Dr Aurélie Mendoza Spinola, Senior Lecturer in Law, Middlesex University, Mauritius
Abstract
In March 2026, China unified its environmental laws into a comprehensive Environmental Code. While primarily domestic, the Code acts as a tool of global statecraft, reshaping regulations far beyond China's borders; particularly in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO). Instead of exporting law directly, China projects influence indirectly through corporate ESG standards, finance, and development partnerships.
In the WIO, this creates a dual dynamic: it can raise environmental standards in infrastructure and marine sectors, but it also risks worsening governance gaps where local institutions are weak. For vulnerable Small Island Developing States like Mauritius and Seychelles, the stakes are incredibly high. Ultimately, China's Code is a strategic signal, and its true impact will depend on how host states adapt or contest these emerging norms to protect their own sustainable development.
Keywords: China Environmental Code; Environmental governance Western Indian Ocean; Legalised environmental statecraft; China overseas investment environmental standards; Blue economy regulation SIDS
In March 2026, China adopted its long-anticipated Ecological and Environmental Code, a landmark piece of legislation that consolidates decades of environmental regulation into a single, unified legal framework(1). While this reform is primarily domestic in scope, its implications extend significantly beyond China’s borders. For regions such as the Western Indian Ocean (WIO), where Chinese investments, infrastructure, and scientific partnerships are increasingly visible (2), the Code represents more than just a legal milestone; it is a strategic signal. This article argues that China’s Environmental Code functions as a tool of legalised environmental statecraft, whose impact in the Western Indian Ocean will depend less on its formal provisions than on how its standards are translated, adapted, and contested in regional contexts.
Background
China’s Environmental Code is only the country’s second formal statutory code, following the Civil Code of 2020. Comprising over 1,200 articles, it unifies more than 30 existing laws and numerous administrative regulations into a coherent system (3). This extensive codification directly reflects China’s long-standing policy vision of “Ecological Civilisation,” now translated into binding legal form.
At its core, the Code aims to improve coherence, strengthen enforcement, and deeply embed environmental protection into economic governance. It introduces structured provisions on pollution control, ecological conservation, and, notably, green and low-carbon development. The formalisation of dual-carbon objectives with peaking emissions before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 provides a degree of legal predictability that strengthens China’s global environmental credibility (4). This aligns with a broader global trend towards more robust international environmental governance frameworks. The significance of the Code, therefore, lies not only in its content but also in its strategic positioning, reinforcing China’s transition from a cautious participant to a more assertive norm-shaper in international environmental affairs.
The Domestic–International Nexus
At a deeper level, the Environmental Code illustrates an evolving fusion between China’s domestic legal reforms and its international behaviour. By codifying environmental objectives into binding law, China enhances the credibility and predictability of its global environmental commitments. At the same time, it creates new instruments through which domestic standards can shape external practices.
This dual approach reflects a broader strategy of projecting influence through internal strength. Rather than imposing rules on other nations, China embeds these standards into its domestic law, allowing them to diffuse globally through international trade, institutional ties, and scientific cooperation. For Western Indian Ocean states, this shift is particularly relevant, as China’s domestic legal consolidation increasingly shapes the standards underpinning its external investments and partnerships. This may lead to gradual alignment with Chinese standards in areas such as carbon management, environmental monitoring, and sustainable infrastructure. However, this process remains contingent and negotiated. Its outcomes will depend on the capacity of regional states to engage critically with these emerging norms, adapt them to local contexts, and maintain regulatory autonomy.
From Domestic Codification to External Environmental Behaviour: How the Code Travels
A central question for the Western Indian Ocean is whether China’s strengthened domestic legal framework will effectively translate into improved environmental practices abroad. The answer is neither straightforward nor uniform and depends largely on the mechanisms through which the Environmental Code extends its influence beyond China’s borders.
Rather than operating as a traditional legal export, the Code travels through a constellation of regulatory, financial, and institutional practices that collectively shape environmental governance in partner regions. At the core of this process is the behaviour of Chinese firms, particularly state-owned enterprises, which are increasingly expected to comply with domestic environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards, green supply chain requirements, and carbon accounting rules. These obligations can generate a “standard export effect,” whereby environmental expectations accompany Chinese capital in overseas infrastructure, energy, and maritime projects.
This dynamic is reinforced by emerging forms of extraterritorial regulation, as well as by financial instruments (5). Provisions allowing Chinese authorities to hold companies accountable for certain overseas environmental harms introduce an additional layer of oversight, while Chinese public banks and green finance frameworks are progressively integrating environmental risk assessments and low-carbon criteria, subtly conditioning access to funding.
Beyond these formal levers, the Code also operates through softer but influential channels, including standard-setting, scientific cooperation, and technical assistance. Initiatives in marine science, blue economy governance, and environmental monitoring contribute to shaping how environmental challenges are defined, measured, and managed, often embedding Chinese methodologies and data systems into local practices.
