS in operationalizing new financial models.
However, the private sector experience from the workshop highlights the barriers that remain. They noted that energy bonds alone must quadruple in the next decade, yet data and structures for vital areas like social bonds and blue economy bonds are almost non-existent. The fact that the first sustainable-linked bond by a private conglomerate in Africa was only achieved in 2025, a decade after such frameworks became common, is a marker of the region’s capital market challenges.
This directly points to the underdeveloped state of local and regional capital markets, which are currently not fit for purpose. SIDS lack the essential infrastructure and resources for financial roadshows, investor negotiations, and offtake agreements that are needed to attract large-scale private investment.
The long-term diplomatic challenge, therefore, is not just to secure funds, but to reform the very rules of finance and build the regional capital markets capable of funding a resilient and sustainable future.
Economic diplomacy
Economic and trade diplomacy remains the central arena where SIDS must translate their strategic goals into tangible outcomes. For nations like Mauritius, whose prosperity is inextricably linked to global markets, leveraging the opportunities brought about by international trade is a core foreign policy objective. However, this navigation is increasingly difficult in a world where the established rules and systems are under strain, exposing SIDS to both external shocks and internal implementation failures.
Trade Diplomacy Challenges
The primary challenge stems from the fracturing of the global trading system. The decline of a predictable, rules-based order, historically championed by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), has given way to a landscape dominated by geopolitical interests, unilateral tariff escalations, and unpredictable policies from major trading partners. This creates uncertainty for SIDS’ economies, particularly for their Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) which lack the capacity to absorb shocks from disrupted supply chains and volatile market access.
Compounding this is a structural issue within the multilateral system itself: SIDS, despite their shared vulnerabilities, do not constitute a formally recognised category at the WTO. This has historically prevented them from securing a tailored “toolbox” of policies and flexibilities, such as Special and Differential Treatment (SDT), that acknowledges their unique circumstances, a point discussed in them literature on the trade challenges of small, remote economies (Winters & Martins, 2004). While the ongoing restructuring of global value chains towards “near-shoring” and “regional-shoring” presents a potential opportunity, SIDS first need the policy space and support to build the capacity to participate effectively in these new, closer-to-home supply networks.
Trade Agreements and the Implementation Gap
Mauritius has a sophisticated network of bilateral and multilateral trade pacts, from Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU to agreements with India and China. While the market access components for goods are often utilised, the deeper, more transformative chapters, covering investment, services, innovation, and technology transfer tend to lie dormant.
Perhaps the most difficult challenge is the “implementation gap.” The workshop revealed a pattern of diplomatic success giving way to difficulties to fully leverage and implement the benefits at home. A 500-page Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU sits largely un-operationalised; a Green Climate Fund accreditation for the Indian Ocean Commission remains untapped for years; and numerous international conference outcomes, like the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS (ABAS), do not always lead to a clear implementation plan. The workshop highlighted the lack of coordination and ownership across stakeholders. The responsibility for executing these complex agreements is often fragmented across multiple ministries and agencies, leading to a situation where, as one participant noted, “no one is in charge.” This points to a systemic need for an institutional overhaul, moving towards multidisciplinary diplomatic teams and establishing clear, empowered bodies to drive the implementation of all facets of trade agreements, ensuring they become catalysts for transitioning to a knowledge-based economy rather than remaining as documents on a shelf.
Regional cooperation and Africa policy
In an era of global withdrawal from traditional partnerships, an effective pivot towards Africa should be a key strategic focus for AIS like Mauritius. The African Hub policy, actively pursued by the Mauritian government and its private sector, represents an interesting calibration of its economic diplomacy. With the erosion of preferences in European markets and the uncertainties surrounding frameworks like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), such a policy has the potential to complement our already-existing trade space by shifting the focus from distant, uncertain markets to the dynamism of its own continent.
The cornerstone of this strategy could be the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The AfCFTA is envisioned as far more than a simple trade pact; it is the continent’s most ambitious attempt to create the integrated production networks, an “Africa Factory”, that have powered economic transformation in regions like Asia. The challenges in the implementation of AfCFTA are significant, but for island nations, it offers a pathway to overcome the limitations of their small domestic markets by embedding themselves into larger, continental value chains. However, as noted in analyses by Songwe et al. (2021), the promise of the AfCFTA is tempered by significant practicalities requiring proactive diplomacy to dismantle non-tariff barriers and harmonise regulations.
