Original article by:
Pooja Jhinni Awotar, Program Assistant Port Security and Safety of Navigation, Indian Ocean Commission
Introduction
From 10-12 April 2026, the Republic of Mauritius will host the 9th Indian Ocean Conference under the theme, “Collective Stewardship for Indian Ocean Governance.” This Conference is co-organised with the India Foundation, and the Ministry of External Affairs of the Republic of India.
Stakeholders in the Indian Ocean maritime domain may ask themselves – a) how is this conference different from the previous Conferences organised by the Government of Mauritius in collaboration with the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the European Union (EU) since 2018 and[MB1] [PA2] what does it bring to the evolving maritime security architecture of Mauritius and the broader region? b) what is the significance of India co-organising a high-level conference on Indian Ocean governance alongside Mauritius at this juncture? The article evaluates whether the conference represents a step toward deeper multilateral maritime governance or an exercise in diplomatic optics.
Over the years, Mauritius has evolved as a champion of maritime security and provided a platform to discuss maritime security at high level. From 2018-2024, the government hosted four Ministerial Conferences on maritime security and related issues (2018, 2019, 2023 and 2024) in collaboration with the EU and the IOC - an institutionalised multilateral and regional organisation based in Mauritius.
Mauritius is also a signatory country of the IOC’s led Regional Maritime Security Architecture (RMSA), established in collaboration with six other regional states of the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) namely Comoros, Djibouti, France/Reunion, Kenya, Madagascar and Seychelles to address maritime security and non-traditional through the enhancement of maritime domain awareness and undertaking regional operations at sea. If the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) stretches from Africa’s eastern coast to Australia’s western coast,[i] the WIO as defined by the Nairobi Convention spans from the Somalia region, northern Indian Ocean and South Africa. Evidently, the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) includes countries of the WIO and is therefore more productive to discuss both inclusive of the Indian Ocean instead of creating an artificial demarcation. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the WIO region is vulnerable to maritime security threats despite the decline in piracy attacks with an estimated economic loss of USD 1.14 billion annually.
The 9th Indian Ocean Conference arrives at a moment when the WIO's maritime governance architecture is institutionally mature but chronically under-implemented. India's growing regional ambitions, expressed through SAGAR and now MAHASAGAR, offer both an opportunity and a test: can India translate diplomatic rhetoric into concrete, multilateral governance support rather than bilateral influence?
Maritime Governance - A case of Mauritius?
In the last 20 years, no significant maritime security incidents were recorded in Mauritius apart from the 2020 MV Wakashio Oil Spill, which is known to be the “worst ecological disaster” that the country had ever witnessed. The major maritime security concerns of the country remain trafficking of arms, drugs and other illegal goods, IUU fishing and oil spills according to various government officials. Despite having developed a robust national maritime governance framework, the Wakashio incident revealed inconsistencies and the limits that small islands like Mauritius can face in light of limited monitoring demands that national capacity alone can meet.
Mauritius’s maritime governance is centred around the development of national structures, law enforcement and high-level committees which is Chaired at the level of the Prime Minister’s Office, including a National Maritime and Harbour Security Committee (NMHSC) which oversees the (a) Maritime Security Steering Committee, (b) Port Security Committee and (c) Maritime Search and Rescue Standing Committee (MSRSC).
National structures such as the National Maritime Security Strategy, National Maritime Security Risk Register and the National Maritime Information Sharing Centre (NMISC) are usually viewed in conjunction to each other and prone for a whole of government approach to maritime security. Through its newly established NMISC, Mauritius aims to collect, analyse and merge maritime data from external and internal sources including human, web and satellite sources to constitute a picture of maritime situation in the region in view of supporting decision-making processes, operational management processes and exchange of information between stakeholders.
As for law enforcement, the National Coast Guard (NCG) established in 1987, is equipped with surface and air assets such as maritime patrol aircraft, offshore patrol vessels, Coastal Surveillance Radar System (CSRS), and functional tools as well as trained personnel to operate at sea, on land, and in the air. While it remains under the Command of the Commissioner of Police, the NCG is supported by a Commandant from India. The post for deputy commandant was recently introduced in 2025 to empower and entrust a Mauritian national in undertaking the role.