However, the translation of legal ambition into practice remains uneven. Empirical evidence shows that Chinese firms frequently adapt their practices to host-country regulatory environments, and where environmental governance is weak, compliance often remains limited to minimum legal requirements (6). As a result, a persistent gap emerges between domestic legal ambition and operational outcomes on the ground. The Code’s international influence is therefore contingent on domestic implementation, the regulatory capacity of partner states, and the broader political economy of development cooperation.
Therefore, these mechanisms do not automatically result in upward convergence of environmental standards; rather, they create a layered governance landscape in which competing regulatory logics (Chinese, domestic, and international) interact, and sometimes conflict, raising the technical issue of multijurisdictional governance.
Implications for the Western Indian Ocean
For Western Indian Ocean countries, this underscores a key strategic reality: the Environmental Code is less a fixed legal framework to be adopted than a dynamic set of pressures and opportunities that can either strengthen or dilute environmental governance depending on how they are engaged.
The region combines high ecological vulnerability (coral reefs, mangroves, fisheries) with growing exposure to large-scale infrastructure, maritime investments, and resource-based activities. The protection of marine ecosystems and the establishment of binding legal obligations for environmental protection are core issues in global and regional ocean governance (7).
In this context, the Environmental Code may influence regional environmental governance in two contrasting ways. On one hand, it could contribute to raising environmental standards, particularly if Chinese enterprises are required to comply with stricter domestic regulations when operating abroad. This could significantly improve environmental impact assessments, pollution control, and biodiversity protection in sectors such as ports, energy, and coastal infrastructure.
On the other hand, the Code may also reinforce existing governance asymmetries. Where host-country institutions are weak or fragmented, environmental standards may be diluted in practice, despite stronger commitments at the policy level.
For Small Island Developing States (SIDS) such as Mauritius and Seychelles, the implications are particularly significant. These countries face acute environmental vulnerabilities while simultaneously engaging in ambitious blue economy strategies. China’s growing involvement in marine science, ocean governance, and climate-related cooperation offers opportunities for capacity-building, technological transfer, and financial support. Yet, it also introduces new dependencies and normative influences that may shape long-term governance trajectories. The evolving policy context for the ocean economy emphasises the need for adaptive governance systems to manage these complex interactions effectively (8).
Opportunities, Risks, and Strategic Considerations
For policymakers in the Western Indian Ocean, China’s Environmental Code presents a mixed landscape of opportunities and risks that require careful navigation.
On the opportunity side, the Code provides a potential leverage point. Its formalisation of environmental standards allows WIO states to anchor negotiations with Chinese partners in clearer expectations, particularly in infrastructure and investment agreements. The alignment of China’s legal framework with low-carbon development also opens avenues for cooperation on climate adaptation, renewable energy, and sustainable marine resource management.
At the same time, several risks must be acknowledged. The most immediate is the implementation gap: without consistent enforcement, the Code’s influence may remain largely symbolic in overseas contexts. The emergence of overlapping regulatory frameworks, driven by extraterritorial provisions, may also complicate domestic legal systems and create uncertainty for local actors. More broadly, asymmetries of power between China and smaller WIO states may limit the latter’s ability to shape the terms of engagement or ensure accountability.
An additional concern relates to governance models. The Code reflects a predominantly state-led, administrative approach to environmental protection, with more limited roles for civil society and public interest litigation (9). When projected externally, this model may not fully align with participatory governance expectations in WIO countries, particularly in contexts where local communities are directly affected by large-scale projects.
A Strategic Signal for the Western Indian Ocean
China’s Environmental Code is both a significant legal milestone and a potent geopolitical instrument. It consolidates environmental governance domestically while projecting new forms of influence internationally. For the Western Indian Ocean, its significance lies less in its formal provisions than in its capacity to reshape environmental practices, partnerships, and governance dynamics.
The Code does not guarantee higher environmental standards in the region. Its ultimate impact will depend on rigorous implementation, consistent enforcement, and constructive interaction with diverse local regulatory frameworks. Yet, it undeniably alters the landscape, introducing new expectations, new mechanisms of influence, and new strategic considerations for environmental protection and sustainable development.
For Mauritius and its regional partners, the challenge is therefore not only to understand the Code but to engage with it proactively and strategically. By leveraging its provisions, strengthening domestic institutions, and fostering robust regional cooperation, WIO states can position themselves not as passive recipients of external norms, but as active participants in shaping the future of environmental governance and the blue economy in the Indian Ocean.
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Main photo: A scenic aerial view of wind turbines amidst misty hills in Jiangxi, China showcasing renewable energy. Jason Hu, Pexel.