This is where the concept of “Made in Moris, Africa” becomes a potent diplomatic tool. It reflects a tangible reality where Mauritius’s most significant companies are already leading the charge, investing increasingly across the continent in countries like Kenya, Rwanda, and Madagascar. This is not merely about exporting finished goods; it is about building genuine regional supply chains, a crucial step towards the kind of resource-based industrialisation explored by Fessehaie & Rustomjee (2018). This private-sector-led integration provides a powerful narrative for Mauritian diplomacy: the country is not just seeking access to African markets, but is an active partner in building them.
The diplomatic task is therefore to create the enabling conditions for this integration to flourish. This involves using its influence within regional economic communities like Southern African Development Commnunity (SADC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) to champion trade facilitation, and ensuring that its international agreements, including the EPA with Europe, are negotiated in ways that support and complement its African strategy. By positioning itself as a key hub for finance, logistics, and innovation for the wider region, Mauritius can leverage regional integration to build a more diversified and sustainable economic future.
Science, Technology, and Innovation Diplomacy
A central pillar of Mauritius’s transition from a reliance on trade preferences to a resilient, high-income economy is its pivot to a knowledge-based service model. In this new paradigm, research and innovation (R&I) are not just economic sectors; they are central to national development and, by extension, must become a core component of its foreign policy. This requires the integration of Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) Diplomacy as a key diplomatic function, a concept explored by scholars like Flink & Schreiterer (2010) on national approaches to science diplomacy.
The strategic importance of STI diplomacy is multifaceted. It is the primary tool for attracting the technology transfer, research partnerships, and skilled talent necessary to build a competitive innovation ecosystem. Diplomatically, it offers a new, high-value basis for collaboration, moving beyond traditional aid or trade relationships. By forging partnerships with STI leaders like Singapore and Finland, Mauritius can benchmark its progress and accelerate its own development.
Furthermore, this presents a clear leadership opportunity. By pioneering a coherent STI agenda, Mauritius can position itself as the SIDS leader in this critical space, moving beyond a passive role to actively shaping its economic future. This strategic importance is being recognised institutionally, with the Ministry of Tertiary Education reportedly developing a foundational document on research and scientific diplomacy. However, to be effective, this vision will require what has been lacking in other areas : clear, unambiguous institutional ownership and robust coordination across government, academia, and the private sector to ensure that STI diplomacy is not just a concept, but an operational reality.
Key Policy Recommendations
To navigate this complex landscape and translate diplomatic strategy into tangible success, the following interconnected recommendations are proposed:
For Multilateral Engagement
Consolidate and Lead the African Island States SIDS Bloc: Mauritius could leverage its diplomatic “clout” to provide formal leadership for the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea (AIS) group. This includes building on the May 2025 Cabo Verde meeting, potentially designating the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) as a coordinating secretariat, and establishing regular ministerial and technical working groups to develop common positions. Mauritius could position itself as the convenor for this bloc, offering to host future forums and developing niche expertise on behalf of the group in areas like finance and ocean governance.
Pursue a Small and Vulnerable Economies hook/case at the WTO: Launch a coordinated diplomatic campaign ahead of the 2026 WTO Ministerial in Cameroon. This could involve convening a working group of SIDS diplomats and trade experts to develop priority proposals on (a) an informal recognition of Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) in the WTO architecture, (b) a corresponding expansion of the Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) toolbox, and (c) linking trade rules to climate financing and debt-swap instruments. This campaign must unify the Caribbean, Pacific, and AIS blocs and engage sympathetic partners early.
- Implement the ABAS Agenda: Move from advocacy to action on the Antigua and Barbuda Agenda for SIDS (ABAS). This requires establishing a dedicated national task force to review all ABAS commitments, create a clear implementation roadmap, assign specific ministerial responsibilities, and set measurable targets to ensure the agenda does not remain a document but becomes a national strategy.
For Economic and Financial Diplomacy
Consolidate the “Look Africa” Regional Integration Strategy: Concretise the “Made in Moris, Africa” initiative. This strategy must be diplomatically supported by (a) deepening AfCFTA engagement to tackle non-tariff barriers, (b) mapping existing private sector investments to identify and support high-potential regional value chains, and (c) integrating energy resilience as a key pillar of regional economic security.
Develop a SIDS-Adapted Sustainable Finance Hub: Given Mauritius’ strong financial section it could position itself as the operational hub for SIDS-centric finance. This requires a multi-pronged approach:
- Domestic Foundation: Complete the Mauritius Bankers Association’s work on de-risking instruments and the Ministry of Finance’s sustainable finance taxonomy.
- Instrument Innovation: Pilot 2-3 innovative instruments like blue bonds, debt-for-climate swaps, and insurance-backed resilience funds.