While these structures serve to enhance Mauritius’s maritime governance, there are ample opportunities to be tapped to address maritime security comprehensively and develop ambitious blue economic activities as highlighted in the National Blue Economy Strategy and in line with the Government programme 2025-2029. The programme aims at enhancing the fisheries sector, research capabilities, and foster an inclusive, sustainable ocean economy.
Greater Regional Engagement on Maritime Security
As it was known, maritime security has in the past not featured on the policy agenda of the African Union and Regional Economic Communities although it plays a bigger role in sustainable development in Africa (Assis, 2016; Demessie, 2014; Engel, 2014; Bueger, 2013). However, with the establishment of the RMSA, countries in the WIO have increasingly prioritised their national maritime security responsibilities to better address emerging security challenges.
The RMSA is designed as a unique mechanism “for the region, by the region” to address sea-blindness and ensure a presence of its signatories at sea as and when needed. Over the years, the RMSA has developed into a well-oiled system through its two operational arms namely the Regional Maritime Fusion Information Centre (RMIFC) based in Madagascar and the Regional Coordination of Operations Centre (RCOC) in Seychelles with the IOC as governance body and the EU financially supporting it.
The RMIFC is capable of collecting and disseminating critical maritime information on a daily basis. From 2017-2024, the RMIFC has recorded a total of 7,787 of maritime security events in its area of interest. As per the RMIFC’s Annual report, in 2024, a total of 1145 events were recorded in different categories ranging from maritime incidents to IUU fishing to smuggling and contrabands.
As for the RCOC, about 30 operations were completed between 2019-2025 through the aerial and surface assets of the signatory countries and that of partners. The RCOC has also conducted/ participated in regional and international exercises in collaboration with key partners such as US Naval Forces Africa Command (CUTLASS EXPRESS), EU Naval Forces, INTERPOL amongst others. Article 7 (Para 2) of the Regional Agreement on the Coordination of Operations at Sea states that an operation at sea shall be of regional interest leading to legal action and legal finish. Accordingly, coordinated regional maritime security operations by the RCOC are law enforcement actions undertaken by navies and coastguards of the MASE signatory countries to address sea-based illegal activities through inspections and forced boarding of vessels at sea, also known as visit, board, search and seizure (VBBS).
Gaps with Past Recommendations
The recommendations made at the 3rd Ministerial Conference on Maritime Security and Safety in the WIO, provided overall direction and guidelines for countries to enhance maritime governance. However, despite the efforts in promoting dialogue and formulating these recommendations based on the needs of the countries; implementation of same remain low or non-existent leading to a veneer of agreement in addressing maritime security challenges collectively and accentuating poor maritime governance. The challenges to implementing these recommendations remain structural, institutional, and capacity-related challenges, including inadequate funding, limited technical expertise, weak enforcement mechanisms, and lack of inter-agency coordination.
While the appetite for better maritime governance is present, governments and policy makers must push for the implementation of these recommendations instead of only prescribing to a ‘wish list.’ To ensure a responsive approach to maritime security, strong political will is foundational.
India's Role
India as a resident country of the Indian Ocean, shares flourishing bilateral relations with small islands like Mauritius and is also an observer to the IOC. Ever since India acceded the IOC as observer in 2020 with the agreement of the 34th IOC’s Council of Ministers held in Seychelles, there has been meaningful engagement with the RMIFC and RCOC to address maritime security issues. It should be noted that, observer status allows countries and entities to follow discussions therein on matters of direct interest to them albeit without a right to vote or interventions. Countries and organisations currently holding observer status at the IOC include China, the EU, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, the Sovereign Order of Malta, India, Japan and the United Nations.
The 2 official visits of India’s Prime Minister Modi to Mauritius in 2015 and 2025 are testament to the strong and unwavering relations between the two countries. During both visits, Modi unveiled India’s grand policy for the Indian Ocean; in 2015 – SAGAR and in 2025 – an upgrade to India’s new maritime vision called MAHASAGAR [A1] (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security). This vision builds on the legacy of SAGAR to emphasize on greater cooperation through technology sharing, concessional loan and grants[i] which could prove to be crucial for small islands given their reliance for high-level technological development and investments.
Building on the objective of MAHASAGAR, an inaugural naval exercise called Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME) was held in April 2025 in Tanzania and included the participation of other Indian Ocean littoral countries namely Mozambique, Kenya, South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, Madagascar, Djibouti and Eritrea.[ii] Key analysts note that the AIKEYME puts forth India’s security partnership with African countries which should be continued for greater maritime cooperation.[iii]
As an Indian initiative, the possibility to conduct an annual AIKEYME under the coordination of the IOC and within the RMSA could consolidate a security partnership with African countries and in particular WIO countries that is driven by mutual interests and priorities. It should be noted that the RCOC plays an important role hosting the Maritime Operations Center of the annual US led maritime exercise, Cutlass Express. The maritime legal trainings during Cutlass Express are also held at the RCOC.[iv]
A joint Indian led maritime security initiative within the ambit of India’s observership at the IOC should include a Track 1.5 or Track 2 dialogue to enhance common understanding between partners and chart out engagement on non -traditional issues and their recommendations. Such an initiative will amplify India’s ambition of being a reliable maritime security partner in the Indian Ocean as well as its role of observer to the IOC and the RMSA.
What to Expect from the Conference?
The aim of the 9th Indian Ocean Conference is to bring leaders, policymakers and experts from across the IOR to deliberate on shared responsibilities, cooperative frameworks, and the future of regional governance therefore representing the need for collective security order.
Conferences can indeed play a crucial role in fostering regional and international cooperation for sharing intelligence, coordinating responses to diverse threats and serving recommendations on best practices as highlighted in the previous conferences hosted by Mauritius and the IOC/EU.
The need of the hour is to address the lack of action planning which limits the impact of enhanced maritime security. The extent to which governments and stakeholders can be held accountable for the commitments that they make at conferences varies.
The region needs to start reflecting whether it requires Maritime Security Sector Governance (MSSG) and Maritime Security Sector Reform (MSSR) to govern the maritime domain in line with principles such as efficiency, effectiveness and accountability. Together, MSSG/R addresses governance principles and organisational reforms that are needed to address the complexities involved. At the core of MSSG, multilateral efforts remain an enabler, for dialogue and cooperation between countries are usually based on commonly accepted standards and norms.[v]
This 9th Indian Ocean Conference could potentially assess the readiness of the region in taking greater accountability and engagement to address maritime security holistically by addressing state, economic, environmental and human security.
References:
i. Darshana M. Baruah, Nitya Labh, Jessica Greely, “ Mapping the Indian Ocean Region,” 15 June 2023, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/06/mapping-the-indian-ocean-region
ii. Press Statement by Prime Minister during the India - Mauritius Joint Press Statement (March 12, 2025), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/39157/English_translation_of_Press_Statement_by_Prime_Minister_during_the_India__Mauritius_Joint_Press_Statement_March_12_2025
iii. Ruchita Berri, “AIKEYME: India – Africa Maritime Engagement gets a Boost,” 22 April 2025, Vivekanand International Foundation, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2025/aprul/22/AIKEYME-India-Africa-Maritime-Engagement-Gets-a-Boost
iv. Ibid
v. US Embassy Seychelles, “U.S. Embassy Concludes Exercise Cutlass Express 2025 in Seychelles,” 11 February 2026, https://sc.usembassy.gov/u-s-embassy-concludes-exercise-cutlass-express-2025-in-seychelles/
vii. Kevin Socquet-Clerc, Samantha Khoo Su-Yen, Scott Edwards, Gilang Kembara, Asyura Salleh, and Jay Tristan Tarriela. Maritime Security Sector Governance and Reform in Southeast Asia. Thematic SSG Brief. Geneva: DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2023. https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/MaritimeSSGR_SoutheastAsia_EN.pdf
Charles Telfair Centre is an independent nonpartisan not for profit organisation and does not take specific positions. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in our publications are solely those of the author(s).
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