- Market Reform: Develop regulatory frameworks and certification processes for SIDS-specific instruments, and partner with DFIs to build a regional capital market.
- Accessing Funds: Create a dedicated pipeline for bankable projects to utilise existing accreditations, such as the Indian Ocean Commission’s at the Green Climate Fund.
Financial Sovereignty: Expand de-dollarization strategies, such as Vostro accounts and rupee-based trading, to reduce currency vulnerability.
- Integrate Science, Technology and Innovation into all Economic Diplomacy: Mandate that all future and reviewed trade agreements include binding chapters on Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI). This policy would need to be supported by (a) completing the Ministry of Tertiary Education’s policy on scientific diplomacy, (b) establishing a formal STI Diplomacy Unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and (c) actively pursuing partnerships with innovation leaders like Singapore to accelerate the transition to a knowledge economy.
For National Governance and Strategy
7. The Government could address the critical “implementation gap” by creating a high-level, multi-sectoral coordinating body (e.g., an Economic Diplomacy Coordinating Committee or revamp the EDB). This unit, with clear authority, would be responsible for (a) commissioning a comprehensive assessment of all existing trade agreements, (b) overseeing the implementation of all major international pacts (trade, climate, STI), and (c) creating multidisciplinary teams and performance metrics for key embassies.
8. As also highlighted during les Assises de L’Ocean organised by the Ministry of Blue Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping, SIS like Mauritius could reinforce “Big Ocean State” as an Official Diplomatic Identity. This could be done by launching a communications strategy around the “Big Ocean State” identity to shift the international narrative from vulnerability to agency. This identity must be backed by substantive action, including (a) leveraging the early ratification of the BBNJ treaty and campaigning to host its COP1, (b) completing the UK-Mauritius Marine Protected Area negotiations, and (c) positioning Mauritius as a responsible steward of the Indian Ocean, using its the legal and political acknowledgement of its sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago as a foundation for enhanced maritime governance.
9. Develop an Evidence-Based Diplomatic Policy Framework: Move from assertion-based to evidence-based diplomacy. This involves establishing a SIDS comparative data platform (potentially with a university partner) to conduct annual benchmarking against peer nations. The resulting “Mauritius SIDS Dashboard” would provide credible, data-driven evidence to support all international advocacy, from WTO negotiations to climate finance proposals.
References:
Briguglio, L. (1995). Small island developing states and their economic vulnerabilities. World development, 23(9), 1615-1632.
Chan, N. (2018). “Large ocean states”: sovereignty, small islands, and marine protected areas in global oceans governance. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 24(4), 537-555.
Cooper, A. F., & Shaw, T. M. (2009). The diplomacies of small states at the start of the twenty-first century: how vulnerable? How resilient?. In The diplomacies of small states: between vulnerability and resilience (pp. 1-18). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Flink, T & Ulrich Schreiterer, Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs: toward a typology of national approaches, Science and Public Policy, Volume 37, Issue 9, November 2010, Pages 665–677, https://doi.org/10.3152/030234210X12778118264530
Klöck, C., & Nunn, P. D. (2019). Adaptation to Climate Change in Small Island Developing States: A Systematic Literature Review of Academic Research. The Journal of Environment & Development, 28(2), 196–218. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26978780
Long, T. (2020). A Small State’s Guide to Influence in World Politics. Oxford University Press.
Srebrnik, H. F. (2004). ‘Small island states and the international system: The case of the Republic of Mauritius’. The Round Table, 93(376), 511-525.
Songwe, Vera & Jamie Alexander Macleod & Stephen Karingi, 2021. “The African Continental Free Trade Area: A Historical Moment for Development in Africa,” Journal of African Trade, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 12-23, December.
Steele, P. and Patel, S. (2020). Tackling the triple crisis. Using debt swaps to address debt, climate and nature loss post-COVID-19. IIED, London.
Winters A L, Martins Pmg. When comparative advantage is not enough: business costs in small remote economies. World Trade Review. 2004;3(3):347-383. doi:10.1017/S1474745604001922
Note on Methodology and AI Assistance
The development of this policy brief incorporated the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. The specific applications included:
• Transcription: AI-powered services provided a complete text record of the workshop discussions.
• Thematic Analysis: The transcript was processed by an AI model to perform an initial analysis, helping to identify and categorize the primary themes and arguments that emerged.
• Language Refinement: The final draft was reviewed with AI-driven tools to enhance grammar, style, and overall readability.
Main photo from Flickr PMO Barbados, Flickr
Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s) and participants.
